ON MILITARY INCOMPETENCE
Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
"Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."
--- Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower after the end of Second World War
More than 70 years have passed since the end of second World War. Who does not know in modern times without jointness no war can be fought. Every modern armed forces of the world have changed accordingly. Even the Chinese is going in for integrated commands in a big way. The most honourable exception is Indian Armed forces. Second largest Army, fourth largest Air Force and sixth largest Navy of the world refuse to change! They still want to fight the war service wise from their own service centric Operations Rooms. Led by a Committee. In 21st century. All Command HQs of all the three services are located at different places! Not a single one is co located. For example in a conflict with China Eastern Army will fight from Kolkata, Eastern Navy from Vizag and Eastern Air Force from Shillong.
Whenever the issue of lack of jointness comes up at the highest levels, one often hears, it has to come from top meaning political leadership. I have never heard more 'daft' reasoning. You know the problem, you know the solution. But won't do anything, pass the buck to political leaders, sit back, relax and play golf. Typical of No Action Talk Only (NATO) forces. I often wonder is it too much for the political leadership to kick the butt of some people responsible and get a road map moving. Of course, they have to be clear in mind what they want to do with jointness.
How Does Reorganisation Happen, Some Examples
Future of the Army
In recent times two key issues which were bugging Pentagon on US Army. US Congress ordered a study to answer these questions: What should the size of the future Army be? And how should the Amy apportion its aviation fleet between the regular Army and the Army National Guard? National Commission on the Future of the Army came out with a report in one year flat. The hyper link would get you the report of 9 MB. Since I have been blocked by US Army to access any document I requested my Naval chela to send me the document which he sent me pronto with his comments. I have a fair idea how many in Indian Army's Think Tank are reading these reports. Of course there are observation / criticism. Conrad C Crane has raised the following seven Issues the Future of the Army Commission should Have Spent More Time On :
a) Once cut, the Army is not easily expansible
b) Deeper analysis on options to better integrate the active and reserve components
c) A more thorough discussion of deficiencies in force structure and capabilities
d) Expanded discussion of stability operations and counterinsurgency
e) Explicit analysis of force size and structure recommendations
f) A real discussion of risk
g) Contractors on the battlefield
Maj Gen Robert H. Scales (Retd) ex Commandant Army War College writes :
And I was pleasantly surprised. The document is good. The commission members were faithful to their congressional charter. Fifteen years of continuous warfare have changed the Army's culture. Decades of regular–National Guard mutual commitment have co-joined the services into a joint fighting force unparalleled on the planet. One cannot find a serving senior soldier who fails to appreciate the amplifying power of "jointness." Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has compelled the Army to discover new dimensions of war by embracing the role of the interagency, so called "whole-of-government" contributions to wars fought in the gray regions of conflict.... Virtually hidden in the report are a few additional jewels that should raise awareness among our political leaders. The commissioners write about capability "gaps" and the consequences for "risk." In essence, the commission is warning that the fighting abilities of the nation are being impeded by several very serious shortcomings that have grown and festered during our recent wars. The first is air defense. In Ukraine and Syria, the Russians have clearly shown that they understand our "gaps" in air defense and have worked effectively to exploit them. In both places, the Russians have created an enormously complex, layered array of integrated air defenses that, in the hands of a Russian or Russian surrogate force, might deny our air forces access to the close fight. If the air forces are late to the battle, the Army will be unable to shoot down attacking aircraft and drones because it has virtually no low- and medium-altitude air defenses. This is a serious shortcoming. The Army must field a robust air defense capability immediately. ..... The second critical commission observation deals with a painful self-inflicted wound: neglect of our artillery force. The Russians have rediscovered artillery. In 2014, Russian multi-battalion artillery "fire strikes" virtually destroyed a Ukrainian tank unit within minutes. The "Little Green Men" employed sophisticated electronic means to locate the Ukrainians and followed their movements using layers of orbiting drones.
