SEAT - UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNSEL
Friends, It is really surprising that Arun Jaiteley, who is one of the leading lawyers and must be in the know of UNO and its charter had joined the bandwagon of ill informed followers, that Nehru had declined the offer of UNSC seat. Is he comparing the UNSC seat with the allocation of Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha seat to some disgruntled opposition candidates, like Tom Vadakkan, so that their loyalty could be subverted?
The recent controversies are about USA's offer in 1950 and the offer of USSR in 1955.
From the pages of 'The Hindu' dated September 28, 1955.
Here is Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in reply to a question in the Lok Sabha on September 27, 1955 by Dr. J.N. Parekh on whether India had refused a seat informally offered to her in the U.N. Security Council.
Prime Minister Nehru has categorically denied any offer, formal or informal, having been received about a seat for India in the UN Security Council. He made this statement in reply to a short notice question in the Lok Sabha on September 27 by Dr. J.N. Parekh whether India had refused a seat informally offered to her in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said: "There has been no offer, formal or informal, of this kind. Some vague references have appeared in the press about it which have no foundation in fact. The composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter, according to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition can be made to this without an amendment of the Charter. There is, therefore, no question of a seat being offered and India declining it. Our declared policy is to support the admission of all nations qualified for UN membership. "
The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (also known as the Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5) are the five states which the UN Charter of 1945 grants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council: China (formerly the Republic of China), France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were all allies in World War II, which they won. They are also all nuclear weapons states. A total of 15 UN member states serve on the UNSC, the remainder 10 are elected for a tenure of two years, at a time. Any one of the five permanent members have the power of veto, which enables them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" draft Council resolution, regardless of its level of international support.
China has been exercising this Veto power repeatedly for many years, to bail out Masoor Azhar from being branded as a wanted terrorist, though the rest of four members were for the resolution.
The whole talk of offer of permanent seat in UN Security Council to India replacing permanent founder member China(ROC) is quite a bunkum. None of the 5 permanent founder members could have been replaced by the machinations of either of the two super powers ( USA and USSR) in the heydays of Super power cold war rivalry during 1950s.
People forget the timeline. Chinese revolution of October 1949 had brought Communist Party in power in mainland China. She became the People's Republic of China (PRC). Nationalist government of Chiang, Republic of China (ROC - a UN founder member) escaped to Taiwan and continued to occupy both General Assembly and Security Council seats till 1970. PRC replaced Taiwan (ROC) in 1971, in both Security Council and General Assembly, only after US-China détente brought by Nixon and Mao.
Simultaneously 1950 also brought Korean crisis with all its furies. All out war started between Western nations' armies under UN aegis against armies of China and North Korea( June 1950- July 1953). USSR had also covertly helped the cause of China and North Korea, by providing their Airforce Pilots to China. Though the Armies of 21 Member Nations were involved in the Korean War, 90 per cent of the fighting strength was provided by the USA.
Role of India during the Korean War, in which she had sent a contingent of Medical personnel in support of UN Forces, and after declaration of ceasefire as a peacemaker was commendable. But, Mao and Chou-en-Lai viewed this logistical support by India to USA/UNO as a breach of the avowed principle of India's neutrality. Let us not forget that at that period of time, Republic of China, Taiwan (ROC) was occupying the UNSC and People's Republic of China (PRC), which was governing the main land China and 95 % of the population of China with them, was not recognised by the USA and its allies. But, Soviet Union was a staunch supporter of PRC and the spread of communism. The legitimacy of PRC to be recognised as the representative of China, could not be questioned. Nehru, also supported PRC on this issue, which cannot be faulted at any period. Under those circumstances, the USA, would not like to lose her loyal ally with Veto power, ROC in the UNSC. Therefore, the so called offer to Nehru for this seat, could only have been a bait to test the waters. Only in 1971, the USA realised the importance of PRC in Asia and agreed to replace ROC with PRC, for which USSR would never exercise her veto power.
