NARRATIONS ON BATTLE OF LONGEWALA AS EXPLAINED BY VARIOUS OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THIS BATTLE INCL THE CO OF 38 CAV (PAK ARMY)
AND A TRIBUTE TO BRIG KS CHANDPURI
Battle of Longewala (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the western sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan state in India. (CONTINUE READING MORE)
"A" company (reinforced) of the Indian Army's 23rd battalion, Punjab Regiment, commanded by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a mechanised infantry Pakistani force.[9] Choosing the former, Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly deployed, and made the most use of his strong defensive position, and weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was also fortunate in that an Air OP then Capt PS Sanga was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later during the day from Sadewala. The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their strategic intelligence to foresee availability of Indian strike aircraft in the Longewala area, exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance[citation needed]. This led to the Pakistani brigade group with two armoured Regiments being left extremely vulnerable to air attack, vehicles becoming bogged in terrain not suitable for the movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single track, these being more susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in tactical combat, attempting to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry being surprised by obstacles to troop movement causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness, when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire
FOR THIS DAY AS A TRIBUTE TO THE BRAVE HEARTS FROM ARMY AND AIR FORCE, WE HAVE COMPILED ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND NARRATIONS INCLUDING FROM ACROSS THE BORDER AND HAVE HOSTED THE SAME ON OUR BLOG SITE FOR OUR ESTEEMED READERS. LET US REMEMBER THOSE WHO FOUGHT AGAINST ALL ODDS.SHARE THIS POST WITH YOUR FRIENDS - PLEASE SEND THIS LINK TO THEM https://goo.gl/8JDHuU
Please read on further battle accounts given by Col PS Sangha , who was Air OP and directed the air for about 5 hours and Col Harcharan Singh who was in the ops room and had full knowledge of the events as they emerged.
Please read on further battle accounts given by Col PS Sangha , who was Air OP and directed the air for about 5 hours and Col Harcharan Singh who was in the ops room and had full knowledge of the events as they emerged.
In addition the narration on battle of Longewala will not be complete unless we hear the same from Pak side as well. We have an account of the entire battle by Brig ZA Khan who commanded an armoured Regt as part of the Brigade group on attack on Longewala.
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A TRIBUTE TO BRIGADIER KULDEEP SINGH CHANDPURI, MVC, VSM HERO OF LONGEWALA
Hardships and hard work are companions that build character, S Karam Singh decided to move the family from their rain dependent farming to canal irrigated fertile lands that he had invested in. In early 1938 the family left Village Chandpur Rorki (7 Kms from Garh Shankar on Noorpur Bedi road) for Chack 161/9L, Tehsil Hadappa in the Montgomery (now in Pakistan) district. S Karam singh had invested in 6 Morabas of fertile land. Life began afresh for this hard working family of Karam singh and his four brothers, Sant singh, Karam singh, Indar singh & Udham singh . Wattan singh lived in Motgomery town while the rest were at Chack 161.It was here that Kuldeep Singh was born on 22 Nov 1940, his two sisters followed. Things were beginning to look up, however, providence had other plans and Partition happened. A young seven year old saw murder, loot and rape from close quarters, till his mother, sisters and him were evacuated by the Army to Amritsar, where Col Assa Singh a family friend provided shelter. The male members of the family had to trudge back in different groups avoiding murdering marauders. The family reunited at Chandpur Rorki and set about stitching their lives together.
The loss of fertile agricultural base was partly compensated when some land of repatriated Muslims was allotted to the family at Village Saroya, Tehsil Balachaur, not far from Chandpur Rorki. As elders set about building life anew, young Kuldeep set about educating himself. Studies were enjoyable but football even more, but as lives were being built over again one had to help with chores in farming.It was a hard grind, school, followed by churning the fodder machine wheel and feeding the cattle. The young shoulders were strengthening under the weight of responsibilities. This is where young Kuldeep Singh grew up, studying, helping out on the farm and when time permitted playing Football that had caught his fancy.
After passing District Board High school, from Saroya, football took Kuldeep Singh to SGS Khalsa college, Mahilpur, which was considered a nursery of the game. The next leap based on football was to government college Hoshiarpur. While still undergoing graduation Kuldeep Singh became an under officer in NCC, participating in the Republic Day Parade of 1962 as part of the NCC contingent. Later the same year the Chinese invasion happened. Kuldeep singh's leaning towards an Army career found opposition from his mother.
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| MAP OF THE AREA |
The Indian Army was weighed down by the humiliation of the Chinese aggression, newer equipment was inducted and the entire focus was on training. For a young officer it was an ideal learning opportunity. Soon, the Indo-Pakistan September 1965 war happened and 3 Punjab was defending the Beas Bridge as the enemy armored thrust threatened to cut off a major chunk of Punjab. Being a reserve battalion 3 Punjab saw frequent changes in tasks and locations, all adding to the experience of Lt Chandpuri.
In Oct 1965, the Battalion moved to Poona (now Pune) for its UN Mission assignment UNIEF in Gaza for a year. An international assignment early in ones military career always helps widen ones perspective, so it did for Capt Chandpuri. On completion of the UN assignment 3 Punjab landed in Sunderbani (J&K), from where Capt Chandpuri proceeded on Platoon weapons course, returning with an instructor grading and Best student award.
On 10 Dec 1967 Capt Kuldeep singh Chandpuri married Ms Surinder Kaur whose father S Baldev Singh was a Dy Superintendent of Police in the Vigilance Department of Punjab Police. A stint as General staff officer Grade 3(GSO3) in Sikkim followed in 1968. A GSO3 being an operational appointment Capt Chandpuri learnt operational details from his association with Maj Gen Inder Gill, the General officer Commanding who had an exceptional war record.
In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector of the Thar Desert. 23 Punjab was then commanded by Lt Col Md Khurshid Hussain also of 3 Punjab, but not particularly fond of Chandpuri. Maj Chandpuri after his promotion was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) company, (Punjab Battalions have a mix of two Sikh & two Dogra Companies).
Soon Major Chandpuri , was detailed for a month long familiarization with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow. Maj Chandpuri diligently studied the terrain in detail going over from one sand dune to the other. After a sweat soaked month under the unbearable sun, Maj Chandpuri was sure of his bearings, little realizing that time and events were beckoning him to claim his glory. The Indo-Pak war of Dec 1971 was about to unfold.
In Oct 1965, the Battalion moved to Poona (now Pune) for its UN Mission assignment UNIEF in Gaza for a year. An international assignment early in ones military career always helps widen ones perspective, so it did for Capt Chandpuri. On completion of the UN assignment 3 Punjab landed in Sunderbani (J&K), from where Capt Chandpuri proceeded on Platoon weapons course, returning with an instructor grading and Best student award.