My most serious concern with the commission report is its apparent failure to pay close attention to the lessons we have learned during the past 14 years of war (or, for that matter, the last 70 years of ground conflict since the end of World War II). Such ahistoricism manifests itself in the commission's recommendation to reduce the Army by two light infantry brigades. This decision is, in a way, understandable given that the commission followed contemporary rules governing fiscal and human apportionment within the Department of Defense. They recommend reapportioning these light infantry spaces to meet obvious shortfalls in artillery, air defense and military police units.But the Gods of War apportion differently. Like it or not our enemies are overwhelmingly light infantry. They are growing, not diminishing. The shortage of light infantry in Iraq and Afghanistan came close to collapsing our Army in 2006 and 2007. Too many close combat tours for our young infantry soldiers and leaders came close to breaking the Army. Too few soldiers for too many close combat missions has left scars that will torment them for generations. The Army can make up for artillery, air defense, and MP increases without affecting close combat BCTs. It just needs to take a sharp pencil to the issue and reduce logistics, higher level staffs, and acquisition officers with no detriment on the fighting capability of the Total Force.Another painfully learned fact from our history is that a volunteer Army tends to fight with the forces they first take to war. It took almost five years for former Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld to be persuaded to increase Army forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same tragic scenario played out in Korea and Vietnam. So my personal plea would be for the Army to increase not decrease its close combat (principally infantry) forces.
There is no ideal solution fulfilling everybody's requirement. But some optimum solution can be arrived at.
"Force of the Future"
This is Ash Carter's pet programme ( https://t.co/pckyujee6s). He said, " The military is a profession of arms, It's not a business. The key to doing this successfully is to leverage both tradition and change." The 200+ page "Force of the Future" report included recommendations to better balance work and family demands, such as expanding parental leave and removing the "up and out" approach to force management. Some of the Force of the Future report initiatives are :
Replace "Up or Out" with "Perform and Out." The services lose members at around 40-45 years of age -- when they are performing at their highest level. Carson said careers need to last longer while retaining quality; if the military is to keep field grades officers longer, for example, they must be quality field grade officers contributing in an important fashion.
Develop and Employ Talent Management System (TMS). These types of systems are currently being used in the private sector for recruitment, performance management, learning and development, and compensation management.
Establish Technical Career Tracks. The need for technical skills is increasing and service members should be able to stay in those career tracks without a negative impact on career progression and promotions.
Align Compensations to a Talent Management Paradigm. This will require establishing new metrics for evaluating talent versus solely job performance. Services need to be able to measure and identify high-potential talent as these individuals tend to grow into leadership positions. Highly talented people want to be challenged and see results, which is not often achieved in a bureaucratic environment.
Increase Gender and Racial Diversity. The Navy believes women are an underused talent pool and are evaluating opening jobs previously closed to women. (One could argue the Army and Air Force are on board with this sentiment!) The current personnel systems, in place from the 1940s when women were not a major presence in the work force, must be updated. The services will try to be more reflective of the civilian population. This year's incoming West Point class is the most diverse group the school has ever admitted.
Expand Parental Leave. This will include using parental leave for adoptions. It will be available to men and women. The Navy is out front with its new extended maternal leave policy.
Improve Quality of Life for Military Families. This would include expanding gyms and adapting military service fitness tests to age and medical status. The services are also piloting child care hours by staying open 24/7 to include Naval Station Norfolk.
Expand Fertility Treatment. This has become more of an issue for the military as a result of injuries received from IEDs. Congress recently tried to help with " . . . expanded fertility services offered by the Defense Department, through Tricare, to severely injured troops, including those with fertility issues related to traumatic brain injury, and also would have lifted the ban on in vitro fertilization at VA medical centers."
Improve Recruiting and Accession Efficiency. This recommendation was the most enthusiastically embraced by all of the services. It can increase the quality of the force by saving $1 billion each year. For example, 20 percent of recruits completing basic training do not show up for their first duty station, resulting in loss of the training investment when they are discharged.
Increase Permeability between Components. The thought here is to integrate personnel and pay systems. The recent change recommended by the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to reduce Guard and Reserve duty statuses from over 30 to just six is an example of the types of changes that will be needed. The services will be offering more 2-3 year limited active duty tours for Guard and Reserve members as a way to augment active forces without increasing their end strength. The services would prefer to do this by merging the RC MPA funds into the active duty account.
Expand In-Service Civil Schooling Opportunities. The Navy has increased quotas next year in their pilot for service members to complete graduate education in civilian institutions.
