The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965
A Strategic and Operational Analysis
A.H Amin
Originally Published in Defence Journal Karachi, December 2001
Issue
The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general has remained the subject of too much propaganda
and too little analysis. On Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a
superhuman effort while on the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses
in the Indian Army at unit, brigade, divisional and corps level.
On the other hand the
total failure of the main Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or
forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by official propagandists who
successfully shifted the entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc.
Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armoured Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.
Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armoured Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.
Unfortunately, instead
of dispassionate analysis the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor as one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at
individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to
various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit employment.
After the war, Indian High Command spent a very large fortune on increasing
terrain friction by construction of spurs, bunds, drains etc to ensure that
something like a tank thrust against their strategic line of communication to
Kashmir and Amritsar may never again take place. In 1971, thus
little activity took place in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis shifted to
area south of Sutlej.
We will analyse the
corps level battle in this article in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which
involved a total force of some five infantry divisions and one armoured
division and an independent armoured brigade.
Orientation withthe
battle area
The Ravi-Sutlej Corridor
from the point where the River Ravi finally enters Pakistan near BRB Syphon
north of Lahore till Kasur measures roughly 160,000 yards in frontage. The main
Pakistani town Lahore, a place which had immense strategic, political as well
as psychological significance for Pakistan was located just 29 kilometres from
the border while the main Indian town Amritsar was about 28 kilometres from the
border. Khem-Karan, a small Indian town which made many headlines in the first
four days of the war was located about 60 kilometres south west of Amritsar and
5 kilometres to the border. Ravi, the river comprising the northern boundary of
the corridor was relatively smaller than Sutlej, the river which formed the
southern boundary of the corridor and entered Pakistan in the Sejhra Bulge,
going into India again for a few miles into Hussainiwala Headworks before
re-entering Pakistan again a few miles south of Kasur, a small Pakistani town 5
kilometres from the border. Since there was no natural boundary between India
or Pakistan in this corridor, Pakistan had constructed the BRBL (Bambanwalla
Ravi Bedian Link) Canal which the Indians referred to as Ichhogil Canal. The
BRBL canal ran from north to south from Ravi in the north till Sutlej in the
south, after it entered the corridor passing through a siphon on the Ravi from
Sialkot District. The canal was constructed in the 1950s with the express
purpose of serving as a defence obstacle against
a possible Indian attack on Lahore. Its western banks were higher
than its eastern banks to provide good fields of fire and
observation for the defender and lined with bunkers. It was approximately
five metres deep and 45 metres wide and was a “complete water obstacle”,
formidable in subcontinental terms where attack across water obstacles was
regarded as a formidable and extremely difficult operation!1 The BRB running in
a nearly ninety degree direction flows 5 to 14 kilometres from the Indian
border. It has various branches which run from east to west like the Lahore
Branch, Kasur Branch. All these branches ran from northeast to
southwest and thus no cause of any ground friction for any attacker
advancing from east to west. The BRB crossed the GT Road at Dograi a village
located on its east bank. The other obstacles in the corridor were the Hudiara
Drain, Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala. The first two could be crossed with minor
engineer effort or recce while the third required greater engineer effort. Both
Ravi and Sutlej were complete water obstacles with width varying from 150 to
350 metres and were in near full flow in the season. The fields of
fire in the area were limited from 300 yards to 1200 yards and the area near
the canals, their branches and the nalas were boggy, limiting tank movement and
requiring careful reconnaissance. The main roads in the area were the GT Road
linking Lahore with Amritsar and onwards to Jullundhur and Ludhiana.
Lahore-Harike Road linking Lahore with
Ferozepur-Ludhiana Road and the Ferozpur Road linking
Lahore with Ferozpur, after passing through Kasur and crossing the Sutlej over
the Hussainiwala Headworks near Ferozpur. The major bridges from where the BRB could
be crossed were at Dograi on the GT Road, Bhaini, Malikpur, Bedian, Barki,
Kasur etc. In addition, there were various aquaducts and viaducts on the BRB.
The area had thick vegetation trees etc and various crops specially sugar cane
severely limited fields of observation and fire.
Indian Plan
The Indian war plan was
finalized on 9th August 1965.2 The plan envisaged a major attack in the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor employing 11 Corps (4 Mountain Division, 7 Infantry
Division and 15 Infantry Division) along three axis i.e 15 Infantry Division on
Amritsar-Lahore axis, 7 Infantry Division on
Khalra-Barki-Lahore axis and 4 Mountain Division on Khem Karan-Kasur
axis. Each division had two brigades while their third brigade was held by the
11 Corps as reserve or for other tasks. 29 Brigade (ex-7
Division) was directly under corps headquarter and tasked to defend
the area opposite the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave, Dharm Enclave and the Jassar
Bridge. The corps boundary of the 11 Corps extended from Dera Baba
Nanak (Included) some 56 Kilometre North of Amritsar in the north till the
north bank of Sutlej River in the south and onwards till Ganganagar which was
defended by 67 Infantry Brigade (three battalions) supported by 4 Independent
Squadron (Sherman-75mm). The 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was the corps
reserve of 11 Corps. It consisted of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) and 8th Light
Cavalry (AMX-13). 15 Infantry Division had 14 Scinde Horse (Shermans-76 mm),
and 1st Skinners Horse (Shermans) an additional regiment which was on move on
6th September 1965 from Benares to the frontline. This unit joined the 15
Division only on 11th September. The 7th Division’s integral armour unit was
the 21 Central India Horse (Sherman-75mm) while the 4th Mountain Division (less
33 Mountain Brigade deployed on Chinese border) had the 9
Deccan Horse (Sherman-76 mm). In addition after 6th September the 7th Light
Cavalry (PT-76) equipped with fully amphibious PT-76 tanks was moved to the
corps area with restrictions placed on the unit for utilization in only highly
sensitive missions because of conversion and armour vulnerability reasons since
the PT-76 was newly inducted and had very thin armour plates. This
brigade also had 1 Field Regiment (SP) and 1 Dogra (Lorry borne). In addition
the corps also had a reserve infantry brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade (three
infantry units) (ex-15 Division) initially placed at Tarn Taran.
The reader may note that
Joginder Singh claims that at one point General Harbaksh Singh had agreed to
transfer 7 Division to 1 Indian Corps involved in Operation Nepal opposite
Chawinda but the decision was changed on Joginder’s remonstrances to the
Indian Army chief. This if done would have left a big gap in between
Indian 15 and 4 Mountain Division.3
Each Indian division had
an organic artillery brigade known as divisional artillery in Pakistan. In
addition there was the 21 Independent Artillery Brigade consisting
of one medium and one heavy regiment.
In addition the 11 Corps
was also given three other formations which were not in its area of operations
on 6th September 1965.These were 41 Mountain Brigade (forced to move to Akhnur
after Grand Slam), 50 Para Brigade which was on move from Agra to 11 Corps area
on 6th September and the 23 Mountain Division which was initially Indian Army
Reserve and did not arrive in the battle area and had no influence on the
conduct of operations till end of the war. The reader may note that this
formation was last ordered to concentrate in area Dera Baba Nanak by 26th
September 19654 while ceasefire took place on night 22/23rd September 1965.
