POLITICISATION

 The politicisation of India's 3.5 million strong military is a fiercely debated subject today. But in this passionate and largely irresolvable argument, the uniforms' culpability in pleasing the politician is rarely, if at all dwelt upon. This is because it has become an axiom in official and media circles that the military remains sacrosanct, commits no wrong and its behaviour is unchallengeable and beyond reproach.   

Inversely, the services also wallow in their portrayal of themselves as the politician's hapless handmaidens. But in recent years they have conveniently tailored many of their operational postures and missions to meet the ruling administrations political demands, regardless of the situational requirement. 

This perilous penchant has degenerated into a symbiotic, and mostly accepted, relationship between senior military personnel and politicians: the latter use service personnel, especially from the Indian Army (IA) for political profit while, in turn, the soldier pursues career betterment and, in many cases re-employment after retirement.

    

This cosy relationship is further cemented by the solider and politician jointly 'inventing' triumph and manufacturing success through an increasingly pliable media. Doubtlessly, this furthers their respective interests, but ends up insulating public opinion from insider reality. 

In the process the IA in particular, has been turned into an instrument for permanent crises management, deployed to contain insurgencies in the northeast, Kashmir and earlier in Punjab. Its role has been reduced to that of a better trained, equipped, disciplined and more feared constabulary in olive green.

It continually substitutes the country's vast state police forces and federally managed paramilitaries that collectively outnumber the army twice over but have proven woefully inadequate in ensuring security. And though the army' considers its employment in counter insurgency and related hybrid warfare operations to be an indicator of operational flexibility, many insiders concur that this law enforcement role detracts majorly from its primary function as a military force.     

Over decades the lament of senior retired and serving officers also is that the military's standards and value systems have irrevocably plummeted, in keeping with the overall societal deterioration in probity and ethics. Handily, this decline is explained away as a harsh fait accompli, an inescapable reflection of the national decline in norms and ideals. 

But Indian society in general, confronted with an apocalyptic and irreversible decay in political, official and public standards, still somehow expect better from its soldiery. It continues to desperately seek some form of uniformed noblesse oblige, which unfortunately is now a distant mirage and one largely unattainable.         

             

Till the Eighties Indian military officers were considered upright, respected in society and eagerly sought after by parents as eligible suitors for their daughters. Retired soldiers talk nostalgically of the days when a mere note from the commanding officer on behalf of any jawan, naval rating or airman to the local authorities back in his village, carried weight and invariably ended up resolving niggling administrative complications. 

Those were times when the esprit d' corps in the apolitical services was strong and invitations to riotous and swinging regimental officers messes, much sought after. Salaries were low, but the lifestyle lavish and large hearted in what was largely a gentleman's army, rive with regimental tradition and chutzpah.

Hoary colonial traditions too contributed to this environment, making military service even more attractive in a swiftly changing social milieu, particularly after independence. In short, soldiering represented an even, steady and decent value system that largely endured for several decades.

In reality, many officers were eager and enthusiastic lads trapped inside grown bodies, all of who were seeking to indulge passions like shikar, riding, polo and outdoor living and danger at state expense. And, much like Freemasons officers rarely, if at all discussed politics and religion and if passed over for promotion retired gracefully, confident of their assured status in society.

   

Promotions were almost entirely merit-based, with undeserving candidates adhering to the Peter Principle and rarely ever crossing their limits of incompetence. Service chiefs and senior commanders brooked no political interference in operational matters and were listened to with respect by the ruling establishment.

The flamboyance, bravery and tactical brilliance of all ranks in the first three wars with Pakistan is well recorded and the subject of study in combat institutions around the world. It is rarely acknowledged, even at home, that in 1971 India's military single-handedly achieved what even the US with all its weaponry and hi-tech wizardry has not managed since World War II: it created a new nation: Bangladesh.

The fabled Sam Maenkshaw amply vindicated the military's and the soldiers' operational independence. After touring the teeming refugee camps in East Bengal in early 1971, crammed with Bengali's fleeing the Pakistan Army's pogrom in East Pakistan, General Mankekshaw (later Field Marshal) was asked by an agitated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi what the IA would do to control the situation.

"Nothing", quipped Manekshaw, to the horror of Mrs Gandhi's entourage of senior civil servants and ministers, as no one had ever dared to respond so brusquely to the despotic leader. The level-headed Manekshaw then unwearyingly informed Gandhi that it would take at least 10 months before his force would be ready for combat for an assortment of  tactical and strategic reasons. To her credit, Gandhi listened and Bangladesh came into being.       

The earlier disastrous 1962 war with China, however, in which India came off worse and one that heaped ignominy on the country and scarred the IA for generations, was widely acknowledged as a political and diplomatic catastrophe. Over half a century later the reality behind this rout remains secreted in the inquiry report authored by Major General T B Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat, which even Prime Minister Narendra Modi's brash and macho BJP government has shirked from disclosing.   

But after the spectacular 1971 victory and the capture of over 90,000 Pakistani Army personnel, India's military led by the IA, enjoyed an exalted status. But it was one it would gradually lose due in large measure to its internal dynamics, which today are studiously ignored. 

In its single-mindedness in seeking parity with their civilian counterparts, the services professionalism and apolitical stance began to gradually unravel under successive cadre reviews in 1979, 1984 and 2001-02 executed to enhance career prospects. One of the major casualties in the ensuing changes was that operational and command and control responsibilities for officers were reduced greatly in inverse proportion to their ranks.

This, in turn, perpetuated a situation where one and two-star officers discharged duties and responsibilities previously performed by junior and mid-ranking personnel. Pressure on promotions too created a situation in which many senior ranks served between 12-18 months in their posts, leaving them little or no time to effect any meaningful changes.

Alongside, internal shenanigans in the IA in the late 1990s spawned a 'caste system' that effectively 'Mandalised' the force, further fuelling resentment and diluting standards. This new complex policy of quotas for combat and support arms upset decades of established practice, whereby merit was the sole criterion for promotion.

This enduring Mandalisation further depreciated flagging officer morale, creating unnecessary rifts and frustrations within the IA and prompting competent and independent minded officers to quit service after becoming eligible for their pension. The IA is imminently undergoing another seismic restructuring but that, as they sat, is a far longer and complex saga. ENDS.

[It seems we retired well in time. NKR]

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