Expand Partnerships with Industry and Local Government. DoD believes more service members should train with industry, using 1-2 year assignments.
Modernize Joint Professional Development. The Army wants to "set the table" for future leaders by establishing the right mix of senior service school, joint qualifications and enterprise experience. Right now 50 percent of their captains are leaving the service.
Al the above issues are equally applicable to us. What we do with these issues? Well.....
USA 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act 2.0
We are very fond of quoting USA 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. That time also there was lot of reservation about jointness from the different services HQs. They were firmly told either fall in line or get out. Nobody got out. If you want to read the act itself please click onhttp://history.defense.gov/…/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct19… If we ever think of something on these lines may be it will help copy pasting! Of course it has to be Indian solution, we will have to look into CDS concept of UK on whom our customs, traditions organizations of armed forces are based.
USA after 30 years experience of war fighting is now planning to proceed to Gold Water Nichols Act 2.0. Sen. John McCain, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee opened the first of what he said would be a series of hearings on Defense organization with a favorable nod to the 1986 legislation, saying it did exactly what it was supposed to: breaking down parochial barriers between the military services and building jointness into the culture of the U.S. military. But he said the nature of warfare and technology have changed a lot in the intervening years, and the scale of the Pentagon's bureaucracy has ballooned without much to show for it. "Our Defense spending, in constant dollars, is nearly the same as it was 30 years ago. But we're getting 35 percent fewer combat brigades, 53 percent fewer ships and 63 percent fewer combat air squadrons. More and more of our people and money are in overhead functions, not operating forces," McCain said.
The committee heard from several experts on Defense organization, including two former Congressional staffers who stewarded Goldwater-Nichols through Congress. Each counseled that another round of reforms is long overdue, but urged lawmakers against knee-jerk legislation. The 1980s reforms were preceded by five years of Congressional study; the next overhaul deserves that amount of attention too, they said.
Nevertheless, some issues keep coming up for discussion. It's worthwhile, then, to take a look at these issues to see whether they are ready for decision.
The Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are bloated and should be refocused on warfighting.
The pendulum has swung too far towards joint organizations and away from the services. Gen. Tommy Franks, when preparing for the invasion of Iraq in 2002, made it clear that he did not want to hear from the "Title 10 motherfuckers," as he called the service chiefs. The service chiefs, with their expertise in organizing, training, and equipping the forces, could be brought back into operational planning.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff have too much overlap. Over the years, OSD and the Joint Staff have both built organizations that cover the entire spectrum of activities, from budgeting to acquisition to strategy development to operational planning. Today OSD numbers about 3,300 and the Joint Staff about 2,700.
Pentagon overhead is bloated, inhibits rapid decision-making, and needs to be reduced.
Many senior decision-makers, former Secretary Robert Gates prominent among them, have complained about the highly centralized decision-making of the Obama White House. Indeed, the National Security Council staff has grown to a record size of 400 people. However, the interagency process is at the fault line between Congress and the executive branch. Presidents get the interagency process that fits their decision-making style. It's not something that Congress can legislate.
The next step would be to take a few quick wins this year. What follows is not a comprehensive list but a start.
Authorize another round of base closure (BRAC), increase workforce flexibility by allowing outsourcing (through OMB Circular A–76), and begin a process for easing some of the restrictive civilian personnel rules. These are hard because they contravene powerful parochial interests, but there is widespread agreement that Department of Defense needs these authorities to operate more efficiently. Congress can always override individual decisions that it doesn't like.
Upgrade Cyber Command to a combatant command, but require that the total number of its personnel not change. These new domains would thus receive increased attention, hopefully without increasing total overhead.
Allow service chiefs to participate in some phases of operational planning. This would not put them into the chain of command but would provide a mechanism to give their advice and keep them informed.
Increase to four years the terms for the Chairman and Vice Chairman so they are comparable to the service chiefs. Although both are routinely given a second two-year term, this would eliminate any perception that they have less room to take risks.
Increase education in strategy formulation for both military and civilian personnel. This would improve the strategy formulation process without requiring controversial organizational changes.
Upgrade Cyber Command to a combatant command, but require that the total number of its personnel not change. These new domains would thus receive increased attention, hopefully without increasing total overhead.