In the strategic sense
the prime Indian aim in 11 Corps area was to launch a thrust at Pakistani vital
centre of Lahore which would compel Pakistan to “retain large portion of her
reserves in that Sector”.5
Another major strategic
benefit that the Indians visualised to derive from 11 Corps attack was ensuring
defence of Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor by utilising the BRB as a
water obstacle. The Indian planners had assessed that with all territory from
the border till BRBL in Indian hands the Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor was secure against any Pakistani attack. This was so since no water
obstacle like BRB was available with the Indians for the defence of their side
of the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.
The reader may note that
before the war if Joginder Singh the Chief of Staff Western Command is to be
believed some people (Harbaksh Singh) in the Indian Higher Command regarded the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as indefensible and were in favour of taking a defensive
position on the Beas River.6
In classical strategic
terms the Indian 11 Corps attack was a “Thrust” defined by Andre Beaufre
as “Reach a vulnerable point in spite of opposition of the
enemy” and aimed at “Depriving the enemy of his freedom of action by wearing
him down”.7
In pure operational
order terminology 11 Corps tasks were:—8
Advance to the Ichogil
Canal (BRBL) along the axes GT Road, Bhikiwind-Khalra and Bhikiwind-Khem Karan
to capture Pakistani territory from opposite Ranian inclusive to its junction
with Dipalpur Canal opposite Hussainiwala inclusive and capture intact:—
a. GT Road Bridge over
Ichogil Canal.
b. GT/Jallo Link Road
Bridge. Barki Bridge over Ichogil Canal.
c. Destroy any enemy
which may enter the Punjab and Ganga Nagar Sector in Rajhastan.
d. Simultaneously with
point “a” above eliminate Bridgehead in the area Dera Baba Nanak, and if
possible capture the bridge
intact.
e. Finally on completion
of task “a”, be prepared to continue the advance to Lahore.
15 Division Plan
Translated into tangible
terminology the above mentioned objectives were to be acomplished by commencing
the advance of 15 Infantry Division in two phases. In Phase One commencing on
night 5/6 September with two brigades and one task force. 54 Infantry Brigade
(three battalions) of this divison supported by a tank squadron (14 Scinde
Horse) and engineer field company was to advance along GT Road after
crossing the international border at 0400 Hours 6th September and capture two
bridges on BRB at Jallo and Dograi. Simultaneously, a battalion group task
force i.e 1 Jat (ex-38 Infantry Brigade) half tank squadron (14
Scinde Horse), engineer field company, under direct command of HQ 15
Division were to capture road bridge in area Bhaini-Dhilwal. In the second
phase not before six hours after 0400 Hours 38 Infantry Brigade was
to capture area Bhasin and Dograich.
7 Division Plan
The 7 Infantry Division
was also given a two phase plan. In Phase one, it was to advance with one
infantry brigade (48 Brigade) supported by tank squadron less one troop (21
Central India Horse) advancing along axis Khalra-Barki capturing Barki and
securing the adjacent bridge over the Ichogil Canal (BRBL) by last light 6th
September. Simultaneously and independent task force directly under 7 Division
Headquarter comprising 17 Rajput and one tank troop (21 Central India Horse),
supported by a regiment strength of artillery and a field company of engineers
was to cross the border at axis Wan-Bedian and secure Bedian by last light 6th
September. In Phase two, 65 Infantry Brigade was to carry out mopping up
operations along BRBL and also destroy all bridges on BRBL within 7 Division
area of responsibility.
4 Mountain Division Plan
4 Mountain Division
comprising two infantry brigades and one tank regiment (9 Deccan Horse) was the
southern most division of the advancing force. It was tasked to secure
Pakistani territory upto Ichhogil Canal which in this area was just about 4
kilometres from the Indian border, destroying bridge over Ichhogil Canal over
road Khem Karan-Kasur and to occupy a defensive sector to contain possible
Pakistani offensive consisting of an armoured division and two infantry
brigades. This division was also assigned the support of 2 Indian Independent
Armoured Brigade on priority.
The reader may note that
initially the Indian planners had correctly assessed that Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division may be employed in this sector. However, once Pakistan’s 7th
Infantry Division the sister division of the 1st Armoured Division had moved
into Gujrat area the Indian Intelligence equally incompetent like
their Pakistani counterparts had by September assessed that the Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division was in Wazirabad area!9
Thus the 11 Corps was in
a relaxed mood and had no clue that the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was
dispersed in Changa Manga Forest area about to commence an attack which in
leading Indian military analyst Ravi Rikhyes word had the potential to be
India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.
Pakistani Plan 10 Division Plan
The Pakistani plan in
this corridor had two different dimensions. One was the defence of Lahore the
prime Pakistani defensive consideration. The second was the main Pakistani
attack originating from Kasur aimed at severing the entire Indian 11 Corps line
of communication. There were three Pakistani divisions in the corridor. The 10
Division responsible for defence of Lahore from BRB Syphon till Bedian in the
south a frontage of approximately 60,000 yards.10 The newly raised 11 Division
responsible for defence of the area from Bedian till and including Hussainiwala
Headworks, a total frontage of some 100,000 yards11 in
gunner terminology!
The 10 Division had
three infantry brigades, two of which were deployed in defensive role and one
along with a tank regiment (23 Cavalry), two infantry battalions, a field
artillery regiment in direct support and an R & S Company was
designated as the Division Strike Force responsible for
counterattacks.Before the war this brigade had been trained to carry out
counterattacks to destroy any enemy penetration west of BRBL. The reader may
note that 23 Cavalry had one M-47 Squadron while the remaining two squadrons
were equipped with Shermans.12 The TDU regiments were also equipped with
Shermans.
114 Brigade was
responsible for defence of Ravi Syphon through Bhaini Bridge till and including
the main GT Road at Wagah. It had three infantry battalions, an R & S
Company less one platoon, a TDU tank squadron (30 TDU) and was directly
supported by a field artillery regiment. The main defensive positions of the
brigade were on the BRBL.
103 Brigade was
responsible for defence of area excluding GT Road till Bedian. It had two
infantry battalions, a TDU tank squadron (30 TDU), an R & S Company less a
platoon, and a field artillery regiment in direct support.
The 10 Divisional
artillery’s strong point and one which gave it a marked advantage over the
Indians, was in possession of 30 Heavy Regiment consisting of latest
US eight 155 mm guns and four 8 inch Howitzers. In addition, the division
had three medium regiments supporting three infantry brigades, a medium
regiment and two locating batteries.
11 Division Plan
The 11 Division was
raised in 1965 around May 1965.13 It consisted of three infantry brigades i.e
21 Brigade, (two battalions), 52 Brigade (three battalions) and 106 Brigade
(two battalions). In
addition it had two tank regiments (15 Lancers and 32 TDU). The division had
two roles i.e defending the line of BRB and also providing a bridgehead to the
main Pakistani attack force i.e the 1st Armoured Division. Its artillery
consisted of three field regiments, one mortar troop,one medium regiment, one
heavy regiment (eight 8 inch Howitzers and four 115 mm guns) and
most valuable a corps locating regiment.
The dual operational
task of the 11 Division was defence of Kasur, destroy enemy advance on axis
Ferozpur-Kasur and Khem Karan-Kasur, capture Pakistani side of Hussainiwala
enclave and destroy all enemy likely water crossings in the divisional area.
