A TRIBUTE TO BRIGADIER KULDEEP SINGH CHANDPURI, MVC, VSM HERO OF LONGEWALA
An outstanding Soldier by Brig Indrajeet Singh Gakhal
The genes of valour were tempered in the First World War, reinforced during the Second World War and decorated in the third generation at Longewala. S. Karam Singh, the grandfather, served with XXXVI Sikhs(4 SIKH-Saragarhi Battalion) in Mesopotamia in WW-1, followed by S Wattan Singh , the father who served in the St John's Ambulance Brigade during the Second WW.
Hardships and hard work are companions that build character, S Karam Singh decided to move the family from their rain dependent farming to canal irrigated fertile lands that he had invested in. In early 1938 the family left Village Chandpur Rorki (7 Kms from Garh Shankar on Noorpur Bedi road) for Chack 161/9L, Tehsil Hadappa in the Montgomery (now in Pakistan) district. S Karam singh had invested in 6 Morabas of fertile land. Life began afresh for this hard working family of Karam singh and his four brothers, Sant singh, Karam singh, Indar singh & Udham singh . Wattan singh lived in Motgomery town while the rest were at Chack 161.
It was here that Kuldeep Singh was born on 22 Nov 1940, his two sisters followed. Things were beginning to look up, however, providence had other plans and Partition happened. A young seven year old saw murder, loot and rape from close quarters, till his mother, sisters and him were evacuated by the Army to Amritsar, where Col Assa Singh a family friend provided shelter. The male members of the family had to trudge back in different groups avoiding murdering marauders. The family reunited at Chandpur Rorki and set about stitching their lives together.
The loss of fertile agricultural base was partly compensated when some land of repatriated Muslims was allotted to the family at Village Saroya, Tehsil Balachaur, not far from Chandpur Rorki. As elders set about building life anew, young Kuldeep set about educating himself. Studies were enjoyable but football even more, but as lives were being built over again one had to help with chores in farming.
It was a hard grind, school, followed by churning the fodder machine wheel and feeding the cattle. The young shoulders were strengthening under the weight of responsibilities. This is where young Kuldeep Singh grew up, studying, helping out on the farm and when time permitted playing Football that had caught his fancy.
After passing District Board High school, from Saroya, football took Kuldeep Singh to SGS Khalsa college, Mahilpur, which was considered a nursery of the game. The next leap based on football was to government college Hoshiarpur. While still undergoing graduation Kuldeep Singh became an under officer in NCC, participating in the Republic Day Parade of 1962 as part of the NCC contingent. Later the same year the Chinese invasion happened. Kuldeep singh's leaning towards an Army career found opposition from his mother.
MAP OF THE AREA |
The Indian Army was weighed down by the humiliation of the Chinese aggression, newer equipment was inducted and the entire focus was on training. For a young officer it was an ideal learning opportunity. Soon, the Indo-Pakistan September 1965 war happened and 3 Punjab was defending the Beas Bridge as the enemy armored thrust threatened to cut off a major chunk of Punjab. Being a reserve battalion 3 Punjab saw frequent changes in tasks and locations, all adding to the experience of Lt Chandpuri.
In Oct 1965, the Battalion moved to Poona (now Pune) for its UN Mission assignment UNIEF in Gaza for a year. An international assignment early in ones military career always helps widen ones perspective, so it did for Capt Chandpuri. On completion of the UN assignment 3 Punjab landed in Sunderbani (J&K), from where Capt Chandpuri proceeded on Platoon weapons course, returning with an instructor grading and Best student award.
On 10 Dec 1967 Capt Kuldeep singh Chandpuri married Ms Surinder Kaur whose father S Baldev Singh was a Dy Superintendent of Police in the Vigilance Department of Punjab Police. A stint as General staff officer Grade 3(GSO3) in Sikkim followed in 1968. A GSO3 being an operational appointment Capt Chandpuri learnt operational details from his association with Maj Gen Inder Gill, the General officer Commanding who had an exceptional war record.
In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector of the Thar Desert. 23 Punjab was then commanded by Lt Col Md Khurshid Hussain also of 3 Punjab, but not particularly fond of Chandpuri. Maj Chandpuri after his promotion was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) company, (Punjab Battalions have a mix of two Sikh & two Dogra Companies).
Soon Major Chandpuri , was detailed for a month long familiarization with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow. Maj Chandpuri diligently studied the terrain in detail going over from one sand dune to the other. After a sweat soaked month under the unbearable sun, Maj Chandpuri was sure of his bearings, little realizing that time and events were beckoning him to claim his glory. The Indo-Pak war of Dec 1971 was about to unfold.
In Oct 1965, the Battalion moved to Poona (now Pune) for its UN Mission assignment UNIEF in Gaza for a year. An international assignment early in ones military career always helps widen ones perspective, so it did for Capt Chandpuri. On completion of the UN assignment 3 Punjab landed in Sunderbani (J&K), from where Capt Chandpuri proceeded on Platoon weapons course, returning with an instructor grading and Best student award.