On 10 Dec 1967 Capt Kuldeep singh Chandpuri married Ms Surinder Kaur whose father S Baldev Singh was a Dy Superintendent of Police in the Vigilance Department of Punjab Police. A stint as General staff officer Grade 3(GSO3) in Sikkim followed in 1968. A GSO3 being an operational appointment Capt Chandpuri learnt operational details from his association with Maj Gen Inder Gill, the General officer Commanding who had an exceptional war record.In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector of the Thar Desert. 23 Punjab was then commanded by Lt Col Md Khurshid Hussain also of 3 Punjab, but not particularly fond of Chandpuri. Maj Chandpuri after his promotion was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) company, (Punjab Battalions have a mix of two Sikh & two Dogra Companies).
Soon Major Chandpuri , was detailed for a month long familiarization with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow. Maj Chandpuri diligently studied the terrain in detail going over from one sand dune to the other. After a sweat soaked month under the unbearable sun, Maj Chandpuri was sure of his bearings, little realizing that time and events were beckoning him to claim his glory. The Indo-Pak war of Dec 1971 was about to unfold.
Anticipating the war, 23 Punjab had occupied its battle positions, Major Chandpuri's Alfa Company was defending the Logewala sweet water position, while the remaining Battalion was occupying a Battalion defended area at Sadewala. The remaining brigade was to Tanot. The Longewala position was reasonably well fortified with anti-Tank mines laid by the Pioneer section largely towards the South West . The only wire fence that circumvented the position was basically laid to keep out the wild camels that came sniffing for water. This wire was to later prove the undoing of the attackers.
A section each of 81 MM Mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches the Sikhs were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, sure enough on 03 Dec 1971 air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, who was keeping tabs of the enemy reported large columns of tanks and Infantry moving towards Longewala.
Maj Chandpuri collected his men spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and the Gurus blessings, urging them to hold fast at all costs. "Loon day mull chakon da wayla agaya" (time to repay the Nation is upon us) he said. A series of Jaikars "Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sari Akal" reverberated amongst the vast expanse of the dunes. Maj Chandpuri realized that his motivational tirade had hit home. The battle that unfolded is well documented and gave Sunny Deol's flagging career a great thrust. (Today when people use Sunny Deol's name to recall Maj Chandpuri, it hurts us soldiers).
The crux was holding fast despite the overwhelming enemy tank's, artillery bombardment and infantry attacks. It needed grit and faith, both amply displayed by Maj Chandpuri. The morning after saw the Indian Air Force decimate the Pakistani tanks. It was the grit of Maj Chandpuri, his motivational skills his faith in God and his men that the battle ended the way it did. The strand of wire that had kept the camels away also kept the Pakistani's at bay! The Maha Vir Chakra awarded to Maj KS Chandpuri was an apt recognition of his valour & professionalism.
A section each of 81 MM Mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches the Sikhs were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, sure enough on 03 Dec 1971 air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, who was keeping tabs of the enemy reported large columns of tanks and Infantry moving towards Longewala.Maj Chandpuri collected his men spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and the Gurus blessings, urging them to hold fast at all costs. "Loon day mull chakon da wayla agaya" (time to repay the Nation is upon us) he said. A series of Jaikars "Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sari Akal" reverberated amongst the vast expanse of the dunes. Maj Chandpuri realized that his motivational tirade had hit home. The battle that unfolded is well documented and gave Sunny Deol's flagging career a great thrust. (Today when people use Sunny Deol's name to recall Maj Chandpuri, it hurts us soldiers).
The crux was holding fast despite the overwhelming enemy tank's, artillery bombardment and infantry attacks. It needed grit and faith, both amply displayed by Maj Chandpuri. The morning after saw the Indian Air Force decimate the Pakistani tanks. It was the grit of Maj Chandpuri, his motivational skills his faith in God and his men that the battle ended the way it did. The strand of wire that had kept the camels away also kept the Pakistani's at bay! The Maha Vir Chakra awarded to Maj KS Chandpuri was an apt recognition of his valour & professionalism.
As Col Chandpuri progressed in life, successfully commanding his Battalion, as Brigadier commanded 100 Brigade and the Punjab Regimental Centre, besides other staff appointments. In his entire military career his earthy and simple ways came to the fore. A son of the soil he remained a teetotaler and vegetarian all his life, simple of habit and strong of character was Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri , MVC.His dedicated services were recognized by the Nation by way of the award of Vashisht Seva Medal. By now he had established his credentials in the Track and Field and was a listed IOA judge, frequently called upon to lend his services at international meets. His ability for hard work and constantly learn were not diminished by age.
Post retirement Brig Chandpuri , MVC, VSM worked with Godrej & Boyce as their Security advisor for many years. He was on the board of directors of the PESCO and a nominated member in the UT council. In all the appointments his sincerity, simplicity and earthiness endeared him to all whose lives he touched.
On 17 Nov 2018, just five days short of his 78Th Birthday Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM breathed his last. His passing is a loss to the entire soldier's brotherhood and those whose lives he touched however fleetingly.
Soldiers may fade away, but their valour lives forever. Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM Amar Rahain and may the noble soul rest in the heaven above till eternity !!
Soldiers may fade away, but their valour lives forever. Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM Amar Rahain and may the noble soul rest in the heaven above till eternity !!
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TIMES OF INDIA REPORTS- 1971 India-Pakistan war hero Brig Chandpuri dead.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/1971-india-pakistan-war-hero-brig-chandpuri-dead/articlesho/66664353.cms?utm_campaign=andapp&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=native_share_tray
I am deeply grieved to learn the sad news, that the Great Son Of India in no more among us. During my tenure as GSO2(OPS) of Jodhpur Desert Division in 1980-82 (Olden days, when Div HQ rather the entire Div had only one Full Colonel as the ADMS and we wore Khaki Uniforms, probably to fool Pakistani Observers from across the borders), I had very intimate contact with Brig KS Chandpuri, we used to invite him to Jodhpur very often during the visits of VVIPs which included the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi to Pokharan blast site and Longewala. My job took me to Longewala in-numerable times with Brig Chandpuri, to commence the briefing after GOC's initial introduction, giving broader picture of 1971 ops in the theater a. The entire briefing incl each and every Dhora opposite Longewala, We did this many times and I could then simply rattle out extempore. Thanks to this Great Hero, the Brave Son Of Soil, who took me to every spot from where his RCL took on paki tanks during the night and how the low wire fence laid to ward off the wild animals proved to be a boon for them which posed a picture of large mine field for the advancing columns of Pakistan Army.His emotional oration of the night ordeal when PAK tanks in large numbers just appeared opposite him tingles fresh in my ears. What a man in uniform he has been in true tradition of his Fauji family genes. We were in touch for a long period and had developed closeness.
God bless his soul, A brave leader and commander, My salute to you Sir,
Brig NK Dhand.