Super power rivalry was on peak during 1950s to 1970s. Korean and Vietnam wars, Berlin, Suez , Hungarian and Cuban Missile crises, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were the outcome of this rivalry.
As for this game of feelers either by Dulles in 1950 or Bulganin in 1955, it is so inchoate that taking them at its face value is laughable. Even after strenuous efforts by India, Japan, Brazil and Germany (Group 4) to achieve entry in Security Council as a permanent member for last many decades, has not been fruitful.
That the 1955 incident was publicly discussed in 2002 in print by A.G. Noorani, a major scholar of modern Indian history and politics, has not ended the rumour-mongering. However, new evidence of an even earlier offer—by the US in August 1950—to assist India in assuming a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has recently emerged, adding substantially to what Noorani earlier wrote. Nehru's rejection of the US offer underlined the consistency of his conviction that the PRC's legitimate interests must be acknowledged in order to reduce international tensions. Integrating the PRC into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the Security Council was in fact a central pillar of Nehru's foreign policy. Nehru's skepticism about accepting this offer, and thereby disrupting the dynamics of the UN, revealed the reverence he had for the international organisation, despite its flaws. Furthermore, his principled rejection of the US's suggestion indicates Indian agency in its difficult relations with the US at this time. Finally, Nehru's sense that India deserved recognition as a great country was made plain, although this was qualified by his refusal to compromise core principles to gain such recognition. That the US made such an approach to India also suggests that the traditional emphasis on the US's early attempt to pursue an even-handed approach to the subcontinent's major powers and defer to the UK's greater experience in the region ought to be reconsidered. Furthermore, this episode enriches our understanding of the US government's internal wrangling over how to bend the UN to its interests in this early stage of the Cold War.
The 1955 Soviet offer
In 2002, A.G. Noorani wrote a defence of Nehru's decision to reject Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin's offer of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1955. He wrote Nehru was right to do so, as really the offer was just a "feeler to test India." Noorani was reviewing the new, and then most recent, volume of the second series of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He was also taking aim at those political figures who had attacked Nehru's decision to reject this offer based on a reference in the well-known Sarvepalli Gopal biography of Nehru (1979) in which Gopal wrote: "He [Jawaharlal Nehru] rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given to China's admission to the United Nations." (p. 248) Utilising the new evidence available in the Selected Works, Noorani argued that Nehru was correct in making little of this offer, as the offer was in fact unlikely to materialise in reality; and even if the Soviets were sincere about facilitating India's accession to the Security Council as a permanent member, this would have caused major problems for India's overall foreign policy strategy by complicating its relations with China and the major powers. Noorani quoted the following exchange offered in the Selected Works to bolster his claims:
"[Nikolai] Bulganin: Regarding your suggestion about the four power conference we would take appropriate action. While we are discussing the general international situation and reducing tension, we propose suggesting at a later stage India's inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council".
"JN [Jawaharlal Nehru]: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject to controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council, it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China's admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted. What is Bulganin's opinion about the revision of the Charter? In our opinion this does not seem to be an appropriate time for it".
Bulganin: We proposed the question of India's membership of the Security Council to get your views, but agree that this is not the time for it and it will have to wait for the right moment later on. We also agree that things should be taken one by one".
Noorani suggested that Bulganin's response to Nehru's reservations indicated that the "offer" was not a real one, but more a means of sounding out India's views, as Bulganin agreed with Nehru that the time was not right for pushing a new permanent member into the Security Council.
Furthermore, the exchange shows that India had already rejected a similar suggestion made by the US. Nehru ascribed the American offer to its desire to disturb Sino-Indian relations. The status of the People's Republic of China in the UN, Nehru argued, should take priority, before any consideration be given to the necessary revision of the UN Charter required for the admittance of any new permanent members. What exactly Nehru meant in terms of "others" whose admission possibly also should be settled prior to India is unclear, but he probably had in mind the newly independent nations not yet admitted as members of the UN.