On 10 Dec 1967 Capt Kuldeep singh Chandpuri married Ms Surinder Kaur whose father S Baldev Singh was a Dy Superintendent of Police in the Vigilance Department of Punjab Police. A stint as General staff officer Grade 3(GSO3) in Sikkim followed in 1968. A GSO3 being an operational appointment Capt Chandpuri learnt operational details from his association with Maj Gen Inder Gill, the General officer Commanding who had an exceptional war record.
In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector of the Thar Desert. 23 Punjab was then commanded by Lt Col Md Khurshid Hussain also of 3 Punjab, but not particularly fond of Chandpuri. Maj Chandpuri after his promotion was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) company, (Punjab Battalions have a mix of two Sikh & two Dogra Companies).
Soon Major Chandpuri , was detailed for a month long familiarization with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow. Maj Chandpuri diligently studied the terrain in detail going over from one sand dune to the other. After a sweat soaked month under the unbearable sun, Maj Chandpuri was sure of his bearings, little realizing that time and events were beckoning him to claim his glory. The Indo-Pak war of Dec 1971 was about to unfold.
Anticipating the war, 23 Punjab had occupied its battle positions, Major Chandpuri's Alfa Company was defending the Logewala sweet water position, while the remaining Battalion was occupying a Battalion defended area at Sadewala. The remaining brigade was to Tanot. The Longewala position was reasonably well fortified with anti-Tank mines laid by the Pioneer section largely towards the South West . The only wire fence that circumvented the position was basically laid to keep out the wild camels that came sniffing for water. This wire was to later prove the undoing of the attackers.
A section each of 81 MM Mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches the Sikhs were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, sure enough on 03 Dec 1971 air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, who was keeping tabs of the enemy reported large columns of tanks and Infantry moving towards Longewala.
Maj Chandpuri collected his men spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and the Gurus blessings, urging them to hold fast at all costs. "Loon day mull chakon da wayla agaya" (time to repay the Nation is upon us) he said. A series of Jaikars "Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sari Akal" reverberated amongst the vast expanse of the dunes. Maj Chandpuri realized that his motivational tirade had hit home. The battle that unfolded is well documented and gave Sunny Deol's flagging career a great thrust. (Today when people use Sunny Deol's name to recall Maj Chandpuri, it hurts us soldiers).
The crux was holding fast despite the overwhelming enemy tank's, artillery bombardment and infantry attacks. It needed grit and faith, both amply displayed by Maj Chandpuri. The morning after saw the Indian Air Force decimate the Pakistani tanks. It was the grit of Maj Chandpuri, his motivational skills his faith in God and his men that the battle ended the way it did. The strand of wire that had kept the camels away also kept the Pakistani's at bay! The Maha Vir Chakra awarded to Maj KS Chandpuri was an apt recognition of his valour & professionalism.
A section each of 81 MM Mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches the Sikhs were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, sure enough on 03 Dec 1971 air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, who was keeping tabs of the enemy reported large columns of tanks and Infantry moving towards Longewala.
Maj Chandpuri collected his men spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and the Gurus blessings, urging them to hold fast at all costs. "Loon day mull chakon da wayla agaya" (time to repay the Nation is upon us) he said. A series of Jaikars "Jo bole so nihal, Sat Sari Akal" reverberated amongst the vast expanse of the dunes. Maj Chandpuri realized that his motivational tirade had hit home. The battle that unfolded is well documented and gave Sunny Deol's flagging career a great thrust. (Today when people use Sunny Deol's name to recall Maj Chandpuri, it hurts us soldiers).
The crux was holding fast despite the overwhelming enemy tank's, artillery bombardment and infantry attacks. It needed grit and faith, both amply displayed by Maj Chandpuri. The morning after saw the Indian Air Force decimate the Pakistani tanks. It was the grit of Maj Chandpuri, his motivational skills his faith in God and his men that the battle ended the way it did. The strand of wire that had kept the camels away also kept the Pakistani's at bay! The Maha Vir Chakra awarded to Maj KS Chandpuri was an apt recognition of his valour & professionalism.
As Col Chandpuri progressed in life, successfully commanding his Battalion, as Brigadier commanded 100 Brigade and the Punjab Regimental Centre, besides other staff appointments. In his entire military career his earthy and simple ways came to the fore. A son of the soil he remained a teetotaler and vegetarian all his life, simple of habit and strong of character was Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri , MVC.
His dedicated services were recognized by the Nation by way of the award of Vashisht Seva Medal. By now he had established his credentials in the Track and Field and was a listed IOA judge, frequently called upon to lend his services at international meets. His ability for hard work and constantly learn were not diminished by age.
Post retirement Brig Chandpuri , MVC, VSM worked with Godrej & Boyce as their Security advisor for many years. He was on the board of directors of the PESCO and a nominated member in the UT council. In all the appointments his sincerity, simplicity and earthiness endeared him to all whose lives he touched.