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| LONGEWALA MEMORIAL SO ESTABLISHED AT THE BATTLE SITE BY 12 CORPS WHICH INCLS THE RCL JEEP USED BY THEN MAJ CHANDPURI , HAWK HUNTER AIRCRAFT AND THE CAPTURED PAKISTANI TANKS. |
OPEN STREET VIEW LONGEWALA MEMORIAL
CLICK - https://goo.gl/maps/5ap3hP5LDc72
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NOTE :- By anonymous
1971 was a debacle for Southern Command operations, The tank assault to Longewala- Ramgarh and Jaisalmer by PAK checkmated the pending Divisional assault planned towards R.Y.Khan from Kishangarh
The Armoured assault by PAK, one can say, by sheer divine intervention, halted since some of their tanks got bellied in soft sand while skirting and out flanking Longewala position through the narrow inter-dunal spaces. They lacked logistics and air support.
The only RCL with the Longewala company was ordered to be withdrawn the previous day but could not leave for Tanote for some reasons, as such saved the situation at Longewala during the night from being run over and churned by Pakistsni Tanks in direct assault to get on to the road at Longewala on way to Ramgarh..Some - odd through-some one relayed radio communication worked and Hunters from Jaisalmer took on the tanks in early hours of the morning. They had good range and target practice since Paki Air wasn't there to support the armoured columns.
Pak logistics to support the attacking columns which were mostly B-Vehicle based could not fetch up in time due to sandy track from border to Longewala.
Had Paki succeeded in out-skirting Longewala they would have had a free run to Jaisalmer. Fortunately for us they had miscalculated the softness of sand dunes in the LW area which is so even today.
In Chandpuris words "Utte Rabb Haiga" (There is God up there).
Pakistan Army outsmarted Southern Command in all it's measures, in making their plans ans preparations for offensive against Rahim Yar Khan, To sum up God saved the Situation for India,
There were only two MVCs (No PVCs) awarded in Southern Command, Maharaja Col Bhawani Singh who died in 2015 for Para Cdo Ops towards Munnabao and Chandpuri for sticking to the loc against severe odds and being out numbered.
: END OF AN ERA.. with Brig Chandpuri's demise.
REST IN PEACE THE BRAVEST OF BRAVES SON OF INDIA.
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War diaries are written much after the war ends describing situations that suit , hiding incompetence and failures ...
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NARRATION BY BRIG. E. N. RAMADOSS (RETD.) AVSM, SM
BRIGADE COMMANDER AT THE BATTLE OF LAUNGEWALA
Wrote sometimes after the operations, as his son describes :-
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| FORT KISHANGARH |
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| MAP OF THE AREA OF OPS |
I requested General Khambhata to allot me all the available air support at first light, due to the disparate relative strengths of four Indian AMX tanks against estimated 30 tanks of Pakistan (which turned out later to be 48 T-59 and 12 Sherman Mk V American tanks). The troops were ordered back from the road where they were waiting for transport from the previous night to reopen their defences. One company of 17 RAJRIF was to proceed with the troop of tanks to reinforce LAUNGEWALA and the remainder of 17 RAJRIF was to build up on LAUNGEWALA later as per the situation. One company of 6/5 GR was to provide a screen two kms ahead of our own defences at SADEWALA.
When the leading tanks of the Pakistani force reached about a km South-West of LAUNGEWALA Post on the road to GHOTARU at about 0515 hours, Maj. Chandpuri informed my Brigade Major, Maj. Bhandari (now Col. (Retd.)) and ordered his recoil less guns to open fire. No tank was hit. In return, the Pakistani troop knocked every structure at the post to rubble (Temple escaped) and set fire to a large stack of fodder for camels. This silenced 'A' company completely. The left platoon fell back from their positions, leaving Maj. Chandpuri with just his company HQ personnel and one platoon on the post. Surprisingly the Pakistani armour did not press the attack.
Actually there was no physical assault on the Post by enemy tanks or infantry. This was confirmed later by a Pakistani Bangladeshi Officer who was with the leading Pakistani infantry battalion and escaped to our side after the cease fire. There was no dead body or crippled tank within 400 meters of the Post.
Our fighter planes, Hunters, flew over at telescopic first light at 0730 hours and reported there were no tanks visible. I realised the pilots were new to the desert, asked them to hang on over the target area and requested our Division HQ to send up Maj. Atma Singh, our Air OP Flight Commander, to direct the fighters on to enemy tanks. Then the Air Force had a merry day; with Maj. Atma Singh and Capt. Sangha directing the planes alternately, knocked out 23 tanks (19 T-59 and 4 Shermans) during 5th and 6th Dec 1971. It was confirmed later that there had been no recoil-less gun hit on any of those enemy tanks. Our fighters dared to come singly even, once they realised there was no enemy air cover to their armoured thrust in the open desert. Two Pakistani Starfighters straffed my Brigade Column towards Border Pillar 635 on the afternoon of 8th Dec 1971, the only air attack during the whole operation. Their absence for three days is quite inexplicable. Had they been there on 5th Dec 1971, our Hunters would have been seen off.
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| TANOTE MATA MANDIR AS OF TODAY |
Lt. Col. A. S. Grewal of 17 RAJ RIF and I had been on the road LAUNGEWALA-SADEWALA two kms short of the Laungewala helipad from 0900 hours onwards behind 'A' Company 17 RAJ RIF who did the link up. At 0915 hours our leading AMX tank was hit by one enemy T-59 which had come upto the helipad. Our tank blew up along with the its crew of three but had also hit the enemy tank which was abandoned by the crew, leaving the gunner dead inside. At 1300 hours Maj. Atma Singh force landed on the helipad near the abandoned T-59, picked up the maps from inside the tank, reported to my HQ at 1500 hours and said that the enemy tank seemed to be a running one. My Staff Officer, Capt. Ramesh Khatri drove it back to my HQ at 1700 hours. This was the only running Pakistani tank captured in the whole operation. The shell from our AMX tank had hit the side of the main armament, ricocheted into the hull and killed the gunner whom we buried in our HQ at SADEWALA.
The 6th Independent Armoured Squadron (14 brand new T-55 tanks) under Maj. R. D. Law, VrC rushed back on tracks from KISHANGARH and arrived at LAUNGEWALA helipad area at 1300 hours restoring our morale.
Lt. Gen. Eric Vaz used to start his lecture on 1971 operations that "Two factors favoured our actions during the war GOD and LUCK". We had plenty of both at LAUNGEWALA on 5th Dec 1971.
The above is my father's report on the Longewala battle. He was Brig Cdr. 30 Brigade. Incidentally I met Maj Chandpuri at Longewala on 24th Dec 71 when on leave from NDA.
Son of Brig EN Ramadoss
Son of Brig EN Ramadoss
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War diaries are written much after the war ends describing situations that suit , hiding incompetence and failures ...