Allow service chiefs to participate in some phases of operational planning. This would not put them into the chain of command but would provide a mechanism to give their advice and keep them informed.
Increase to four years the terms for the Chairman and Vice Chairman so they are comparable to the service chiefs. Although both are routinely given a second two-year term, this would eliminate any perception that they have less room to take risks.
Increase education in strategy formulation for both military and civilian personnel. This would improve the strategy formulation process without requiring controversial organizational changes.
Finally, Congress should put in place the mechanics for the next step. The first task is to identify the specific areas of interest. As noted above, COCOM function, COCOM consolidation, OSD/Joint Staff overlap, organizational delayering, and strategy formulation are candidates. Then Congress needs to establish a mechanism for assessing these questions. Although the Department of Defense needs to be consulted, it cannot objectively assess these questions on its own.
Recently Ash Carter in CSIS said : "This year, as Goldwater-Nichols turns 30, we can see that the world has changed,Instead of the Cold War and one clear threat, we face a security environment that's dramatically different from the last quarter-century. It's time that we consider practical updates to this critical organizational framework, while still preserving its spirit and intent." The first reform is clarifying the role of the Chairman, currently Marine Gen. Joe Dunford, while still keeping him outside the chain of command. Essentially, it codifies the Chairman's role as the top military adviser. "We need someone in uniform who can look across the services and combatant commands and make objective recommendations to the department's civilian leadership about where to allocate forces throughout the world and where to apportion risk to achieve maximum benefit to our nation," Carter said. "And the person best postured to do that is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs."
Carter acknowledged the Chairman is supposed to be the military advisor for the President and secretary, but said in today's world, the role goes beyond that narrow definition. "It doesn't say [the Chairman is] also the one who supposed to be, everyday and periodically as we move forces around, giving me that advice on where things ought to be and how they ought to be used," Carter said after his speech. "That is self-evidently required in today's world and it wasn't part of the original conception. As a practical matter everyone know I look to Gen. Dunford to do that, but I think it's worth writing it down."
The second change focuses on how the Pentagon buys equipment. Congress delivered acquisition reform directives to the Pentagon last year, which Carter said the building would follow, with an emphasis on increasing the acquisition powers held by the individual service chiefs. This will include evaluating – "and where appropriate reducing" – members of the Defense Acquisition Board, which currently is comprised of 35 principals and advisers. "Reducing these layers will both free up staff time and focus decision-making energy on overcoming real obstacles to program success rather than bureaucratic hurdles," Carter said.
Sometimes reform can come from not making big changes, something Carter indicated is the right path with the geographic combatant commands, his third area of focus. Merging several COCOMS, as has been publicly debated around Washington, doesn't make sense in a world with unique conflicts in many different regions. "Instead of combining these commands to the detriment of our friends, our allies, and in fact our own command and control capabilities, we intend to be more efficient by integrating functions like logistics, intelligence, and plans across the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and subordinate commands, eliminating redundancies wherever we find them without losing capability," he said.
Carter also indicated that the number of four-stars may be winnowed in the future, noting he will "look to simplify and improve command and control where the number of four-star positions have made headquarters either top-heavy, or less efficient than they could be."
Perhaps most interesting, Carter seemed to leave the door open for a change in status for US Cyber Command, saying "we should consider changes to cyber's role in DoD's Unified Command Plan." That could be a hint that he would consider making Cyber Command a full combatant command. "We have a cyber command today, and i have given cyber command in the counter-ISIL [the common name for the Islamic State group] fight, really, its first wartime assignment. and we're seeing how that works out," Carter said during a question and answer session after his speech. "
"Where we see potential to be more efficient and effective, billets currently filled by four-star generals and admirals will be filled by three-stars in the future," Carter added.
Finally, Carter proposes to change the requirement that officers service in joint roles as they progress in their career, calling the current requirements "more narrow and rigid than they need to be." Instead, Carter envisions a situation where officers can receive joint duty credit for operational functions, "such as intelligence, fires, transportation and maneuver, protection, and sustainment, including joint acquisition." The secretary also wants to shorten the joint duty requirement time, going from three years to two.
How are they going about it.