His dedicated services were recognized by the Nation by way of the award of Vashisht Seva Medal. By now he had established his credentials in the Track and Field and was a listed IOA judge, frequently called upon to lend his services at international meets. His ability for hard work and constantly learn were not diminished by age.
Post retirement Brig Chandpuri , MVC, VSM worked with Godrej & Boyce as their Security advisor for many years. He was on the board of directors of the PESCO and a nominated member in the UT council. In all the appointments his sincerity, simplicity and earthiness endeared him to all whose lives he touched.
On 17 Nov 2018, just five days short of his 78Th Birthday Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM breathed his last. His passing is a loss to the entire soldier's brotherhood and those whose lives he touched however fleetingly.
Soldiers may fade away, but their valour lives forever. Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM Amar Rahain and may the noble soul rest in the heaven above till eternity !!
Soldiers may fade away, but their valour lives forever. Brig Kuldeep Singh Chandpuri, MVC, VSM Amar Rahain and may the noble soul rest in the heaven above till eternity !!
TIMES OF INDIA REPORTS- 1971 India-Pakistan war hero Brig Chandpuri dead.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/1971-india-pakistan-war-hero-brig-chandpuri-dead/articlesho/66664353.cms?utm_campaign=andapp&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=native_share_tray
Published on blog site -- With tribute from --
Brig Narinder Dhand,
Founder & Convener
Veteran's Web Portals.
http://signals-parivaar.blogspot.in
I am deeply grieved to learn the sad news, that the Great Son Of India in no more among us. During my tenure as GSO2(OPS) of Jodhpur Desert Division in 1980-82 (Olden days, when Div HQ rather the entire Div had only one Full Colonel as the ADMS and we wore Khaki Uniforms, probably to fool Pakistani Observers), I had very intimate contact with Brig KS Chandpuri, we used to invite him to Jodhpur very often during the visits of VVIPs which included the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi to Pokharan blast site and Longewala. My job took me to Longewala in-numerable times with Brig Chandpuri, to commence the briefing after GOC's initial introduction, giving broader picture of 1971 ops in the theater a. The entire briefing incl each and every Dhora opposite Longewala, We did this many times and I could then simply rattle out extempore. Thanks to this Great Hero, the Brave Son Of Soil, who took me to every spot from where his RCL took on paki tanks during the night and how the low wire fence laid to ward off the wild animals proved to be a boon for them which posed a picture of large mine field for the advancing columns of Pakistan Army.
His emotional oration of the night ordeal when PAK tanks in large numbers just appeared opposite him tingles fresh in my ears. What a man in uniform he has been in true tradition of his Fauji family genes. We were in touch for a long period and had developed closeness.
God bless his soul, A brave leader and commander, My salute to you Sir,
Brig NK Dhand.
Founder & Convener
Veteran's Web Portals.
http://signals-parivaar.blogspot.in
I am deeply grieved to learn the sad news, that the Great Son Of India in no more among us. During my tenure as GSO2(OPS) of Jodhpur Desert Division in 1980-82 (Olden days, when Div HQ rather the entire Div had only one Full Colonel as the ADMS and we wore Khaki Uniforms, probably to fool Pakistani Observers), I had very intimate contact with Brig KS Chandpuri, we used to invite him to Jodhpur very often during the visits of VVIPs which included the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi to Pokharan blast site and Longewala. My job took me to Longewala in-numerable times with Brig Chandpuri, to commence the briefing after GOC's initial introduction, giving broader picture of 1971 ops in the theater a. The entire briefing incl each and every Dhora opposite Longewala, We did this many times and I could then simply rattle out extempore. Thanks to this Great Hero, the Brave Son Of Soil, who took me to every spot from where his RCL took on paki tanks during the night and how the low wire fence laid to ward off the wild animals proved to be a boon for them which posed a picture of large mine field for the advancing columns of Pakistan Army.
His emotional oration of the night ordeal when PAK tanks in large numbers just appeared opposite him tingles fresh in my ears. What a man in uniform he has been in true tradition of his Fauji family genes. We were in touch for a long period and had developed closeness.
God bless his soul, A brave leader and commander, My salute to you Sir,
Brig NK Dhand.
NOTE :- By anonymous
1971 was a debacle for Southern Command operations, The tank assault to Longewala- Ramgarh and Jaisalmer by PAK checkmated the pending Divisional assault planned towards R.Y.Khan from Kishangarh
The Armoured assault by PAK, one can say, by sheer divine intervention halted since some of their tanks got bellied in soft sand while skirting and out flanking Longewala position through the narrow inter-dunal spaces.
The only RCL with the Longewala company was ordered to be withdrawn the previous day but could not leave for Tanote for some reasons, as such saved the situation at Longewala during the night from being run over and churned by Pakistsni Tanks in direct assault to get on to the road at Longewala on way to Ramgarh..