Col TN Raman (Retd)
E5/230, AWHO Parameswaran Vihar,
67, Arcot Road, Saligramam,
Chennai 600093
Mob: 9840033326
From the pages of 'The Hindu' dated September 28, 1955.
Here is Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in reply to a question in the Lok Sabha on September 27, 1955 by Dr. J.N. Parekh on whether India had refused a seat informally offered to her in the U.N. Security Council.
Prime Minister Nehru has categorically denied any offer, formal or informal, having been received about a seat for India in the UN Security Council. He made this statement in reply to a short notice question in the Lok Sabha on September 27 by Dr. J.N. Parekh whether India had refused a seat informally offered to her in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said: "There has been no offer, formal or informal, of this kind. Some vague references have appeared in the press about it which have no foundation in fact. The composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter, according to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition can be made to this without an amendment of the Charter. There is, therefore, no question of a seat being offered and India declining it. Our declared policy is to support the admission of all nations qualified for UN membership. "
The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (also known as the Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5) are the five states which the UN Charter of 1945 grants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council: China (formerly the Republic of China), France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were all allies in World War II, which they won. They are also all nuclear weapons states. A total of 15 UN member states serve on the UNSC, the remainder 10 are elected for a tenure of two years, at a time. Any one of the five permanent members have the power of veto, which enables them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" draft Council resolution, regardless of its level of international support.
China has been exercising this Veto power repeatedly for many years, to bail out Masoor Azhar from being branded as a wanted terrorist, though the rest of four members were for the resolution.
The whole talk of offer of permanent seat in UN Security Council to India replacing permanent founder member China(ROC) is quite a bunkum. None of the 5 permanent founder members could have been replaced by the machinations of either of the two super powers ( USA and USSR) in the heydays of Super power cold war rivalry during 1950s.
People forget the timeline. Chinese revolution of October 1949 had brought Communist Party in power in mainland China. She became the People's Republic of China (PRC). Nationalist government of Chiang, Republic of China (ROC - a UN founder member) escaped to Taiwan and continued to occupy both General Assembly and Security Council seats till 1970. PRC replaced Taiwan (ROC) in 1971, in both Security Council and General Assembly, only after US-China détente brought by Nixon and Mao.
Simultaneously 1950 also brought Korean crisis with all its furies. All out war started between Western nations' armies under UN aegis against armies of China and North Korea( June 1950- July 1953). USSR had also covertly helped the cause of China and North Korea, by providing their Airforce Pilots to China. Though the Armies of 21 Member Nations were involved in the Korean War, 90 per cent of the fighting strength was provided by the USA.
Role of India during the Korean War, in which she had sent a contingent of Medical personnel in support of UN Forces, and after declaration of ceasefire as a peacemaker was commendable. But, Mao and Chou-en-Lai viewed this logistical support by India to USA/UNO as a breach of the avowed principle of India's neutrality. Let us not forget that at that period of time, Republic of China, Taiwan (ROC) was occupying the UNSC and People's Republic of China (PRC), which was governing the main land China and 95 % of the population of China with them, was not recognised by the USA and its allies. But, Soviet Union was a staunch supporter of PRC and the spread of communism. The legitimacy of PRC to be recognised as the representative of China, could not be questioned. Nehru, also supported PRC on this issue, which cannot be faulted at any period. Under those circumstances, the USA, would not like to lose her loyal ally with Veto power, ROC in the UNSC. Therefore, the so called offer to Nehru for this seat, could only have been a bait to test the waters. Only in 1971, the USA realised the importance of PRC in Asia and agreed to replace ROC with PRC, for which USSR would never exercise her veto power.
Super power rivalry was on peak during 1950s to 1970s. Korean and Vietnam wars, Berlin, Suez , Hungarian and Cuban Missile crises, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were the outcome of this rivalry.