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BATTLE ACCOUNTS BY OFFICERS WHO ACTUALLY
TOOK ART IN THESE OPERATIONS
NOTE - These Audio Video narrations have been extracted from a Webinar conducted by Rashtrya Raksha University , Lavad in the public domain and are placed here with due permission from the participating officers
Col PIRTHI SINGH SANGHA Vr C , ARTY- Col Sangha then a Capt was part of the Air OP flight which had been allotted to 12 Inf Div for their operations for offensive across the border. The flight was commanded by then Maj Atma Singh who came to the flight on the 5th Dec 1971 to inform his flight that the tables have been turned and now the air OP has to do a different job altogether :- Let us listen to Col Sangha in his own words..
He remained in the OPs Room of the Bde HQ throughout the 1971 ops as such was intimately connected with the information that was being exchanged with the three Battalions and the Div HQ by the Brigade. He gave a detailed narration of the ground battle as it happened during the night of 04/05 Dec 1971 and during the day of 05 Dec 1971 during the seminar. It was a pleasure to hear his briefing during the said Webinar. I have obtained his OK to place his briefing here for the information of our readers as under :-
Air Marshal Minnie Bawa was the Air Officer Commanding of the Jaisalmer Air Force Station in 1971. Let us hear him how he tackled the Air Effort in defeating the Pak armoured attack on Longewala.:-
Air Marshal Jagjit was the Hiunter Squadron Commander deployed at Jaisalmer Air Force Station and managed sortie after sortie on 5th dec 1971. Let us hear him describe his role.
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VIDEO _ LONGEWALA AIR BATTLE
OTHER VIDEOS ON YOU TUBE
(a) https://youtu.be/bVWY6aUpY90 - AIR BATTLE - LONGEWALA
(b) https://youtu.be/Y2rh8Qn-iwE -- HUNTERS AT DAWN PART - 1
(c) https://youtu.be/Y2rh8Qn-iwE -- HUNTERS AT DAWN PART - 2
(d) https://youtu.be/BzFsV2IKHtY - BATTLE OF LONGEWALA -1971
(e) https://youtu.be/CW7XvIaLBE4 - BRIG CHANDPURI TALKS ON LONGEWALA.
(f) https://youtu.be/hoqxNsirWAA - The story behind 1971 Indo-Pakistan war
(g)
(h) https://youtu.be/lh7hsGt3QsE - BORDER HINDI FILM - 1997
(j) https://youtu.be/8M6Aqcff0_0 - Flights of Glory Battle of Longewala I/2
(k) https://youtu.be/HsYVKVu-lKI - Flights of Glory Battle of Longewala 2/2
(l) https://youtu.be/z5-KDljeGnU - 125 Indian Army Jawans Defeated 2000 Pakistanis at Longewala
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FROM PAK SIDE
THE BATTLE OF LONGEWALA
PAKISTAN ARMY'S VERSION
Pak Stretegy - The president of Pakistan General Yahya Khan's policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and that since East Pakistan was un-defendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's "overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive".[citation needed] The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions.
To support Khan's troops, the PAF had launched pre-emptive strikes on the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities. In the western theatre, the town of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border, formed a critical communication centre for Khan's forces and, situated on the Sindh — Punjab railway, remained a vulnerable link in Khan's logistics. The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab, starving Khan's forces of fuel and ammunition delivered to Karachi.
Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with the 12th Indian division towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim Yar Khan, which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab, but also in the Jammu & Kashmir Sector, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.[15]
Pakistan, which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a pre-emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh.[15] Pakistani intelligence was able to infiltrate the operations area posing as local people and pass on information. However, these sources failed to pass on information on the Longewala post which, originally a BSF post, was now held by a company of the Punjab Regiment. Longewala formed a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front.
Pak Tactical plan - Pakistan's tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan's 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border. A Combined Arms Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala, a junction on the Indian road system and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Cavalry (Pakistan Army Armoured Corps) to operate beyond Longewala to capture Jaisalmer.[16]
The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer. The plan was far-fetched from the start, if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance, and the armoured troops were therefore unaware of the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective. As the day unfolded, Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest losses in a battle for Pakistan despite overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle, largely due to the vehicles becoming bogged down in soft sand.
BRIEF ON ATTACK ON LONGEWALA
BRIG ZA KHAN - PAK ARMY
(As Stated by Brig Z A Khan (Ex CO of 38 CAV – Pak Army) in an Interview in Jan 2002)
Please tell us in detail about the Longewala Operation of 1971?
While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division Headquarters were located. There the GOC Major General B. M. Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lieutenant Colonel Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Colonel Wajid Ali Shah present.
The general planned to defensively hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmir; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmir; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view.
Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmir had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be discussed with anyone.
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| JAISALMER SECTOR - 12 INF DIV |
In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan. A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Marshal Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support.
A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited. I considered the operation, Jaisalmir was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti, I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines, the GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements.
The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border, Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border without telling them that that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming operations.
About the middle of November the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad.
With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmir and neutralise the airfield. I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the division headquarters there was no preparations for the very imminent operations, on 1 December Colonel Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters.
On 2nd December I received orders to report to the division headquarters and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade upto Loganewala and proceed to Jaisalmir to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the division orders but to organise my force.
I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out, I next went to the AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol, the AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available, after a discussion with the colonel staff the AA&QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.
When the 18 Division ‘O’ group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander informed the ‘O’ Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to cancel or postpone the operation, the GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air, after the discussion he informed the ‘O’ Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the ‘national interest’. The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the ‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because if did not he would be labelled as a general who had lost his nerve.
The plan made by Major General B. M. Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty mile to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations) and 22 Cavalry, by passing Loganewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan. I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metal road to Jaisalmir, 20 miles inside India was reached and then continue to Jaisalmir. 206 Brigade leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions) was to follow my force and secure Loganewala to form a firm base.
After these orders were issued the 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmir with mechanically unsound tanks, the GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch the divisional Reconnaissance and Support Battalion less company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade. I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December.
The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, a total march of 120 miles in one night.
On the evening of 2 December I went to the 51 Brigade Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed was already there, he told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve, a little later the brigade commander came to the tent where the ‘O’ Group had assembled, he appeared shaken. The GSO 3 laid out the maps of the operational area, the maps covered our territory, Indian territory was blank squares, the brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the division headquarters. I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table.
From the ensuing discussion it became apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11 whereas it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Loganewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Loganewal and by passing Loganewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Loganewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade; no one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan.
When the ‘O’ Group dispersed the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border.
On 3 December at 38 Cavalry tanks were to move on tracks for 25 miles and entrain at Sadiqabad and arrived at Reti railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours. I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train, I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railway about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and after a lot of shouting and threatening the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line, there was no ‘power’ available at Reti, we were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through, I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train. At about nine o’clock the tank train with 14 tanks whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters arrived and were unloaded.