Some - odd through-some one relayed radio communication worked and Hunters from Jaisalmer took on the tanks in early hours of the morning. They had good range and target practice since Paki Air wasn't there to support the armoured columns.
Pak logistics to support the attacking columns which were mostly B-Vehicle based could not fetch up in time due to sandy track from border to Longewala.
Had Paki succeeded in out-skirting Longewala they would have had a free run to Jaisalmer. Fortunately for us they had miscalculated the softness of sand dunes in the LW area which is so even today. In Chandpuris words Utte Rabb Haiga (There is God up there).
Pakistan Army outsmarted Southern Command in all it's measures, in making their plans ans preparations for offensive against Rahim Yar Khan, To sum up God saved the Situation for India,
There were only two MVCs (No PVCs) awarded in Southern Command, Maharaja Col Bhawani Singh who died in 2015 for Para Cdo Ops towards Munnabao and Chandpuri for sticking to the loc against severe odds and being out numbered.
: END OF AN ERA.. with Brig Chandpuri's demise.
REST IN PEACE THE BRAVEST OF BRAVES SON OF INDIA.
War diaries are written much after the war ends describing situations that suit , hiding incompetence and failures ...
BRIG. E. N. RAMADOSS (RETD.) AVSM, SM
BRIGADE COMMANDER AT THE BATTLE OF LAUNGEWALA
Wrote sometimes after the operations, as his son describes :-
FORT KISHANGARH |
A
Company under MAJ. K.S. CHANDPURI of 23rd Punjab (commanded by Lt. Col.
M. K. HUSSEIN) of 45th Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brig. KHARBANDA)
was holding LAUNGEWALA post. A platoon (under the present Commanding
Officer who was then a Captain) had been sent out on patrol towards the
border. He had reported the enemy armour movements. Pakistani medium
guns (130 mm) shelled LAUNGEWALA Cross Roads – Water Point Area at 0230
hours, sound of which woke me up at my Headquarters, ten kilometres away
from LAUNGEWALA near SADEWALA.
I
requested General Khambhata to allot me all the available air support
at first light, due to the disparate relative strengths of four Indian
AMX tanks against estimated 30 tanks of Pakistan (which turned out later
to be 48 T-59 and 12 Sherman Mk V American tanks). The troops were
ordered back from the road where they were waiting for transport from
the previous night to reopen their defences. One company of 17 RAJRIF
was to proceed with the troop of tanks to reinforce LAUNGEWALA and the
remainder of 17 RAJRIF was to build up on LAUNGEWALA later as per the
situation. One company of 6/5 GR was to provide a screen two kms ahead
of our own defences at SADEWALA.
When
the leading tanks of the Pakistani force reached about a km South-West
of LAUNGEWALA Post on the road to GHOTARU at about 0515 hours, Maj.
Chandpuri informed my Brigade Major, Maj. Bhandari (now Col. (Retd.))
and ordered his recoilless guns to open fire. No tank was hit. In
return, the Pakistani troop knocked every structure at the post to
rubble (Temple escaped) and set fire to a large stack of fodder for
camels. This silenced 'A' company completely. The left platoon fell back
from their positions, leaving Maj. Chandpuri with just his company HQ
personnel and one platoon on the post. Surprisingly the Pakistani armour
did not press the attack.
Actually
there was no physical assault on the Post by enemy tanks or infantry.
This was confirmed later by a Pakistani Bangladeshi Officer who was with
the leading Pakistani infantry battalion and escaped to our side after
the cease fire. There was no dead body or crippled tank within 400
meters of the Post.
Our
fighter planes, Hunters, flew over at telescopic first light at 0730
hours and reported there were no tanks visible. I realised the pilots
were new to the desert, asked them to hang on over the target area and
requested our Division HQ to send up Maj. Atma Singh, our Air OP Flight
Commander, to direct the fighters on to enemy tanks. Then the Air Force
had a merry day; with Maj. Atma Singh and Capt. Sangha directing the
planes alternately, knocked out 23 tanks (19 T-59 and 4 Shermans) during
5th and 6th Dec 1971. It was confirmed later that there had been no
recoilless gun hit on any of those enemy tanks. Our fighters dared to
come singly even, once they realised there was no enemy air cover to
their armoured thrust in the open desert. Two Pakistani Starfighters
straffed my Brigade Column towards Border Pillar 635 on the afternoon of
8th Dec 1971, the only air attack during the whole operation. Their
absence for three days is quite inexplicable. Had they been there on 5th
Dec 1971, our Hunters would have been seen off.
Lt.