The entire national security community has responded. The Department of Defense has its own group working on the problem and will provide its proposals in about six weeks. Many think tanks (including, in the spirit of full disclosure, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where I work) are doing their own analysis and providing opinions. While it is true that many weaknesses in defense management have been identified, there is no clear consensus about what to do. An alternative approach, then, might be to take some quick wins now and put in place a process for identifying and building consensus for bigger changes later.
In order to help the process of identifying problems and potential solutions, CSIS analyzed the testimony given to the Senate Armed Services Committee and arranged the recommendations into nine categories. The CSIS team then looked for common themes in the recommendations where a consensus might be emerging. One of the themes was management weaknesses in the Defense Department's organization and decision-making processes. There was little consensus, however, about how to fix these weaknesses. This was in contrast to the situation in the 1980s when the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation was developed. At that time there was a clear consensus that the services needed to work together more effectively and thus make operations more joint. I am attaching the excel sheet.
Center for Strategic & International Studies' established A Defense 360 micro website. A survey on Defence Reforms was conducted results of which were made available at :http://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/160314_defense_reform_conference_survey_results.pdf . Opinions and papers on Defence Reforms are being put in this web site.
State Department felt that their authority has been reduced by the 1986 Act and wanted Foreign Policy makers to have more say and their voice was published by Brookings at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/09/goldwater-nichols-american-foreign-policy-hein/goldwater_nichols_final.pdf
All these are available at my blog. I wonder how many of my brethren have read those.
All these are available at my blog. I wonder how many of my brethren have read those.
Defence Reform is a major issue with lot of complications and major financial effects. Number of Armed Forces in the world have undertaken reforms with mixed results. We need to have a look at all those examples and try to learn from others mistakes and don't be a fool to learn from own mistakes.
We do have some similarities with Israel. Like us they fought three major wars in 48, 67 and 73, Air War at Becca Valley and is in continuous conflicts with Hizbollas and Hamas. Before the 2006 First Lebanon War Israel Defence Force went gaga over all the technological superiority displayed in First Gulf War, got seduced by NCW and EBO and all those fancy concepts some of them enunciated by Israeli's themselves. IDF was headed for the first time by an Air Force Ofiicer, Gen Halutz . After the disaster the Government of Israel appointed a governmental commission called The Winograd Commission. More than 600 page report is available. The classified interim report is available at : http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/winogradreport-04302007.pdf . IDF has since vowed never to appoint an Air Force officer as their head.
We must also see how some of the other armed forces of the world are evolving as the character of warfare is changing continuously. For example Russia is changing.The 2008 Georgian War revealed many of the Russian military's shortcomings. Orders were slow to travel down the chain of command, a lack of coor-dination between the air force and troops on the ground led to higher casualties, and a breakdown in intelligence and planning resulted in the Russian air force losing several aircraft to Georgia's anti-aircraft missile batteries. Russian troops were able to overwhelm the overmatched Georgian army, but the after action review left little doubt that changes were badly needed.
Shortly after the Georgian war Russia's Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov launched a sweeping reorganization of the army. Although Serdyukov's (2008–12)reorganization is only one component of a broader, ongoing three-stage plan of rearming and modernizing Russia's military by 2020, the reorganization has been by far the most controversial aspect of the modernization. In the span of four years, the Russian military did away with many of its long-held practices. Russia significantly reduced the size of its officer corps; the military moved away from a Soviet divisional model of organization to a NATO-like brigade structure. Supply and logistics jobs were outsourced to private contractors; and the military education system was radically altered.
Proponents of the reform argue that the changes improved the combat readiness and professionalism of the army. Opponents counter that while reform was necessary, Serdyukov's initiatives were poorly thought out and resulted in widespread chaos and demoralization. Serdyukov's reforms were met with fierce opposition from Russia's military establishment and remain a source of derision. And while Western analysts dismissed the criticism as personal resentment over losing coveted sinecures, there is anecdotal evidence that the transition to private contractors led to serious service and supply disruptions . Moreover, even defenders of the reforms have admitted that the army continues to lack the promised high-tech and high-precision weaponry . The controversy surrounding the changes ultimately proved to be Ser-dyukov's undoing; he was sacked in 2012 and tried for corruption. Serdyukov's dismissal and trial seem to have placated critics of the reforms; his successor, Sergei Shoigu, has managed to keep most of the changes made by his predecessor.