Its offensive role was to be prepared to secure a bridgehead across the Rohi
Nala for the 1st Armoured Division. In this task the division was to secure
general line Patti-Harike inclusive of bridge over Harike and Bhikkiwind on
axis Lahore-Harike. In the Phase two, the division was to get the 5 Armoured
Brigade to capture Jandiala Guru Bridge over the Beas River.14
Conversely, if the GHQ
decided to launch the whole of 1st Armoured Division in conjunction with 11
Division, 11 Division was then to provide a firm base to facilitate operations
of 1st Armoured Division. In this eventuality the 5 Armoured Brigade was to
revert to under command 1st Armoured Division.15
Lately, Major General
Naseerullah Babar in an interview conducted by this scribe for the Defence
Journal claimed that the originator of this offensive plan was Major
General Altaf Qadir.16
1st Armored Division
Plan
As per the initial war
plans of the Pakistani GHQ Headquarter, 1 Corps was supposed to
control the operations of 8 Division, 15 Division, 10 Division, 11
Division and 1st Armoured Division. Humanly speaking, this was an impossible
task and a tribute to Ayub and Musa’s grasp of strategic and
organisational depth or lack of it! Even the officially sponsored historian
Shaukat Riza admitted “nothing could be farther away from intention or
capability of HQ 1 Corps” .17
The reader may, note
that the 1st Armoured Divisions prime task was to function as
a reserve for the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor along with 7 Infantry
Division. However, later on the 7 Division was diverted to Operation Grand Slam
North of Chenab River.18
The first armoured
division as it stood in 1965 was one of the finest armoured formations that the
sub continent had seen till 1965. To be precise in the words of Gul
Hassan the last C-in-C of the Pakistan Army and the then Director Military
Operations in 1965, the 1st Armoured Division was the “best equipped
division that we fielded and far superior to any armour formation the Indians
had”19
In September 1965, the
1st Armoured Division consisted of three armoured brigades (3rd, 4th and 5th)
each with two tank regiments and one APC borne (Armoured Personnel Carrier)
mechanised infantry battalions. In addition the division had a recce regiment
and the normal divisional artillery component of three self propelled (tracked)
artillery regiments, one medium regiment, one self-propelled (tracked) Light
Anti Aircraft Regiment. In addition there was the usual component of engineer
signal and other supporting arm and service battalions.
On 1st September 1965,
Headquarter 1 Corps still in command of 1st Armoured Division and still
retaining some mental equilibrium which it was soon to lose from 6th September
1965 issued its grand operational instruction to the 1st Armoured Division:—
“1st Armoured Division
on orders from GHQ was required to debouch from a bridgehead
provided by 11 Division and to cut Grand Trunk Road in area
Jullundhur”!20
In other words, 1 Corps
Headquarter was assigning the 1st Armoured Division an objective some 100 miles
inside India and one which required crossing of one major river !
As per this instruction
the 5 Armoured Brigade was initially placed under command 11 Division for
establishment of bridgehead.21
The initial 1st Armoured
Division plan is illustrated on the adjoining map. It envisaged an advance by
3rd Armoured Brigade along Sobraon Branch to secure the Beas Bridge, a distance
of 60 miles, an advance by the 4 Armoured Brigade along Kasur Branch
to Jandiala Guru on Grand Trunk Road east of Amritsar, a distance of some 50
miles. 5 Armoured Brigade was to revert to command of 1st Armoured Division in
the breakout phase and act as reserve.22
If 1st Armoured Division
succeeded in accomplishing the above mentioned tasks this would have meant that
complete Indian 11 Corps was encircled and forced to either surrender or
withdraw northwards towards Pathankot. In the process the Indians would have
forced to sue for ceasefire and would have lost all territory including crucial
cities like Amritsar till the Beas River. This is why Ravi Rikhye called it a possible
fourth battle of Panipat for India.
Conduct of Battle
On 4th
September at precisely 2230 Hours the Pakistani GHQ sent a signal to all
formations which asked them to take “necessary defensive measures” against
India. War had not yet broken out but Pakistan had already launched an infantry
division/armoured brigade size attack in Indian Held Kashmir from 1st
September. The signal whose language was described by Shaukat Riza as “not
peremptory”23 read as following:
Pak
Army DTE Sept 042230 E
Latest Intelligence
reports indicate Indian concentration on both East and West
Pakistan and such flash announcements on All India Radio as QUOTE
Pakistanis attacking Jammu etc. UNQUOTE indicate their aggressive
intention, formations will take necessary defensive measures (.) All Informed
Gul Hassan states that
there was no ambiguity in this signal and that all formations took immediate
action on it barring 10 Division in Lahore. This in view of Gul Hassan was a
clear case of complacency.24
10 Division area
All that 10 Division did
on receipt of the above mentioned signal was to warn forward troops
to exercise greater vigilance and ordered troops to move into defensive
positions on night 5th and 6th September.25 Gul’s assertion is confirmed by
Shaukat Riza who states that GOC 10 Division on 4th September brushed aside
Commander 114 Brigades suggestion to move into defences but later relented and
ordered move to defensive positions during night 5/6 September 1965 on the
morning of 5th September.26 Shaukat did not give any reason in his book in
which he repeatedly praised Ayub and Musa as to why the Pakistan Army had so
non-military in the language of it signals while stating that the 10 Division
was not in full deployment because of the GHQ!27 Even the Indian armour
historian noted that “for some unaccountable reason the 114 Brigade was not in
its defences when the Indian attack came on the morning of 6th September “.28
The two forward brigades
of the 10 Division were occupying their positions when the Indian attack
commenced at 0400 Hours 6th September 1965. 3 Jat the leading battalion of the
54 Indian Brigade reached the BRB bridge near Dograi which had been destroyed
by the Pakistani defenders. The Indians claim that two companies of this
battalion crossed the BRB walking over the partially destroyed debris of the
bridge and occupied Batapur for sometime but were forced to withdraw since the
Indian 54 Brigade/15 Division did not reinforce it.29 The reader may note that
in this case the weakest link in the whole affair was not the Indian soldier or
3 Jat but the Indian 54 Brigade Commander and GOC 15 Division who did not
respond to CO 3 Jat’s repeated requests for reinforcements! The claim of 3 Jat
having crossed the BRBL, however, is denied by Major General Tajammul Hussain
Malik who was then defending that area as Commanding Officer 3rd Baluch.30 In
the final analysis 54 Brigade accomplished little except 3 Jat’s singular
accomplishment of contacting the BRBL opposite Batapur.
1 Jat Group similarly
performed miserably. It failed to reach the BRBL and was repulsed by
the combined effect of artillery fire and left forward battalion of the 114
Brigade. It panicked and dispersed back to the Indian side of the border by
mid-day.31 It was replaced by 6 Kumaon along with two tank troops which
deployed at Ranian.32
The 38 Infantry Brigade
of the 15 Division also advanced very slowly at H + 6 and according
to Harbaksh’s narrative had just advanced within 2000 yards of the BRBL by 2200
Hours 6th September.33
By 1300 Hours 6th
September GOC 15 Indian Division Niranjan Parshad reported that the situation
in his sector was serious on account of high casualties and no
further offensive action was possible! On hearing this report, Harbaksh Singh
accompanied by Commander 11 Corps personally visited 15 Division battle area
and found that “the situation had been grossly exaggerated and the
fighting potential of the formation were in no way impaired — only the GOC had
failed to measure upto certain local reverses, inevitable in any battle”.