Col. A. S. Grewal of 17 RAJ RIF and I had been on the road
LAUNGEWALA-SADEWALA two kms short of the Laungewala helipad from 0900
hours onwards behind 'A' Company 17 RAJ RIF who did the link up. At 0915
hours our leading AMX tank was hit by one enemy T-59 which had come
upto the helipad. Our tank blew up along with the its crew of three but
had also hit the enemy tank which was abandoned bt the crew, leaving the
gunner dead inside. At 1300 hours Maj. Atma Singh force landed on the
helipad near the abandoned T-59, picked up the maps from inside the
tank, reported to my HQ at 1500 hours and said that the enemy tank
seemed to be a running one. My Staff Officer, Capt. Ramesh Khatri drove
it back to my HQ at 1700 hours. This was the only running Pakistani tank
captured in the whole operation. The shell from our AMX tank had hit
the side of the main armament, ricocheted into the hull and killed the
gunner whom we buried in our HQ at SADEWALA.
The
6th Independent Armoured Squadron (14 brand new T-55 tanks) under Maj.
R. D. Law, VrC rushed back on tracks from KISHANGARH and arrived at
LAUNGEWALA helipad area at 1300 hours restoring our morale.
Lt.
Gen. Eric Vazused to start his lecture on 1971 operations that "Two
factors favoured our actions during the war GOD and LUCK". We had plenty
of both at LAUNGEWALA on 5thDec 1971.
The
above is my father's report on the Longewala battle. He was Brig Cdr.
30 Brigade. Incidentally I met Maj Chandpuri at Longewala on 24th Dec 71
when on leave from NDA.
War diaries are written much after the war ends describing situations that suit , hiding incompetence and failures ...
OTHER OPERATIONS IN THE SECTOR
RAID ON CHACHRO BY 10 PARA COMMANDOS
Well done job by 10 Pars Commandos.
THE CHACHRO RAID OF 1971
BY DEFENCE NEWS INDIA STAFF ON JUNE 9, 2017
On
7 Dec 1971; Team of 10 Para (SF) carried out daring raid on Chachro
Town, 80 Km deep inside Pakistan.It was an important communication
centre inside enemy territory.In resounding success large number of
enemy soldiers, material, weapons and ammunition was destroyed.
Elite
Commando troops of the Parachute regiment raided on Chachro on the
night of December 5th. The Unit was based at Sarupkatala, south west of
Barmer town. By the day light, the commandos neutralized all threats and
cleared the enemy from Chachro. It was discovered that a major chunk of
the Pakistani force had escaped earlier. However 17 prisoners and a
huge number of small arms were captured. After that one group proceeded
to raid the town of Virawah.
By
evening Virawah was taken over. Actually this was the biggest
territorial conquest in terms of territory. The whole area of about
3600sq. kilometers remained under the control of Indian Army till 22nd
December 1972.
Operation Details:
At
0700 hours, December 5, 1971, men of the Desert Scorpions (10 Para
Commandos) come under intense medium machine gun (MMG) fire from gun
positions on top of sand dunes at Kita about 70 km into enemy territory.
The Jeep/Jonga-borne commandos take defence positions in the shadow of
the night. As they look for options, one Jeep rushes towards the enemy
without a care for personal safety, firing at the enemy position. Naik
Nihal Singh has opened up his light machine gun (LMG) mounted on his
Jeep. The darkness acts as cover, the enemy only has the machine gun
burst to aim at. This audacious charge gives the other teams time to
start firing — 18 LMGs open up and in a few hours, the enemy positions
are overrun, the survivors abandon the posts and escape.
This
was the start to one of the most audacious commando missions in the
world undertaken by the Indian Army's Para Commandos. Inspired by the
British SAS raid behind enemy lines at a German airfield in Fuka, Lybia
during the Second World War, this successful operation established the
Indian Army's dominance in the desert during the 1971 war.
This
operation was led by Lt Col Bhawani Singh. For four days, the battalion
infiltrated deep inside enemy territory and carried out raids on enemy
positions at Chachro and Virwah. Lt Col Bhawani Singh was awarded the Mahavir
Chakra for his leadership and courage.
Objectives of the Commando Team
Two
teams — Alpha and Charlie — were trained for five months in desert
warfare. A young commando battalion was entrusted with the crucial
mission just five years after its formation in 1967. The objectives were
to strike enemy positions 80 km inside their territory, hit their
supply lines and create confusion. To complete their mission, the teams
travelled over 500 km inside enemy territory, hitting various enemy
positions despite having little knowledge of the terrain and the
challenges that lay ahead.
"Ginger
up the enemy" was the theme used by Lt Col Bhawani Singh. who rose to be a
brigadier and one of the most decorated officers in the Indian Army. He
was the first to be called after retirement to boost the morale of his
unit in Sri Lanka.
Target 1: Battle of Chachro
The
team moved slowly through inhospitable terrain only by night. Brigadier
Abraham Chacko was a Second Lieutenant then assigned to the Alpha team,
the strike team that hit the Wing headquarters of the Pakistani Rangers
in Chachro. Their mission — to create chaos and take vital ascents 80
km into enemy territory.
"The
route was so bad that all silencers of our Jeeps/Jongas made us sound
like a full-tank battalion moving into Pakistan," remembers Brigadier
Chacko. The racket not a positive for commando raid, which relies on
stealth and silence. This, however, came out as an advantage for this
group as the enemy abandoned positions at several locations thinking
that this was indeed a tank column moving.