As for this game of feelers either by Dulles in 1950 or Bulganin in 1955, it is so inchoate that taking them at its face value is laughable. Even after strenuous efforts by India, Japan, Brazil and Germany (Group 4) to achieve entry in Security Council as a permanent member for last many decades, has not been fruitful.
That the 1955 incident was publicly discussed in 2002 in print by A.G. Noorani, a major scholar of modern Indian history and politics, has not ended the rumour-mongering. However, new evidence of an even earlier offer—by the US in August 1950—to assist India in assuming a permanent seat at the UN Security Council has recently emerged, adding substantially to what Noorani earlier wrote. Nehru's rejection of the US offer underlined the consistency of his conviction that the PRC's legitimate interests must be acknowledged in order to reduce international tensions. Integrating the PRC into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the Security Council was in fact a central pillar of Nehru's foreign policy. Nehru's skepticism about accepting this offer, and thereby disrupting the dynamics of the UN, revealed the reverence he had for the international organisation, despite its flaws. Furthermore, his principled rejection of the US's suggestion indicates Indian agency in its difficult relations with the US at this time. Finally, Nehru's sense that India deserved recognition as a great country was made plain, although this was qualified by his refusal to compromise core principles to gain such recognition. That the US made such an approach to India also suggests that the traditional emphasis on the US's early attempt to pursue an even-handed approach to the subcontinent's major powers and defer to the UK's greater experience in the region ought to be reconsidered. Furthermore, this episode enriches our understanding of the US government's internal wrangling over how to bend the UN to its interests in this early stage of the Cold War.
The 1955 Soviet offer
In 2002, A.G. Noorani wrote a defence of Nehru's decision to reject Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin's offer of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1955. He wrote Nehru was right to do so, as really the offer was just a "feeler to test India." Noorani was reviewing the new, and then most recent, volume of the second series of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He was also taking aim at those political figures who had attacked Nehru's decision to reject this offer based on a reference in the well-known Sarvepalli Gopal biography of Nehru (1979) in which Gopal wrote: "He [Jawaharlal Nehru] rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given to China's admission to the United Nations." (p. 248) Utilising the new evidence available in the Selected Works, Noorani argued that Nehru was correct in making little of this offer, as the offer was in fact unlikely to materialise in reality; and even if the Soviets were sincere about facilitating India's accession to the Security Council as a permanent member, this would have caused major problems for India's overall foreign policy strategy by complicating its relations with China and the major powers. Noorani quoted the following exchange offered in the Selected Works to bolster his claims:
"[Nikolai] Bulganin: Regarding your suggestion about the four power conference we would take appropriate action. While we are discussing the general international situation and reducing tension, we propose suggesting at a later stage India's inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council".
"JN [Jawaharlal Nehru]: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject to controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council, it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China's admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted. What is Bulganin's opinion about the revision of the Charter? In our opinion this does not seem to be an appropriate time for it".
Bulganin: We proposed the question of India's membership of the Security Council to get your views, but agree that this is not the time for it and it will have to wait for the right moment later on. We also agree that things should be taken one by one".
Noorani suggested that Bulganin's response to Nehru's reservations indicated that the "offer" was not a real one, but more a means of sounding out India's views, as Bulganin agreed with Nehru that the time was not right for pushing a new permanent member into the Security Council.
Furthermore, the exchange shows that India had already rejected a similar suggestion made by the US. Nehru ascribed the American offer to its desire to disturb Sino-Indian relations. The status of the People's Republic of China in the UN, Nehru argued, should take priority, before any consideration be given to the necessary revision of the UN Charter required for the admittance of any new permanent members. What exactly Nehru meant in terms of "others" whose admission possibly also should be settled prior to India is unclear, but he probably had in mind the newly independent nations not yet admitted as members of the UN.
Col TN Raman (Retd)
E5/230, AWHO Parameswaran Vihar,
67, Arcot Road, Saligramam,
Chennai 600093
Mob: 9840033326
Brig Narinder Dhand,
Founder & Convener
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