Harbaksh found the GOC 15 Division “drained of all will and vision
...his attitude was passively negative and there was the unmistakable air of
the defeatist about him. He stated his inability to undertake any further
offensive action on the plea that his formation had lost all capacity for
operations”.34
On 7th September
afternoon GOC 15 Division while on the way to visit 38 Brigade towards Bhasin
was ambushed35 by 18 Baluch. The GOC escaped but his jeep was captured and is
still retained by 18 Baluch (now 3 Sind) as a war trophy.
Harbaksh Singh sacked
GOC 15 Division on 7th September and Major General Mohinder Singh
succeeded Niranjan Parshad as the new GOC 15 Division on night 7/8 September
1965.36
On night 7/8 September
38 Brigade based in Pul Kanjri area attempted to capture Bhasin but failed. 54
Brigade on Jallo and Dograi villages with a battalion each also failed on night
7/8 September.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani
GOC 10 Division ordered a counterattack to put 15 Division on the defensive.
The Divisional Strike Force 22 Brigade was given orders to attack Indians east
of BRB, something which they had not practiced in pre-war training manoeuvres.
The 22 Brigade crossed the BRB at Maqboolpur Syphon with 23 Cavalry leading,
Brigadier Qayyum Sher37, captured area Bhaini by 0830 Hours 8th September and
had cut the GT Road at Milestone 13 in Dograi area by 1330 Hours. This
audacious counterattack threw the Indian 15 Division into utter confusion.
Harbaksh Singh states that two Indian units 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra in Dograi
area broke the line and abandoned their defences.38 The battalions were later
goaded, rallied and brought back to the defences. This forced 11 Indian Corps
to reinforce the area with their reserve brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade which
was now deployed immediately behind 54 Brigade in depth in the Hudiara Drain
area.
The 22 Brigade Force was
too weak to stay in Dograi area. Therefore, it withdrew back to the west bank
of the BRB after executing their counter-attack.
On 10th September 1965,
1 Jat and 6 Kumaon again abandoned Ranian area39 in face of alleged heavy
artillery, tank and infantry small arms fire. This produced another crisis in
the 11 Corps. The right flank of the Indian 11 Corps was exposed and Amritsar
could be threatened from this direction. This produced an operational crisis of
magnanimous proportions in the 11 Indian Corps Headquarter. To plug this gap,
96 Infantry Brigade was rushed forward to Ranian area and its position at the
Hudiara Drain as the reserve brigade was taken over by the 50 Para Brigade.
Meanwhile, the 7 Indian
Division performed better. It crossed the international border
at 0530 Hours 6th September with 48 Brigade in
lead and secured the Hudiara Drain defended by a company size
advanced position by an outflanking manoeuvre from the left. 65 Brigade
commenced the advance from Hudiara Drain onwards towards Barki and contaced the
BRB opposite Barki which was held in strength by elements of a unit of
103 Brigade. Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and a company of 12
Punjab was captured by the 7 Division employing one battalion (4 Sikh)
supported by Central India Horse less two squadrons on night 10th/11th
September. Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the Nishan-I-Haidar was the
17 Punjab Company Commander at Barki and survived this action. He was killed by
enemy shelling on 11th September on the west bank of the BRBL the next day.40
The Indian Commanding Officer of Central India Horse Lt Col Joshi who was
leading from the front was mortally wounded once his jeep was blown up by an
anti-tank mine and died on 12th September.41
17 Rajput advanced
successfully till the BRBL on 6th September 1965 but failed to capture the
Bedian bridge since the Pakistani battalion defending the area inundated the
area. Nothing significant took place in this sector till ceasefire.
The last significant
event which took place in the 10 Division area was the recapture of Dograi by
the Indians. Dograi on the east bank of the BRBL was defended by the 16 Punjab.
It was attacked by two infantry battalions supported by a squadron plus of
tanks and captured by a multi-directional night attack on night 21/22 September
1965. The village had little strategic significance specially when compared
with the casualties suffered by both the attackers and defenders who were
involved in the Dograi battle.
11 Division area
4 Mountain Division
attacked the 11 Division area on 6th September 1965. The attack was on too wide
a front and too diluted to make any impact. The Indians were overconfident in
this sector since they thought that Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division was in
Wazeirabad as earlier discussed. Ballanwalla a small village and securing all
area upto the east bank of the BRBL from area opposite Rajoke till opposite
Kasur was the main Indian objective in the area. The Indians
had planned a two brigade attack (they only had two brigades in this
division) with 7 Mountain Brigade (two battalions supported by a
tank squadron) going in the north and 62 Mountain Brigade (three battalions and
a company supported by a tank squadron), in the South while 1/9 Gurkha along
with Deccan Horse less two squadrons was the Divisional Reserve.
At mid-day Pakistan’s 52
Brigade mainly 7 Punjab supported by tanks and well directed artillery
fire launched a determined counterattack on the 62 Brigade. Harbaksh Singh
notes that “the 13 Dogra gave away and broke the line”.42 13 Dogra was
the left forward attacking battalion of the 62 Brigade and its bolting away
disoriented the whole Indian attack. Similarly, the 7 Mountain Brigade opposite
Ballanwalla was thrown back by artillery fire and the small arms fire of the
106 Brigade units. The Indian Armour historian claims that “Pattons
unexpectedly appeared east of the canal through a viaduct located 500
metres south of the road bridge”43 (Khem Karan-Kasur on the BRBL). However,
Shaukat Riza has made no mention about this either because of anti-armour bias
or because he wanted to unduly project the 52 Brigade.
K.C Praval notes that 9
Jammu and Kashmir right forward attacking battalion of the 62 Mountain Brigade
became so demoralized by the combined effect of 52 Brigade attack and
artillery/tank fire that it retreated as far back as Valtoha !
Another significant
affair in the 11 Division battle area was the moverment of the 21 Brigade its
reserve brigade. Initially, on 5th September the brigade was ordered to be
ready to move north and moved north towards Bhimbhar at 0430 Hours 6th
September. Later the move was countermanded and the brigade reverted
to command 11 Division whose area it reached on around 0200 Hours 7th
September!44
1st Armoured Division/11
Division Attack
Since this article is
devoted to the overall battle in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor the 1st Armoured Division
attack will be covered in brief.
At 1430 Hours 6th
September, 2 FF (reserve battalion of 52 Brigade) was ordered
by 11 Division Headquarter to capture a bridgehead across the Rohi
Nala by first light 7th September. Similarly the 5 Armoured Brigade which was
placed under command 11 Division on 5th September was ordered on 5th
September to secure “line Bhikkiwind-Patti as soon as possible”.45
The 2 FF launched its
attack astride road Khem Karan-Kasur across the Rohi Nala at 1930 Hours 6th
September 1965 and by 2130 Hours secured a bridgehead across the
Rohi Nala.46 6 Lancers the leading regiment of 5 Armoured Brigade
was to cross the Rohi Nala. The bridge over Rohi Nala was completed by 1130 Hours
but since its exit ramp was too steep the first tank of 6 Lancers crossed it at
1300 Hours 7th September.47 After one squadron of 6 Lancers had crossed the
Rohi Nala at 1600 hours one tank got stuck and blocked the Rohi Nala bridge. At
this time there were ten tanks across the Rohi Nala and about a company
strength of 1 FF. Colonel Sahibzad Gul, CO 6 Lancers made some forward movement
putting some Indians in front on the run shooting three Indian tanks and
capturing about 25 prisoners.