After
the Kita firefight, a small patrol was tasked with route clearance till
the wing headquarters at Chachro. This team moved in the night and gave
a clearance to attack at 0400 hours on December 7. Alpha team took
positions around town blocking every exit point, ready to provide cover
fire. Charlie team moved in for the offensive at dawn. The operation was
a risky one as the town had many civilians. The fear of collateral
damage kept the teams on their toes. They could not risk hostile
civilians so deep into enemy territory.. The teams moved in swiftly and
by first light the town had been taken.
The
commandos moved on, their mission was only half complete. The town was
handed over to 20 Rajput which counted 17 Pakistani casualties and took
12 prisoners. Such was the planning that the raiding team suffered no
casualties. After the Chachro operation, Charlie team exfiltrated while
the Alpha team moved towards its second target.
Target 2 & 3: Virawah and Nagarparkar
For
the first raid on Chachro, the team moved only at night to stay
undetected, but during the Virawah raid, they moved by day because of
paucity of time. This was done at high risk. The team started its
assault on Virawah at 0200 hours on December 8. The first contact with
the enemy was at an observation post at 0130 hours. "I signalled the
Jongas to stop when we noticed movement in the bushes about 25 yards
away. A small patrol led by me was formed. Closer to the observation
post, I lobbed the grenade and charged. We got into hand to hand combat
with the enemy," remembers Col MPS Choudhary, who led one group of
commandos in the attack. As they approached the Rangers camp, the latter
fired in panic but in the opposite direction. The commandos opened up
the camp with motor fire followed by 12 light machine guns. The assault
did not last long. The Rangers fled their positions. Virawah was taken.
The
commandos then moved into Nagarparkar and the tehsil headquarter was
taken over without much difficulty by the first light of December 8. The
teams were back to their bases after this operation..
Target 4: Islamkot
Alpha
group did not get much time to rest. They were reassigned immediately
to another mission. This was an attack on a suspected ammunition dump in
Islamkot. The group entered Pakistan again and reached Sundegaon by
1900 hours on December 16. The village was empty. In the shadow of the
night, they moved towards Islamkot and waited just 2 km east of the
enemy camp. At 0530 hours, they launched their assault but found the
camp empty..
The Ambush at Lunio
On
their way back from the mission is when they faced the enemy again. "On
our way back after handing over Islamkot, leading Jeep with Captain Das
saw dust raised by moving vehicles. We immediately fanned out and went
into ambush. Other teams joined in and we opened fire. I think 18-20
enemy soldiers were killed on the spot and rest were taken prisoners of
war," remembers Col MPS Chaudhary.
This
raid was the biggest territorial conquest in terms of territory . The
whole captured area of about 3600 sq. kilometers remained under Indian
Army's control till 22nd December 1972
VIDEO _ LONGEWALA AIR
**********************
FROM PAK SIDE - A BRIEF ON ATTACK ON LONGEWALA.
BATTLE OF LONGEWALA
(As Stated by Brig Z A Khan (Ex CO of 38 CAV – Pak Army) in
an Interview in Jan 2002)
Please tell us in detail about the
Longewala Operation of 1971?
While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in
Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division
Headquarters were located. There the GOC Major General B. M. Mustafa explained
his concept of forthcoming operations to Lieutenant Colonel Akram Hussain Syed
and me, with his Colonel Staff Colonel Wajid Ali Shah present.
The general planned to defensively
hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank
seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmir; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was
to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmir; the GOC asked for our comments about
the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view.
Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I
said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on
one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air
cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and
Jaisalmir had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the
air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be
discussed with anyone.
In the first week of November, 38
Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at
Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan. A few days after
the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Marshal Rahim, the PAF chief came
to Rahimyar Khan where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief
assured the required air support.
A few days after the Rahimyar Khan
meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because
he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was
better suited. I considered the operation, Jaisalmir was 120 miles from the
rail head at Reti, I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested
that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane
to change engines, the GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements.
The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out
reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan
and Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that
we were to take to the border, Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border without
telling them that that was the route that we were to follow in the
forthcoming operations.
About the middle of November the news
indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft
started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad.
With war imminent I decided to let my
officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an
infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmir and neutralise
the airfield. I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each
tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the division headquarters
there was no preparations for the very imminent operations, on 1 December
Colonel Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered
the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters.
On 2nd December I received orders to
report to the division headquarters and there the GOC told me that operations
would begin that evening that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would
follow 51 Brigade upto Loganewala and proceed to Jaisalmir to neutralise the
airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the division orders but to
organise my force.
I telephoned my regiment to stop the
work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out, I next went to the
AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol, the
AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol
available, after a discussion with the colonel staff the AA&QMG told me that
the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of
the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been
planned.