We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule, from Reti the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank, at Khenju my second in command Major Zia Uddin Javed was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border, thirteen out of fourteen tanks arriving at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived. At 0400 hours the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On the 4 December the Indian Air Force did not show up.
On checking up I found that the lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki, I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion 6x6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down, it was a few miles from Khenju, the Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju that put an end to my engine replacement plan.
During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders the attack on the Jaisalmir airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.
At about 2100 hours six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit, 22 Cavalry was refuelling; Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Loganewala, I met Brigadier Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Loganewal. At about 2300 hours 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.
The operation so far was a movement of fiasco, civilian requisitioned 4x2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand, 20 FF, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert.
At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal with the reconnaissance troop to lead followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain. About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared, I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire). Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles and four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Loganewala, luckily on the highest ridge in the area.
At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Loganewala and columns of smoke started rising, I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my rover and from a ridge overlooking the Loganwala-Jaisalmir metal road we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and Indian tank burning, four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets etc they flew away. A little later a helicopter took off, later I learnt that the GOC had come to 51 Brigade as it was out of communications with the division headquarters and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed to capture Loganewala.
I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade headquarters, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know, I then drove to the base of the hill on which Loganwala was located, two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack.
22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Loganewala defences at about 0200 hours, in the absence of the brigade commander 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Loganewala before advancing to Ramgarh. At 0700 hours a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks, one AMX was knocked out then 6 Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out 5 tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to straffing. Half an hour later 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours 22 Cavalry formed up again but after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Loganewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmir. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade headquarters re-opening the Indian communications to Loganewala. In subsequent air attacks 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Loganewala from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7 mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres.
After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry I returned to where my tanks were, there I found Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, I told him of the affairs at Loganelwala and he asked me to accompany him to Loganewala. We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Loganewala.
While we were at the 51 Brigade headquarters a helicopter, flown by Captain ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, later lieutenant general, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Loganewal and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmir; on receiving the orders Brig Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for brigade to attack.
While we were witnessing the brigade commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders, Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brigadier Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench, there we discussed what we had seen and I told Brigadier Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier; he hesitated and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.
After the Indian aircraft departed Brigadier Jahanzeb informed Brigadier Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Loganwala and he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Shah, the CO 28 Baluch, the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Loganewala-Jaisalmir and capture Ghotaru. The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road.
Brigadier Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped, his brigade had concentrated there; he made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December, he gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brigadier Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the “FUP” and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack. I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours, I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and explained the plan, he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade headquarter and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it; at about 1900 hours the brigade started moving back.
The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped, Brigadier Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge, at about 1130 hours the next day the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry. The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position.
Later the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the division headquarters at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order, I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other, the GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion. My motive in making the suggestion was to recover my broken down tanks lying between Kharo Tar and Gabbar and asked the GOC for recovery assistance, he arranged for WAPDA tractors which towed back most of the tanks.
While driving to the divisional headquarters I found the divisional Supply and Transport Battalion vehicles abandoned on the track on which the division had advanced, I ordered my driver to check the state of a vehicle and found that radiators had been drained and when my driver got into the driving compartment the driver of the vehicle came running, he was hiding in a bush.
By the morning of 7 December 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar, my Quartermaster, Captain Bhatti, kept us supplied with food “meethi roti” and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad.
38 Cavalry squadron left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan.
The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation, I told him I would see what the problem was. I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade Headquarters to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break; my signal JCO could not find the reason; after the ceasefire an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division headquarters, switched off.
On the night 8/9 December 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade, 38 Cavalry after firing all the HE ammunition destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit. On 9 December after taking over the front, Brigadier Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade, 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank; the two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.
A little distance from my regimental headquarters the divisional gun area was located, the IAF attacked gun area and my headquarters, a cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School which fired single shots but kept the IAF away.
On the night 11/12 December the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar, on the morning of 12 December when I with my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ were, I found Major General B. M. Mustafa standing there, someone whispered that the general had been sacked and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.
I met the general and asked his GSO 2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were, the general heard me and indicating the GSO 2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day ordered a ‘general withdrawal’, both brigades took off in the ‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.
On the night 12/13 December I established my headquarters at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone’s surprise, we ceased fire.
After the operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation. The mission assigned to 18 Division was “Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission. It was a classical spoiling attack which put the Indians off balance, the division’s mission was achieved.
If your allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task?
Because the GOC Major General Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal to be disclosed to the Awan Committee.
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LET US GET BACK TO INDIAN SIDE NOW--------->>>>
** FEW POST SCRIPTS **
1. THE 1971 BATTLE OF LONGEWALA: A NIGHT OF CONFUSION, SAM MANEKSHAW’S ORDER, PAKISTAN’S FOLLY
For several months before the battle, Army had been rehearsing breaking through Pakistani defences. The shortfall in vehicles, equipment & manpower was made-up.
By Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah - 3 Dec, 2019
The 1971 Battle of Longewala
A group of eight Army veterans and four wives of soldiers posted in 185 Light regiment (Camel Pack) visited the battlefield of Longewala on 23 November where my regiment had fought a pitched battle in the 1971 India-Pakistan war from 3-6 December. It was a trip down memory lane after almost half a century. We visited the Longewala post and the gun positions we had occupied to provide fire support to the beleaguered post commanded by Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his exceptional leadership.
The Battle of Longewala is etched in our memories courtesy of J.P. Dutta’s 1997 film Border that romanticised the battle, highlighting the heroic actions of Major Chandpuri and the Indian Air Force ‘Hunters’ destroying the Pakistani tanks.
Also read: Before Balakot, a pilot-navigator duo of IAF’s bomber fleet showed up Pakistan in 1971 war
Sam Manekshaw’s charisma :-
In late October 1971, several hundred officers, including me, of the Battle Axe Division, were seated on tarpaulin sheets on the desert sands in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer sector awaiting the address of then-Chief of Army Staff General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw. There was a table covered with a blanket, chair and a microphone set up in front. We heard his helicopter land. He breezed in, brushed aside the microphone, climbed on the table and stood facing us with his hands on his hips. His address was short and crisp: “Boys, I am sending you across. Victory must be ensured. I want you to remember three things. First, prisoners of war will not be ill-treated, second, there will be no plunder or booty hunting, and lastly keep away from the begums (Pakistani women).”
He jumped off the table, had a cup of tea with us in an enamel mug, standard Army issue, and flew off. His speech was succinct and left no doubts in our minds. He was not verbose. Sam Manekshaw’s address had us spellbound. He had incomparable charisma which is a strange alchemy of inner spirit, energy, fire, radiance, enthusiasm and spontaneity. It was a spark that ignited the fire within us.