1st ArmouredDivision
Attack
The 1st Armoured
Division was involved in the main battle from 6th September when 5 Armoured
Brigade was placed under command 11 Division. The 5 Armoured Brigade attack was
to commence at 0500 Hours on 7th September, however, it was delayed to 1130
Hours because of delay in bridge construction on Rohi Nala which was within
Pakistani territory. Gul Hassan the then DMO later claimed in his
memoirs that a bridge was not required since the Rohi Nala was fordable but did
not explain what he had done as DMO to bring this point in any pre-war planning
discussion ! By evening 1600 Hours only about a tank squadron strength of the 6
Lancers leading unit of 5 Armoured Brigade had crossed the Rohi Nala since one
of its tanks had got stuck on the Rohi Nala Bridge. Thus 7th
September was lost with just ten tanks across the Rohi Nala. All this was
happening at a time when the situation in 4 Mountain Division as per Harbaksh
Singh was so serious that ‘out of six battalions two and half had left the line
and the remaining three and half were under severe enemy pressure”. Harbaksh
states that it was under these circumstances that GOC 4 Mountain Division
sought permission from GOC 11 Corps to withdraw and take a position at Assal
Uttar in the rear.48
Harbaksh states that
early in the morning of 8th September he received a handwritten
letter from GOC 11 Corps recommending that four infantry units i.e
18 Rajputana, 7 Grenadier, 9 J & K, AND 13 Dogra be
disbanded and that another infantry division should replace 4 Mountain
Division.49
At this stage Harbaksh
had no reserves and exhorted GOC 4 Mountain Division and GOC 11 Corps to be
more resolute.
While all this was
happening Brig Bashir commander 5 Armoured Brigade was throwing to winds
Pakistan’s Armour superiority by dividing his brigade into two directions with
24 Cavalry to advance along axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind and 6 Lancers towards
Valtoha Railway Station. 24 Cavalry contacted defences of 4 Mountain Division
and tried to develop the situation from the west but failed because of lack of
infantry support and timely arrival of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) which reached
the 4 Mountain Division area after mid-day. 6 Lancers reached Valtoha Railway
Station but was recalled after last light back to Khem Karan by Brigadier
Bashir to leaguer in line with the old British practice which in this scenario
was not required.50
By 9th September when
the Pakistani armour once again commenced advance the Indian armour was well
poistioned with 3rd Cavalry Centurions plugging flanks which could have enabled
5 Armoured Brigade to get into rear of 4 Mountain Divisioon 8th
September. The critical time span was over. The ancient Greeks used to say that
the Goddess of Victory favours those who are bold. Boldness was sadly missing
in 5 Armoured Brigade less Sahibzad Gul the only tank commander who wanted to
lead and fight from the front.
Thus once 5 Armoured
Brigade recommenced advance from its leaguers near Khem Karan, 6 Lancers was
greeted by Centurion fire of 3rd Cavalry while 24 Cavalry also made nominal
progress. To compound things further Sahibzad Gul the only man in the whole
senior lot was killed on 9th September near Valtoha.This indomitable man was
only given an SJ since he was not from the more pampered regiments of the then
Pakistan Army!
By 10th September the
Indians were well poised to meet any outflanking attack.They had taken a horse
shoe position with about three tank regiments, one in 4 Mountain
Division defences, another less one squadron in Valtoha area and the third and
the most formidable in technical terms i.e the 3rd Cavalry covering the western
deep flank of the 4 Mountain Division.
Naseer now launched 4
Cavalry into this valley of death. The result was catastrophic. 4 Cavalry got
bogged down and was forced to surrender. The Indians claimed that they captured
all tanks of the unit, the Commanding Officer and 12 officers including six
majors and several other ranks.51 Shaukat Riza states that “some tank crew of 4
Cavalry trickled into HQ 4 Armoured Brigade.They reported that the regiment had
been taken prisoner...at the end of the day 4 Cavalry reported 4 Officers and
25 Other Ranks missing and a total of ten killed. Almost all the tanks had been
lost”.52 The layman reader should not get shocked.In tank warfare such things
happen. In WW two an illustrious British tank unit 8th Hussars along with 4
Armoured Brigade was captured by the Germans.53 The fault in 4 Cavalry fiasco
was not of the unit but its CO and GOC 1st Armoured Division.
Indian armour historian
admits that 4 Cavalry fought well but ran out of fuel because of poor planning
and was caught in a well laid ambush.
Thus ended an offensive
which had the potential to knock the Indian Army out of the war. The 3rd
Armoured Brigade was never employed and from 11th September the 1st Armoured
Division less 5 Armoured Brigade and 4 Cavalry which was totally written off
was despatched to Chawinda.
The Indians launched
some very fool hardy frontal attacks on 11 Division from 11th September till
22nd September. All were repulsed since surprise had been lost and defence
keeping in view terrain and relative strength was the superior form of war.
Analysis
Level of strategic
success
On the strategic level
the Indians failed in their prime aim i.e in compelling Pakistan to
“retain large portion of her reserves in that Sector” i.e Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division successfully disengaged
from Khem Karan and was redeployed opposite Chawinda. The Pakistanis
thus defended Lahore successfully with existing formations except 5 Armoured
Brigade whose one tank regiment (4 Cavalry) was completely lost, having been
captured by Indians while two (6 Lancers and 24 Cavalry) suffered serious
losses. Thus at ceasefire in strategic terms the Pakistani position opposite
Chawinda was far superior. It is another thing that Ayub and Musa lacked
strategic resolution to launch Operation Wind Up which had the potential of
bagging two Indian Infantry divisions in Chawinda area.
Element of Surprise
Both the sides started
with the element of surprise, the Indians having achieved surprise opposite
Lahore and Pakistan having achieved complete strategic surprise opposite Khem
Karan. Ironically the Intelligence agencies of both sides were a complete
negation of the “Two Nation Theory” in terms of comparative levels
of ‘grey matter’, keeping in view the fact that both miserably failed to detect
the location of each other’s armoured division till the last minute!
Employment of Armour
The conduct of 5
Armoured Brigade on 7th, 8th and 9th September was the most crucial aspect of
the battle. Commander 5 Armoured Brigade totally failed in his job. His initial
orders divided his brigade into three directions, with 6 Lancers going towards
the right and 24 Cavalry going in the centre and left. Had he kept his two tank
regiments concentrated in any one direction with a squadron on the main Khem
Karan-Bhikiwind axis the Pakistanis would have outflanked the 4th
Mountain Division on the 8th September. This would have enabled GOC 1st
Armoured Division to pump in the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the success
of the 5th Armoured Brigade with the 4th Armoured Brigade while
still retaining 3rd Armoured Brigade for the final push to the Beas River
Bridge. By 9th September the Indians were well poised to defeat any outflanking
move and the “critical time span” i.e had run out for the
Pakistanis.
In every battle,
campaign and a war there are/is one or more period/s when one side is greatly
exposed to the risk of being decisively defeated, due to material factors or
psychological factors like perception of the opposing commander that his cause
is doomed, with the other side being possibly aware of it or not.54
Superior decision making means the ability or talent to identify the critical
time span and seize it relentlessly! Brigadier Basheer failed in it on 7th, 8th
and 9th September! Alas, the truth in Schillers saying “what is lost in a
moment is lost for eternity”. The current of history now started moving in the
reverse direction and Pakistan Army paid a very heavy price for the failure at
Khem Karan six years later in 1971!