When the 18 Division ‘O’ group
assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander informed the ‘O’ Group
that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield
had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the
GOC to cancel or postpone the operation,
the GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air, after the
discussion he informed the ‘O’ Group
that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the
‘national interest’. The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse
to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the
‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because if did not he would be
labelled as a general who had lost his nerve.
The plan made by Major General B. M.
Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty mile to the border, then a
forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third
battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations)
and 22 Cavalry, by passing Loganewala, to position itself to counter any
reaction from the Indian 12 Division which was expected to be deployed facing
Rahimyar Khan. I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry
less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metal
road to Jaisalmir, 20 miles inside India was reached and then continue to
Jaisalmir. 206 Brigade leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this
front was held by Hur battalions) was to follow my force and secure Loganewala
to form a firm base.
After these orders were issued the 206
Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmir with
mechanically unsound tanks, the GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch the
divisional Reconnaissance and Support Battalion less company and a mortar
battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51
Brigade. I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2
December.
The orders received from GHQ differed
from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of
60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the
GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3
December and the border had to be crossed at
2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, a
total march of 120 miles in one night.
On the evening of 2 December I went
to the 51 Brigade Headquarters,
Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed was already there, he told me that the brigade
commander was shaken and had lost his nerve, a little later the brigade
commander came to the tent where the ‘O’ Group had assembled, he appeared
shaken. The GSO 3 laid out the maps of the operational area, the maps covered
our territory, Indian territory was blank squares, the brigade had not
collected the maps of the operational area from the division headquarters. I
placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border,
on the table.
From the ensuing discussion it became
apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was
known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was
incorrectly said to be 11 whereas it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated
I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron
would be protecting the Indian flank at Loganewala, that 51 Brigade with 22
Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari
Bhit-Loganewal and by passing Loganewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with
an infantry battalion to follow and secure Loganewala or wait the arrival of
206 Brigade; no one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan.
When the ‘O’ Group dispersed the
artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also
without terrain features across the border.
On 3 December at 38 Cavalry tanks were
to move on tracks for 25 miles and entrain at Sadiqabad and arrived at
Reti railway station about, 30 miles
from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours. I went to
Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what
time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no
intimation of any tank train, I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed
the railway about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller
at Sukkur and after a lot of shouting and threatening the controller agreed to
move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station a goods train was standing
at the tank unloading line, there was no ‘power’ available at Reti, we were
arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure
of allowing a train to pass through, I made him stop the train and use its
locomotive to move the goods train. At about nine o’clock the tank train with 14
tanks whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters
arrived and were unloaded.
We were running well behind the
divisional planned schedule, from Reti the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal
bank, at Khenju my second in command Major Zia Uddin Javed was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled.
From Khenju the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way
to Gabbar 19 miles from the border, thirteen out of fourteen tanks arriving at
0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the
GOC who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived.
At 0400 hours the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments
dispersed. On the 4 December the Indian Air Force did not show up.
On checking up I found that the
lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki, I sent a
message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion
6x6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down, it
was a few miles from Khenju, the Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju that put
an end to my engine replacement plan.
During the day, on the advice of the
brigade commanders the attack on the Jaisalmir airfield was abandoned and 1
Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light a battery of 130 mm guns
passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.
At about 2100 hours six tanks and the
reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit, 22 Cavalry was
refuelling; Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir was
behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond
Loganewala, I met Brigadier Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go
beyond Loganewal. At about 2300 hours 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements
of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at
Masitwari Bhit and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.
The operation so far was a movement of
fiasco, civilian requisitioned 4x2
trucks could not negotiate the loose sand, 20 FF, a battalion of 206 Brigade,
marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed
to negotiate the desert.
At about 0200 hours on 5 December,
Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us
and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal with
the reconnaissance troop to lead followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks
under Major Javed Hussain. About two
miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back,
when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the
reconnaissance troop had disappeared, I realised that the NCOs had hidden their
vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire). Major Javed Hussain now
took the lead and went 18 miles and four tanks broke down leaving two runners
and we had to halt, two miles short of Loganewala, luckily on the highest ridge
in the area.
At about 0730 hours, explosions were
heard from the direction of Loganewala and columns of smoke started rising, I
and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my rover and from a ridge
overlooking the Loganwala-Jaisalmir metal road we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry
and Indian tank burning, four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after
firing all their rockets etc they flew away. A little later a helicopter took
off, later I learnt that the GOC had come to
51 Brigade as it was out of
communications with the division headquarters and ordered Lieutenant Colonel
Akram Syed to capture Loganewala.
I and my adjutant drove to the 51
Brigade headquarters, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and
he said he did not know, I then drove to
the base of the hill on which Loganwala was located, two companies of 38 Baluch
and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack.
22 Cavalry reached the rear of the
Indian Loganewala defences at about 0200 hours, in the absence of the brigade
commander 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Loganewala
before advancing to Ramgarh. At 0700 hours a squadron and two companies of
infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX
tanks, one AMX was knocked out then 6 Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out 5
tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to straffing. Half
an hour later 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six
tanks, at about 0900 hours 22 Cavalry formed up again but after a vehement and
abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut
off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Loganewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmir.