The “Cold Start”
For several months, we had been rehearsing our role of breaking through the Pakistani defences with our objective being the town of Rahim Yar Khan, a rail and road communication centre in Pakistan. Our shortfall in vehicles, equipment and manpower was made-up. We began receiving new vehicles, reservists and ammunition, the markings on which we could not decipher. They were in Hebrew. Our camels had been replaced by vehicles as camels in modern warfare were an incongruity. It would have taken take us seven days of hard riding to travel from our location in Bikaner, where we were stabled, to our operational location in Jaisalmer. So much for ‘Cold Start’.
Our Commanding General, Major General J.F.R. Jacob, in 1968, was a great exponent of mobile warfare and dis-favoured this medieval mode of transport. Once, after I had given him a demonstration of Camel-Mounted Artillery, in order to impress him, he asked me if there was any terrain which modern mechanical transport could not traverse. I told him there were several impenetrable dunes. He challenged me to find one where his jeep, fitted with ‘balloon’ tyres, could not traverse. I did so and on the appointed day, Majoral General Jacob, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, drove over the sand dune we had selected. That episode sounded the death knell for the camel regiment and we were ordered to shed them to the Border Security Force (BSF). We got gun-towing vehicles instead, much to the dismay and sorrow of our Rajasthani troops.
Pakistan’s surprise
One battery of the 170 Field Regiment, which I subsequently commanded, was deployed at Sadhewala to provide fire support to 23 PUNJAB that had company at Longewala, sans artillery support. This post had been established to check any outflanking attack by Pakistan during the Battle Axe Division’s thrust to Rahim Yar Khan (RYK) planned for 4 December 1971. RYK was our objective in the desert. We had to traverse rugged and inhospitable terrain.
The Sadhewala and Longewala posts protected the western flanks of the division. We also did not expect the Pakistanis to take the approach via Longewala. But they surprised us by taking it and surrounded our post on the night of 3/4 December 1971. This had been preceded by massive preemptive strikes on our airfields in the west, including Jodhpur. Our ammunition replenishment column was on its way from Jodhpur that night and reached us with great difficulty.
The night of massive confusion
The Battle Axe Division was concentrated further east at Tanot, preparing for a divisional thrust on 4 December 1971. The Pakistani armour, comprising Chinese Type 59 tanks of 22 Armoured Regiment, surrounded the Longewala post. The Pakistani armour had overshot its infantry elements, a cardinal error in warfare, and paused awaiting their arrival. They were also, probably, inhibited by the wire fence which they mistook as markers of a minefield. It was really meant to keep out dogs and stray cattle.
The post commander, Major Chandpuri kept his nerve and so did his commanding officer, Lt Col Khursheed Hussain at Sadhewala. Unfortunately, the movie Border depicted the latter in ambivalent light, probably to add grist to the mill and to project Indian Muslim soldiers in poor light. This was unfair and challenged by our armed forces personnel, who were in the know of actualities.
There was massive confusion on the night of ¾ December 1971. We were asked to veer west from our assembly area north of Tanot and head for Longewala. The single arterial road was clogged and we were sitting ducks for the Pakistani Air Force. We called in our Air Force at dawn on 4 December 1971. We saw our ‘Hunter’ aircraft dive and play merry hell with the Pakistani armour, the bulk of which was decimated. 34 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned.
The artillery battery at Sadhewala was rushed and deployed to support Longewala. Major Chandpuri, not well-versed in artillery terminology, thus carried out the correction of artillery fire in Punjabi: “Reference Longewala Khu, Gole Barsa” and “400 sajje”, “200 khabbe”. The Artillery Officer Capt Santosh Datta reached the post at dawn on 4 December and subsequently controlled the fire. I moved with the remaining Regiment and deployed in support of the post by noon.
Pakistan’s plan foiled
We seized five field guns and three anti-aircraft guns. The burning tanks eerily lit the night sky. Every artillery piece in range brought down a barrage of fire and contributed significantly to the defence of Longewala. Had it not been for the Indian Air Force, our armour of obsolescent AMX-13 tanks — buttressed by a few Russian T-54 tanks — would have been no match for the Pakistani Armour.
The Pakistani plan was bold and audacious. They planned to outflank us and head for Jaisalmer, their objective. They, however, made the cardinal error, in execution, by allowing their armour to overshoot the Infantry and not allocating enough air resources for their thrust to Longewala.
The destruction of the Pakistani armoured regiment gave us respite and it took another two days for us to stabilise the situation. The Pakistani divisional commander, 18 Infantry division, was reportedly sacked. According to military tradition, the Commander on the spot gets credit for victory but must also bear the ignominy of defeat.
About the Author - Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah PVSM, SM, VSM (retired) is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff and the former Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University. Views are personal.
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2. Col Maxie Dhillon wrote ;-
Hi Narinder ,
Read your blog along with the narrative of the guys ours & the enemy. Generally all the details are factually correct.
I was not there in this area during the actual ops but we were inducted there after the Ceasefire to replace 20L who were withdrawn to convert to Vijayants. We were already equipped with Vijayants. I am familiar with that area from Jaisalmer to Kishangarh, Rahimyar Khan Axis, Ghataru, Ramgarh, Ghantaili. Tanot, Longewala, BP 635 onto Masit waro ka tar , 25 km in Pak territory. I was based at Ghantiali with the RHQ as Adjutant of the Regiment, with the 3 Sabre Sqns deployed fwd on the 3 axis. Remained there till July 72 when we were de-inducted. I am very familiar with the terrain & operated there for 6 months. Those days it was only loose high sand dunes with no vegetation except dry brush twisted wood.
Went to the area about 4/5 yrs back on nostalgic trip upto Ghantiali The whole area has under gone avast change…
When we reached that location (after a month or so in January) I myself counted 31 tanks ( 6 in the bowl & the top of the sand dunes at Longewala). Only 2 tks were holed by rocket fire. Remainder tanks had been abandoned/ caught fire as these were carrying fuel in spare barrels on the engine deck. Also counted all kinds of assorted vehicles lined up line ahead on the desert track for about 4 to 5 kms from the BP & this incl the Bty of L 60 AD guns .
The reasons of our victory are well summarised by Bully Sangha (26 NDA Course Bravo Sqn who is a good friend of mine) It was a screw up & incompetency by the Pakis at every level.
Our stay there for 6 months specially after Mar upto July was hell & we lived amongst sand vipers, scorpions, heat, Kali & grey sandstorms for days together Day & Ni was hellish. For some days there was no breeze and the sun bearing down relentlessly, the sand flies stinging, it was in simple words hellish. Writing now on our stay there after 50 years brings back memories.
Your pictures of the memorial now constructed at Tanot & Longewala makes it look like a habitable place -a far cry from the place I habitated once, half a century ago, when it was just a X- rd surrounded by 4 sand dunes without a blade of grass.