Chances ofStrategic
Success
At the strategic level
the plan was excellent. It was in planning and at operational level that it
failed. Even Indian military writers like K.C Praval admitted that the plan was
“well conceived”...”that the advance throughout would be along the grain of the
country and no water obstacles would have to be crossed”...and that “Pakistani
armour had the capability for the thrust but the plan failed due to inept
execution”.55 Harbaksh Singh admitted that “it was a simple but
foolproof plan” and that “only the 4 Mountain Division stood in its way”.
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu the tank corps historian also admitted that “The loss of
any bridge over the Beas was expected to pose such a serious threat to Delhi
that the rest of the Indian Army would be forced to contain it rather than make
an attempt to rescue the stranded XI Corps”.56
In Clausewitzian terms
the strategic plan decides “when, where and with what forces” the battle is to
be delivered.57 Again in the light of Clausewitz’s teachings, one of the
principal objects of strategy is “always to be strong, first generally and then
at the decisive point”.58 In this regard, strategy placed at Naseer’s disposal
an initial superiority at the decisive point of about 7 to 1 but he failed to
translate it into success because he and his 5 Armoured Brigade Commander were
incompetent and the men who handpicked them based on personal likes were worse!
After all Naseer was Musa’s handpicked choice. The fault was not that he was a
non-armour officer as Gul Hassan fallaciously alleges but simply that Naseer
was incompetent! After all, Ibrar who did far better was also an infantry man.
Rommel was an infantry man. Macarthur, Lee and Meade were from Corps of
Engineers!
The greatness of the
German General Staff as this scribe stated in an article written in 1994 was
not that it produced a Manstein but that it discovered a Manstein and allowed a
Manstein to reach the highest ranks!59 It was here that the Indo-Pak Armies
failed. They are simply a conspiracy against originality and boldness!
If successful the 1st
Armoured Division attack had great chances of success.Indian GOC Western
Command Harbaksh Singh frankly admitted that “A Blitzkrieg deep into
our territory towards the GT Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in a
helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily
available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into his
vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered into retrospect at this
stage.” 60
The BRB as thekey to the
battle
It may sound unheroic
and unromantic but the BRBL proved the English Channel that saved Pakistan’s
strategic position in the crucial Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. This man made obstacle
severely restricted the Indian freedom of manoeuvre and nullified their
relative superiority in infantry. The canal acted as the anvil vis-a-vis
Pakistani artillery fire, tank fire and infantry small arms fire which played the
role of hammer which crushed the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on them.
Without BRB there is no doubt that nothing could have stopped the indians from
entering Lahore on 6th September. Similarly, without BRB the 1st Armoured
Division could not have as easily disengaged from the Khem Karan battle as it
did. Conversely, the BRB also slowed down the induction of the 1st Armoured
Division into the bridgehead but this was less because of the BRB and more due
to incompetence in Pakistani planners at GHQ (DMO), corps and divisional level.
Musa admitted BRBL’s
role, once he stated that Pakistani plan was based on making use of the BRB
canal which to a great extent compensated for disparity in resources and
enabled Pakistani formations in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor to deploy on “very
extended frontages”. 61
Indecision,Vaccillation
and Procrastination inthe GHQ
The Pakistani GHQ
particularly the Military Operations Directorate acted as catalysts towards
increased confusion. Their contradictory orders to a certain extent retarded
the pace of advance of the 1st Armoured Division. Twice the GHQ gave orders
which created great doubt and confusion in the 1st Armoured Division. See the
case of 3rd Armoured Brigade. On 6th September it was told to concentrate east
of Zafarke by first light 7th September. The brigade carried out the move
successfully by 0600 Hours 7th September. The same day at 1400 Hours it was
told to move to Lahore and at 1500 hours on the same day these orders were
cancelled!62 Imagine the state of mind of the brigade commander and his
commanding officers. On the second occasion, the 4 Armoured Brigade was ordered
by the DMO to move to Daska in Ravi-Chenab Corridor at 1300 Hours 7th
September. While the brigade was preparing for the move it was cancelled the
same day at 1600 Hours. Naturally, GOC 1st Armoured Division Naseer could not
have ordered these moves on his own. There were men higher up in the chain of
command who were not clear about many things connected with
operational strategy and generalship! 63
Lack of initiative
atbattalion, brigade and divisional level
There was a marked lack
of initiative at the battalion, brigade and divisional level. Lieutenant
Colonel Ihsan ul Haq Malik who later rose to the rank of major general and
participated in the Khem Karan operations as the CO of the indomitable 15 SP
(it was a privilege for this scribe to have served in the “Romeo Battery”
of this fine unit after a disciplinary problem in 11 Cavalry from
9th August 1984 till 10th October 1984) states that “senior officers
were conspicuously absent from the frontline in war. I saw a command post of
one of them in the rear areas. The bunker was a massive job.Only a direct hit
by a 5 KT would disturb it!”64
Barring exceptions like
Qayyum Sher who as earlier discussed led from the front. GOC 1st Armoured
Division and Commander 5 Armoured Brigade preferred staying many
miles away from the line of action! Brigadier Shami the Artillery Commander was
killed simply because in confusion of battle he was disoriented and travelled
too forward under the assumption that he was in territory held by own troops.
On the decisive 8th of September when the 1st Armoured Division could have
achieved a breakthrough no officer of colonel level except
Sahibzad Gul was anywhere within 1000 yards of action!
In a personal conversation with this scribe Brigadier (then captain
Asmat Beg Humayun) then GSO-3 of the 5 Armoured Brigade stated that Brigadier
Bashir had pitched his headquarter in a rest house many miles behind the actual
scene of action.
Triumph of defenceover
offence
All battles were triumph
of defence over offence. The attacker was stopped whether it was the Indian
opposite BRB or the Pakistani opposite Assal Uttar or Valtoha. If one Pakistani
tank unit stopped the Indian Armoured Division opposite Gadgor, one Indian tank
unit and later one brigade stopped the Pakistani Armoured Division at Assal
Uttar. If there was a Harbaksh Singh at Assal Uttar prodding 4 Mountain
Division to hold on there was an Abrar at Chawinda reviving the spirits of the
6 Armoured Division. There were historic reasons for triumph of defence.The
pre-1947 Indian Army was primarily used by the Britisher as a shield
rather than a spear. While Indian Infantry dug in, the main manoeuvres in North
Africa were performed by the purely British armoured divisions. Burma was
a different case altogether since in Burma the Indian tank brigades
overwhelmed the Japanese with a ratio of 100 to 10 in qualitative and
quantitative terms. Offensive action required initiative,independent judgement,
swiftness in decision making, all of which were sadly missing in both the
armies beyond tank troop level. Men like Sahibzad Gul or Tarapur were solitary
exceptions and that is why once they were killed in action there was no one who
could replace them. Excellence in decision-making had not been
institutionalised in both the armies and I dare say this is the state till to
date. A convincing proof being the latest Kargil affair!
Role of Artillery
Artillery played a
decisive role in breaking many Indian attacks opposite Lahore and Kasur,
however, it lost its effectiveness when Pakistani armour was distributed in too
wide an area on the 8th of September. In the case of
1st Armoured Division offensive its role was severely mauled due to
overemphasis on secrecy. Ehsan then an artillery CO thus noted “In peace we had
not even seen the maps of this area.Nobody had ever thought that we could be
committed in this area for an ofensive task”.65 Ehsan further noted that such
was the confusion that “another artillery unit in our formation moved by rail.