The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the
brigade headquarters re-opening the Indian communications to Loganewala. In
subsequent air attacks 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses
to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air
Force circled Loganewala from 0700 hours
to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7 mm
anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role
but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their
guns from about five thousand metres.
After witnessing the pull back by 22
Cavalry I returned to where my tanks were, there I found Brigadier Jahanzeb
Arbab, I told him of the affairs at Loganelwala and he asked me to accompany
him to Loganewala. We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the
Loganewala-Jaisalmir road out of contact
with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade
had linked up with Loganewala.
While we were at the 51 Brigade
headquarters a helicopter, flown by Captain ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, later
lieutenant general, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to
capture Loganewal and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to
Jaisalmir; on receiving the orders Brig
Tariq Mir announced that he would not
comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for brigade to
attack.
While we were witnessing the brigade
commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders, Indian aircraft
again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brigadier Jahanzeb and I went to
the same trench, there we discussed what we had seen and I told Brigadier
Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and
convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier; he hesitated and said
I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.
After the Indian aircraft departed
Brigadier Jahanzeb informed Brigadier Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack
Loganwala and he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Shah, the CO 28 Baluch, the
Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road
Loganewala-Jaisalmir and capture Ghotaru. The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and
explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide
outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road.
Brigadier Jahanzeb returned to the
point where my tanks had stopped, his brigade had concentrated there; he made
an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December, he gave out his orders
and told me to go and explain the plan to Brigadier Tariq Mir and ask him to
mark the “FUP” and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack. I
reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours, I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram
Syed and explained the plan, he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir had decided to
withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade headquarter and gave the
requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander who said that he was
withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it; at about 1900
hours the brigade started moving back.
The withdrawing 51 Brigade and
advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar a high ridge line
slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped, Brigadier Jahanzeb decided to take
up a defensive position on the ridge, at about 1130 hours the next day the
Indians made contact with tanks and infantry. The GOC came and ordered 206
Brigade to regain the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road and 51 Brigade to prepare a
depth position.
Later
the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to
fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove
to the division headquarters at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order,
I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of
the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled
the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to
cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades
withdrawing through each other, the GOC cancelled both his previous orders and
adopted my suggestion. My motive in making the suggestion was to recover my
broken down tanks lying between Kharo Tar and Gabbar and asked the GOC for
recovery assistance, he arranged for WAPDA tractors which towed back most of
the tanks.
While driving to the divisional
headquarters I found the divisional Supply and Transport Battalion vehicles
abandoned on the track on which the division had advanced, I ordered my driver
to check the state of a vehicle and found that radiators had been drained and
when my driver got into the driving compartment the driver of the vehicle came
running, he was hiding in a bush.
By the morning of 7 December 206
Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar, my Quartermaster, Captain Bhatti,
kept us supplied with food “meethi roti” and water from Sadiqabad and when a
cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my
Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad.
38 Cavalry squadron left at Manthar
because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its
movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to
Rahimyar Khan.
The GOC had complained that he was
having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the
operation, I told him I would see what the problem was. I sent my command
vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade Headquarters to establish communications
between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the
communication would break; my signal JCO could not find the reason; after the ceasefire an NCO disclosed that the
brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division headquarters,
switched off.
On the night 8/9 December 206 Brigade
withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade, 38 Cavalry
after firing all the HE ammunition destroyed its two broken down tanks and
moved to Masitwari Bhit. On 9 December after taking over the front, Brigadier
Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut
off the brigade, 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF
and lost another tank; the two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the
brigade commander’s imagination.
A little distance from my regimental
headquarters the divisional gun area was located, the IAF attacked gun area and
my headquarters, a cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket
hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was
defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School which fired single
shots but kept the IAF away.
On the night 11/12 December the
remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar, on the morning of 12 December when I
with my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended
localities’ were, I found Major General B. M. Mustafa standing there, someone
whispered that the general had been sacked and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was
in command of 18 Division.
I met the general and asked his GSO 2
(Intelligence) where the FDLs were, the general heard me and indicating the GSO
2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of
them. Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the
previous day ordered a ‘general withdrawal’, both brigades took off in the
‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab
Regimental Centre at Mardan.
On the night 12/13 December I
established my headquarters at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks
and started engine replacement. On 16 December ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two
days later, to everyone’s surprise, we ceased fire.
After the operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in
fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation though 206
Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation. The mission assigned to 18 Division was
“Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main
line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into
the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of
600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division
successfully carried out its mission. It was a classical spoiling attack which
put the Indians off balance, the division’s mission was achieved.
If your allegations about the Gabbar
gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task?
Because the GOC Major General Abdul
Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal
to be disclosed to the Awan
Committee.
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