Thanks
MAXIE
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COMING TO THE AREA OF 11 INF DIVISION IN THE SAME SECTOR
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OTHER RETALIATRY OPERATIONS IN THE SECTOR
RAID ON CHACHRO BY - 10 PARA COMMANDOS (INDIAN ARMY)
RAID ON CHACHRO BY - 10 PARA COMMANDOS (INDIAN ARMY)
Well done job by 10 Pars Commandos.
THE CHACHRO RAID OF 1971
BY DEFENCE NEWS INDIA STAFF ON JUNE 9, 2017
On 7 Dec 1971; Team of 10 Para (SF) carried out daring raid on Chachro Town, 80 Km deep inside Pakistan.It was an important communication centre inside enemy territory.In resounding success large number of enemy soldiers, material, weapons and ammunition was destroyed.
Elite Commando troops of the Parachute regiment raided on Chachro on the night of December 5th. The Unit was based at Sarupkatala, south west of Barmer town. By the day light, the commandos neutralized all threats and cleared the enemy from Chachro. It was discovered that a major chunk of the Pakistani force had escaped earlier. However 17 prisoners and a huge number of small arms were captured. After that one group proceeded to raid the town of Virawah.
By evening Virawah was taken over. Actually this was the biggest territorial conquest in terms of territory. The whole area of about 3600sq. kilometers remained under the control of Indian Army till 22nd December 1972.
Operation Details:
At 0700 hours, December 5, 1971, men of the Desert Scorpions (10 Para Commandos) come under intense medium machine gun (MMG) fire from gun positions on top of sand dunes at Kita about 70 km into enemy territory. The Jeep/Jonga-borne commandos take defence positions in the shadow of the night. As they look for options, one Jeep rushes towards the enemy without a care for personal safety, firing at the enemy position. Naik Nihal Singh has opened up his light machine gun (LMG) mounted on his Jeep. The darkness acts as cover, the enemy only has the machine gun burst to aim at. This audacious charge gives the other teams time to start firing — 18 LMGs open up and in a few hours, the enemy positions are overrun, the survivors abandon the posts and escape.
This was the start to one of the most audacious commando missions in the world undertaken by the Indian Army's Para Commandos. Inspired by the British SAS raid behind enemy lines at a German airfield in Fuka, Lybia during the Second World War, this successful operation established the Indian Army's dominance in the desert during the 1971 war.
This operation was led by Lt Col Bhawani Singh. For four days, the battalion infiltrated deep inside enemy territory and carried out raids on enemy positions at Chachro and Virwah. Lt Col Bhawani Singh was awarded the Mahavir Chakra for his leadership and courage.
Objectives of the Commando Team
Two teams — Alpha and Charlie — were trained for five months in desert warfare. A young commando battalion was entrusted with the crucial mission just five years after its formation in 1967. The objectives were to strike enemy positions 80 km inside their territory, hit their supply lines and create confusion. To complete their mission, the teams travelled over 500 km inside enemy territory, hitting various enemy positions despite having little knowledge of the terrain and the challenges that lay ahead.
"Ginger up the enemy" was the theme used by Lt Col Bhawani Singh. who rose to be a brigadier and one of the most decorated officers in the Indian Army. He was the first to be called after retirement to boost the morale of his unit in Sri Lanka.
Target 1: Battle of Chachro
The team moved slowly through inhospitable terrain only by night. Brigadier Abraham Chacko was a Second Lieutenant then assigned to the Alpha team, the strike team that hit the Wing headquarters of the Pakistani Rangers in Chachro. Their mission — to create chaos and take vital ascents 80 km into enemy territory.
"The route was so bad that all silencers of our Jeeps/Jongas made us sound like a full-tank battalion moving into Pakistan," remembers Brigadier Chacko. The racket not a positive for commando raid, which relies on stealth and silence. This, however, came out as an advantage for this group as the enemy abandoned positions at several locations thinking that this was indeed a tank column moving.
After the Kita firefight, a small patrol was tasked with route clearance till the wing headquarters at Chachro. This team moved in the night and gave a clearance to attack at 0400 hours on December 7. Alpha team took positions around town blocking every exit point, ready to provide cover fire. Charlie team moved in for the offensive at dawn. The operation was a risky one as the town had many civilians. The fear of collateral damage kept the teams on their toes. They could not risk hostile civilians so deep into enemy territory.. The teams moved in swiftly and by first light the town had been taken.
The commandos moved on, their mission was only half complete. The town was handed over to 20 Rajput which counted 17 Pakistani casualties and took 12 prisoners. Such was the planning that the raiding team suffered no casualties. After the Chachro operation, Charlie team exfiltrated while the Alpha team moved towards its second target.
Target 2 & 3: Virawah and Nagarparkar
For the first raid on Chachro, the team moved only at night to stay undetected, but during the Virawah raid, they moved by day because of paucity of time. This was done at high risk. The team started its assault on Virawah at 0200 hours on December 8. The first contact with the enemy was at an observation post at 0130 hours. "I signalled the Jongas to stop when we noticed movement in the bushes about 25 yards away. A small patrol led by me was formed. Closer to the observation post, I lobbed the grenade and charged. We got into hand to hand combat with the enemy," remembers Col MPS Choudhary, who led one group of commandos in the attack. As they approached the Rangers camp, the latter fired in panic but in the opposite direction. The commandos opened up the camp with motor fire followed by 12 light machine guns. The assault did not last long. The Rangers fled their positions. Virawah was taken.
The commandos then moved into Nagarparkar and the tehsil headquarter was taken over without much difficulty by the first light of December 8. The teams were back to their bases after this operation..
Target 4: Islamkot
Alpha group did not get much time to rest. They were reassigned immediately to another mission. This was an attack on a suspected ammunition dump in Islamkot. The group entered Pakistan again and reached Sundegaon by 1900 hours on December 16. The village was empty. In the shadow of the night, they moved towards Islamkot and waited just 2 km east of the enemy camp. At 0530 hours, they launched their assault but found the camp empty..
The Ambush at Lunio
On their way back from the mission is when they faced the enemy again. "On our way back after handing over Islamkot, leading Jeep with Captain Das saw dust raised by moving vehicles. We immediately fanned out and went into ambush. Other teams joined in and we opened fire. I think 18-20 enemy soldiers were killed on the spot and rest were taken prisoners of war," remembers Col MPS Chaudhary.
This raid was the biggest territorial conquest in terms of territory . The whole captured area of about 3600 sq. kilometers remained under Indian Army's control till 22nd December 1972
*********** WE THANK YOU FROM OUR HEARTS **********
UNOFFICIAL COMMUNICATION HISTORY
BY LT GEN MG DATAR (THEN A CAPT)
The genesis of the IDEA of the UNOFFICIAL HISTORY relates to such minor events, that probably do not merit to be part of the official History of the war , however, means a great deal to those troops who went through the happening and met with successs.