Understandably, it never got to the required place in time”.
Artillery was even ignored in award of gallantry awards.Thus while infantry
officers particularly belonging to Ayub’s Punjab Regiment Group got the
Lion’s share of gallantry awards artillery and armour
were the underdogs in receipt of gallantry awards.Thus Shaukat Riza caustically
albeit realistically noted “Three of our observers were killed while bringing
fire on the enemy. One captain stood up in his post to engage enemy tanks with
better effect.He was killed with a bullet in his right eye. After ceasefire we
recommended them for gallantry awards. None of them got anything.” 66
Organisational failures
One of the most serious
failures which laid the foundation of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division’s failure
was failure to have a higher command organisation to control and coordinate the
operations of the Pakistani infantry and armoured divisions. On the Indian side
on the other hand the situation was to a great extent since all Indian
divisions in the corridor were controlled by a corps headquarter. The
responsibility for this failure can be laid squarely on the shoulders of Ayub
and Musa and to some extent on the then CGS and DMO.
Staff and Planning
Failures
Ironically while all the
blame for failure was heaped on the shoulders of GOC 1st Armoured Division and
Commander 5 Armoured Brigade, the underlying and some more serious
failures were ignored. Starting from the top, the prime culprit in the planning
was the Military Operations Directorate. Planning for attacks which decides the
fate of a war at the strategic level cannot be relegated to divisional
headquarters. The Khem Karan Offensive plan was prepared many years before the
war started. Obstacles like Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala were pre-partition
obstacles, the Nikasu Nala being so prominent that it was even prominently
marked on the maps of the Radclife Award Boundary Commission maps. The fault
lay not in the fact that the 1st Armoured Division was launched in bad terrain
but in the fact that adequate preparations in planning were not made to ensure
that ground friction was reduced. Compare this with another similar operation
i.e the Inchon landing. The terrain and amphibious factors at Inchon were
formidable. Macarthur’s own Chief of Staff Major General Almond described
Inchon as the worst possible place to land!67 The reader may note that the
water channel from where the amphibious force of Macarthur had to approach
could be conveniently mined or simply blocked by a sunken or
disabled vehicle. Thus, at Inchon terrain did not favour a landing but the
advantage of strategic surprise were far greater than terrain odds.The
important fact which differentiated Inchon and Khem Karan was that the planners
at Inchon took terrain as well as movement factors into account, thereby
reducing terrain friction and the time and space required to concentrate while
at Khem Karan the Pakistani planners starting from the Military Operations
Directorate,1 Corps Headquarter, 1st Armoured Division Headquarter down till
brigade headquarters of the 1st Armoured Division did not plan meticulously for
the move into bridgehead and for getting out of the gap between Rohi Nala and
Nikasu Nala as soon as they could. The governing element in this whole
situation was getting out of the Nikasu-Rohi bottleneck so as to gain complete
freedom of manoeuvre where Pakistani superiority of nine to three in tank
regiments could be fully exploited. If BRB saved the Pakistani position in this
corridor then the Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala to a great extent saved the
Indian position. Nothing in the instructions passed to 1st Armoured Division
indicated that the Pakistani GHQ was even aware of closeness of two obstacles
within Pakistani territory i.e the Rohi Nala and the BRB which could and did
produce traffic jams which severely delayed the induction of the 1st Armoured
Division into the bridgehead and enabled the Indians to bring their independent
armoured brigade into the battle area before the Pakistani 1st Armoured
Division had crossed the crucial Rohi-Nikasu Corridor which was a serious
operational bottleneck. It was not Nasir or Bashir who failed but the whole
staff system inherited from the British. Nasir and Bashir were just
tips of the iceberg! The British staff college at Cambrai in words of
Montgommery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton was an
institution preoccupied with “hunting and socialising”! 68 A British
officer who rose to considerable height in the British Army in WW Two “ frankly
ascribed his selection for staff duty to having played
golf regularly with a senior commander”!69
It was a failure of
command as well as staff system where even the staff officers on both sides
were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than
miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented
and their idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma
or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared
in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men
who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than
unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders
oriented. British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life. It was
this British system in which every senior commander was more interested in
doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and
initiative at brigade and battalion level. They were trained that way and their
behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be
taken in this context.
Analysis of Casualties
Contrary to popular
imagination created by the propaganda that Chawinda was the greatest battle since
WW II it was in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor that the Indians suffered the maximum
casualties.Thus, while the 1 Indian Corps which fought the Battle of Chawinda
suffered a total of 575 killed casualties, the Indian 15 Division opposite
Lahore alone suffered some 486 killed casualties.70 Thus if the
casualties of all three Indian divisions and the independent brigade in 11
Corps area are combined, these far exceed those suffered by the 1 Corps which
fought the Battle of Chawinda.
Influence of Higher
Headquarters on lower headquarters
In the case of Indian 4
Mountain Division the GOC 4 Mountain Division lost the will to carry on as
proved by Harbaksh’s narrative. In this case the situation was restored by
Harbaksh’s personal visit and exhortations to carry on. In the final analysis 4
Mountain Division gradually regained its spirit and functioned effectively in
the defensive role.
Comparative Differences
in the two armies
Many ridiculous
myths were propagated in Pakistan about differences in the two armies. Racially
by and large both the armies were of the same stock. The Pakistan Army bulk of
which some 65% to 75% being Punjabis who were converted to Islam in the period
1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars who were of Hindu Rajput origin. On the other
hand the bulk of the Indian Army was Punjabi
or North Indian again with Sikhs who were converted to Sikhism in the period
from 1500-1800. The remaining larger portion of the Indian Army was Dogra
(Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu Jat, and some Madrasis, Kumaonis and
Gurkhas. Racially by and large the armies were alike. Where a unit did not do
well had a deeper connection with poor leadership at battalion, brigade or
divisional level. Units panicked on both sides, artillery fire had the same
effect on both sides and if one side had better guns it definitely gave it an
advantage. Thus, there was no major differences in both the armies at soldier
to soldier level.
This fact was noted by
some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of
Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche
during the period 1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan
Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon
after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had
distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite
Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations
and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda.
Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused, ‘may indeed have happened, but
they happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of
harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I
wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani
soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he
is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s help is of
the utmost importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own performance. It
would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a
professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar
military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only
reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a comparatively better performance in
this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a defender”.
Siddiqi further noted that “The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use
for such sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and
regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more
realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’ ...The
merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a
taboo”.71 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views.
Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch
opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority
opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani
official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, “We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians
had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our
artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall
superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions
were comparatively ill-equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much
bigger frontier”. 72
Conclusion
The battles fought in
the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are fit to be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of
errors. On a more serious note Pakistan Army lost its last chance to force a
military solution on the Indians. It failed not because failure was inevitable but
because seeds of failure were sown once soldiering was mixed with politics,
merit was sidelined and men of limited grey matter were elevated to the highest
ranks. After 1965 the current of history started flowing against Pakistan and
its full results came into light only in December 1971. There was logic in
Bhutto and his hawk’s position that Pakistan had the potential to knock India
out in a swift war like the Israelis did in 1956 and 1967. Unfortunately,
Pakistan failed not because of material reasons but because of qualitative
reasons. The finest steel goes through the hottest fire. This unfortunately was
not the case with the Pakistan Army of 1965 in terms of higher
leadership.