The story of my Line Detachment (Line Det) and Radio Relay Detachment (RR Det) is similar in the 1971 war in the Desert Sector, which was an important factors for the over all success at Longewala. I was a young Captain then posted to Sutheren Command Mobile Signal Regiment, responsible to provide rearward line and radio relay (RR) communication links to 11 and 12 inf divs from Command advance HQ at Jodhpur. The communications were extended over huge distances In true culture of the Corps we were constantly worried on keeping them ‘Through’ at all costs and under worst of the war situations.
Beginning Dec 1971, and things were moving fast, I shall not relate the situation during the night of 4/5 Dec 71 when Longewal Company came under Pakistani attack, as the same is well known to one and all.
Due to radio silence the telephone calls between commanders were connected only on overhead lines or secured RR. The pressure therefore on our Line parties and RR Dets was sur-mounting every day clubbed with the need to conserve fuel for the Generators, compelling us to work on schedules rather than 24/7 pecially at night. We however kept HF radio communications for any emergency, but our relaying detachemnts were not on HF radio.
During the night 4/5 Dec Longewala inf coy came under Pak Attack, which was a total surprise to 12 Inf Div. Our RR Communication chains were on schedule during the night. As is now known Many factors contributed to the success of the defensive battle of Alfa Company 23 Punjab led by Maj Chandpuri in bravely holding on to the company defences even under attack by an outnumbered force with 2 Armoured Regiments.
We at HQ had our last schedule on the RR with both the Div HQs at 11 PM and closed for the next call at 4 AM after 5 hours, since it was all peace at that time. Past mid night we got a message on the HF Radio that an emergency call from GOC 12 Inf Div was required to the Command HQ. We had no details about the developments taking place at Longewala, but could smell something big.
There had been a major breakdown of the Main Line PL route and our line parties were to repair the breach during the night protcting themselves from the enemy raiding party based on camels operating in the desert. A rescue / support party was also dispatched to join the line party to strengthen it to face the enemy, should an encounter ensue.
The emergency calls are required to be put through atonce, but due to breakdown of the line we were in a spin. We were trying all permutations and combinations to get the call through some how. We were also praying to all Gods to let the enroute Relay Stations to open up at the schedule time of 4 AM. We were also hoping that the Line could be repaired at night , but we were not certain of this due to enemy action in the sector.
We all were at the RR set by 0330 totally, utterly tense praying to God to bless our Generator and the Radio Relay sets to open and work. The Radio Relay equipment was old , requiring complicated tuning of the C41/ R222 sets. Soon it was 4 am , none of us had any thing to eat since an emergency call theat too during operstions pending. Our prayers were fortunatrly answered by the Desert Gods and the Relay stations came up on time. Soon the other end also came up and around 4.15 am we were able to connect the GOC to the Comd HQ followed by another call to the Commander of the Jaisalmer Air Force Base. Soon thereafter we heard the Hunters taking off on missions to create the History and saving the pride and honour of Indian Armed forces.
Had this voice call been not connected to command HQ and then specially to the AOC, Jaisalmer Air Force Station the situation would have been bit different and delayed giving time during day light to Pak Armoured to invest Longewala. Delayed in the sense that the message had then to be passed on radio or any other alternative means to Command HQ. This night event though looks minor was nothing less than a "do or die" situation for us in the Signal Regiment.
It thus became an important part, even though small and unsung, in making the history of the success of Longewala Defensive Battle as we read today. For us it is an Unofficial History of the operations in desert in 1971.
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Sam Manekshaw’s Charisma
(As written by veterans of 185 Lt Regt Arty 'Camel Pack' )
In late October 1971, several hundred officers, of the Battle Axe Division, were seated on tarpaulin sheets on the desert sands in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer sector awaiting the address of then-Chief of Army Staff General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw. There was a table covered with a blanket, chair and a microphone set up in front. We heard his helicopter land. He breezed in, brushed aside the microphone, climbed on the table and stood facing us with his hands on his hips. His address was short and crisp: “Boys, I am sending you across. Victory must be ensured. I want you to remember three things. First, prisoners of war will not be ill-treated, second, there will be no plunder or booty hunting, and lastly keep away from the begums (Pakistani women).”
He jumped off the table, had a cup of tea with us in an enamel mug, standard Army issue, and flew off. His speech was succinct and left no doubts in our minds. He was not verbose. Sam Manekshaw’s address had us spellbound. He had incomparable charisma which is a strange alchemy of inner spirit, energy, fire, radiance, enthusiasm and spontaneity. It was a spark that ignited the fire within us.
** GOD BLESS HIS SOUL **
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WE HAVE RE-SEARCHED, COMPILED AND PUBLISHED ON THIS BLOG SITE THIS TRIBUTE TO ALL THOSE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE INDIAN ARMY AND INDIAN AIR FORCE, AND THOSE OF THE THE PAKISTAN ARMY WHO TOOK PART IN THIS BATTLE OF ITS OWN KIND --
RESULTING INTO A FIASCO FOR BOTH THE SIDES.
WE, HOWEVER DO NOT VOUCH FOR THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE NARRATIONS AND WRITE UPS NARRATED ABOVE.
THERE ARE MANY SUCH IMPONDERABLES - HAD THIS OR THAT BEEN NOT THERE THEN WHAT ?
WE CAN ONLY THANK GOD & LUCK
SURE ENOUGH - "UTTE RABB HAIGA"
NOTE - I WAS THE GSO2(OPS) (OF THE OLDEN DAYS) OF 12 INF DIV FROM 1980 TO 82 AS SUCH WAS MUCH INVOLVED WITH HISTORY AND STUDIES ON BATTLE OF LONGEWALA AS ALSO PREPARING NUMEROUS BRIEFINGS ON GROUND AT LONGEWALA.
HENCE THE NOSTALGIA FOR ME HAS BEEN NATURAL . ब्रिगेडियर_नरेन्द्र_ढंड
Before I end this post I will request my readers to also read through the comments which follow below under the comments, most of these came to us on email which we thought appropriate to place ourself under the comments.
We will add to these once we hear from other offrs who were related to these ops.
WE THANK COL PS SANGHA VrC (26th Course NDA 'B' Sqn), FOR TAKING TIME TO WRITE HIS FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE. HE WAS THE AIR OP , EARLIER TASKED TO DIRECT ARTY FIRE FOR THE DIV OFFENSIVE BUT LATER DIRECTED TO PROCEED TO LONGEWALA AT FIRST LIGHT. HE WAS THE FIRST ONE TO REACH LONGEWALA TO DIRECT THE VERY FIRST STRIKE BY IAF 'HAWK HUNTERS' TO THE TARGETS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FAC AT THAT TIME, THANK YOU SIR,
WE ALSO THANK COL HARCHARAN SINGH OF PUNJAB REGT TO PROVIDE US THE DETAILS OF OPERATIONS AT LONGEWALA DURING THE NIGHT OF 4TH & 5TH DEC 1971
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***** END ****
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