____________________________
1 Gul Hassan the then
Pakistani Director Military Operations (DMO) from 1961 to 1965 stated in his
memoirs that all Pakistani planning was based on the
fact that “both sides would refrain from undertaking a crossing over
a major water obstacle at the outset of operations”. See Page-173-Memoirs of
General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993. The Indians
similarly were equally timid and Harbaksh Singh the GOC Western Command noted
that the Indian GHQ was also hesitant in attempting to cross a major water
obstacle even within Indian territory which was close to the border. See
Page-16 & 17-War Despatches-Lieut Gen Harbaksh Singh-Lancer
International-New Delhi-1991. The reason for this was hesitation in taking any
risk and in being unconventional, the cardinal common trait in both Indian and
Pakistan Army’s higher leadership since the Indians commissioned in the
pre-1947 British Indian Army in any case were not trained to go beyond company
or platoon commander level. The WW II changed everything and speeded up the
process of transfer of power!
2Page-18-War
Despatches-Op Cit.
3Page-132 & 133-
Behind the Scene-An Analysis of India’s Military Operations-1947-71- Major
General Joginder Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.
4Pages-122 &
127-Ibid.
5Page-15-War
Despatches-Op Cit. Harbaksh Singh had visualised that a major attack in
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor with 11 Corps would force Pakistan to retain a large
proportion of her reserves in Lahore Sector and resultantly minimise the
opposition againt the Main Indian Attack in Ravi-Chenab Corridor opposite
Chawinda.
6Page-134-Joginder
Singh-Op Cit- The reader is advised to read Joginder’s book with a pinch of
salt. It was published after publication of Harbaksh’s War Despatches and was
more of a rejoinder than a detached analysis of the war. Joginder was
Harbaksh’s Chief of Staff in the war and it appears that
Harbaksh was tough with Joginder. Joginder retired in the same rank
soon after the war while Harbaksh the most deserving candidate for Indian Army
Chief was not promoted since he was a Punjabi Sikh. It is hard to believe
Joginder’s unsubstantiated assertion that Harbaksh a staunch Sikh would
advocate taking position behind the Beas abandoning holy places like the Sikh
Vatican City i.e Amritsar.
7Page-38-An Introduction
to Strategy-General Andre Beaufre-Faber and Faber-London-1965.
8Page-18-War
Despatches-Op Cit.
9Page-365-The Indian
Armoured Corps-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1940-71-Major General
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1991.
10Page-189-The Pakistan
Army-War-1965-Major General Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984.
11Page-215-Ibid.
12Page-189-Ibid.
13Page-211-Ibid.
14Pages-213 and 214
-Ibid.
15Page-215-Ibid.
16Page-10-” Remembering
our Warriors” series-Interview of Major General Naseerullah Khan Babar
(Retired), SJ and Bar conducted by A.H Amin - Defence Journal-April 2001
Issue-Pathfinder Fountain -Clifton Karachi-2001. The reader may note that
General Babar avoids self- publicity and propaganda.He agreed to an interview
on the personal request of Mr Ikram Sehgal who had served with him in the Corps
of Aviation in the period 1968-71.
17Page-215-Ibid.
18Page-76-Gul Hassan
Khan -Op Cit.
19Page-200-Gul Hassan
Khan-Op Cit.
20Page-235-Shaukat
Raza-Op Cit.
21Ibid.
22Pages 235 &
236-Ibid.
23Page-135 &
135-Ibid.
24Page-189-Gul Hassan
Khan-Op Cit.
25Ibid.
26Pages-192 &
193-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
27Pages-191 &
192-Ibid.
28Page-355-History of
The Indian Armoured Corps -Op Cit.
29 Page-90-War
Despatches-Op Cit and Page-268-The Indian Army Since Independence-Major K.C
Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.
30Pages-52, 53 &
54-Story of My Struggle-Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-`Jang
Publishers-Lahore-1991.
31Page-356-History of
the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
32 Ibid.
33Page-92-War
Despatches-Op Cit.
34Ibid.
35Page-356-History of
the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
36 Page-92 -War
Despatches-Op Cit.
37 Page-203-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit.
38 Page-94-War
Despatches-Op Cit.
39 Ibid.
40Page-202-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit.Harbaksh claims that Bhatti was killed on the east bank of BRB
(page-96-War Despatches-Op Cit) but Shaukat states that Bhatti was killed
by enemy tanks shooting from across the BRB Canal (Page-202-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit).
41Page-362-History of
the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
42 Page-99-War
Despatches-Op Cit.
43Page-366-History of
the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
44Pages-218 and
219-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
45Page-224-Ibid.
46Pages-221 &
222-Ibid.
47Page-227-Ibid.
48Page-100-Harbaksh
Singh-Op Cit.
49Pages-100 &
101-Ibid.
50We shall discuss the
leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour
operations in Khem Karan. The British, mostly withdrew from the final battle
positions in North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and
wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation
in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab, but mobility oriented
since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its
equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of
warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was
important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa.
Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more
difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and
natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which
should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought
since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to
realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing
numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell
Hart.
51Page-109-Harbaksh
Singh-Op Cit.
52Page-245-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit.
53Page-220- The Sidi
Rezeg Battles 1941- J.A.I Agar Hamilton and L.F.C Turner-0xford University
Press-Cape Town-1957
54Page-33- Plain as well
as Subtle aspects of Military Decision-Making- A.H Amin-Citadel
Magazine-Issue-1/94-Command and Staff College Quetta-1994-Term coined and
defined by this scribe.
55Page-278 & 279-Maj
K.C Praval-Op Cit.
56Page-371-History of
the Indian Armoured Corps-Op Cit.
57Page-174-On War-Carl
Von Clausewitz-Edited by Anatol Rapoport-Pelican Books-London-1974.
58Page-276-Ibid.
59Page-35-Plain as well
as Subtle Aspects of Military Decision Making-Op Cit.
60Page-161-Harbaksh
Singh-Op Cit.
61Page-23-My
Version-Indo Pakistan War 1965-General Musa-Wajid Alis-Lahore-1983.
62Page-237-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit.
63Ibid.
64Page-24-Observations
of an Artillery Commander-Major General Ihsan ul Haq Malik (Retired)-Defence
Journal-Volume One-Number -8-1975-Karachi.
65Page-22-Ibid.
66Page-20-Article-Back
to Square One-Major General Shaukat Riza- Defence Journal-Volume One-Number
-8-1975-Karachi.
67Page-24-Hell or High
Water-MacArthurs landing at Inchon-Walt Sheldon-Macmillan and
Company-Newyork-1968 and Pages 19 to 23 and Pages-186 & 187-Victory at High
Tide-The Inchon Seoul Campaign-Robert.D.Heinl Junior-J.B Lippincott
Co-Philadelphia-1968.
68Page-151-Monty-The
Making of a General-1887-1942-London-Hamilton Books-1981.
69Footnote-25-Page-87-Op
Cit-Sidi Rezeg Battles-Op Cit.
70Page-404,405 & 409-Major
K.C Praval-Op Cit .
71Pages-108 &
109-The Military in Pakistan-Myth and Reality-Brig A.R
Siddiqi-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.
72Footnote on
page-78-General Tajammul-Op Cit.
ब्रिगेडियर_नरेन्द्र_ढंड
Brig Narinder Dhand,
Founder & Convener
Veteran's Web Portals.
Brig Narinder Dhand,
Founder & Convener
Veteran's Web Portals.
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