Following Russia's sudden annexation of Crimea and the ongoing campaign in Syria, pundits have been quick to declare the Russian military to be a revamped, modern fighting machine—seemingly vindicating Serdyukov.
Indian Scene
Indian Armed Forces have some peculiarities compared to other armed forces of the world. Some of these are :
The ratio of services are skewed. Normally the ratio of Army, Navy and Air Force in major armed forces of the world is 4:3:3 or thereabouts. In our case strength of Indian Army is 1.2 million, Indian Navy around 60,000 and IAF 1.4 Lakhs. Talking of availability of aircrafts.Take example of US Pacific Command. In PACOM Pacific Fleet has 600 aircrafts, Army Pacific 309, Marine Corps Force Pacific 640, and Pacific Air force 300+. Compare this with ours. In these issues we have similarity with Chinese Armed Forces. They are also predominantly PLA Army dominated. But the Chinese are giving the ultimate compliment to the Americans by following the concept of joint commands in their recent modernisation of Armed Forces.
Present Situation
Recent news reports suggest that the Government is on the verge of appointing a permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee in four star rank. Some sort of watered down version of Naresh Chandra Committee is being implemented.
I don't understand why there is so much of confidentiality with such committee reports. I have given examples how informed debates take place, how experts give their opinion, 360 degree feedback is obtained and then only a major decision like reforms is taken. If there is a portion of reports which need confidentiality same need not be published. Surely the complete report is not confidential. The Kargil Review Committee Report is an example. The classified portion was not published but the rest was quickly put in open domain. Keeping these reports classified serves no purpose. Ultimately Henderson Brooks report, was put in open domain by Neville Maxwell. Only people in the know of things take undue advantage. Idea is to have some lively debate for informed decision making.
How is appointing a permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee is going to help vis a vis present system of CISC. Is he going to have power to override recommendations of Service Chiefs. What is his role in operational planning and operational issues vis a vis Service Chiefs. The command and control issues of strategic forces command are never discussed. What is the relationship between strategic forces command, HQ IDS and service HQS, remember we have Nuc Triads now.
The best that should have happened was to integrate HQ IDS with MoD. Unfortunately that did not happen. What is the domain knowledge expertise that is available with MoD. Bureaucrats, may come from Animal Husbandry Department and go to Agriculture department. Defence today is highly specialised subject. MoD could use IDSA for expert advice. Unfortunately IDSA has hardly any military expertise, IDSA has one retired Brig as DDG and a few Col level officers most of them on sabbatical as study leave for two years. Not that MoD cares though they fund IDSA lavishly.
How will be the new appointment give single point advice. Probably he can do on issues dealt by HQ IDS exclusively like HA/ DR, Cyber, Space, acquisition, management of funds. But operational matters? No service HQ will leave that, nor HQ IDS have that capability at present form. Will the MoD stop asking for information from all the three services and only ask from HQ IDS? MoD does not have domain knowledge. They only play with inputs given by all the three services and HQ IDS.
Let me give an example. Close Air Support for the Army is always a very touchy issue. In a recent seminar at USI I found a retired Air Marshal reacting aggressively to the use of the word CAS. For IAF use of the word CAS is sacrilege. They have picked up the USAF jargon Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO). No matter the US JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09.3 on Close Air Support OF 25 November 2014 available at :https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf. Or the recent "Close Air Support (CAS) Innovation Conference" at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia USA on 23 September 2015 (See http://www.jqpublicblog.com/inside-the-air-forces-close-air-support-conference/ ) and it says, Enter the intrepid Air Force, whose colonel spokesman took the floor not flanked by CAS experts ready to debate competing future visions … not equipped with a lucid if problematic concept to guide discussion … but armed with a single talking point: "the USAF is dedicated to the CAS mission."
U.S. Air Force A-10 Warthog is a formidable weapon of cold war vintage having put in 40-plus years in service. While facing budget constraints first thing USAF does is to retire A10 Warthog in favour of F-35s. There was a huge uproar . Lo and behold The Defense Department plans to test the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jet against the Cold War-era A-10 attack aircraft in close air support tests! (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/08/24/f-35-and-a-10-to-square-off-in-close-air-support-tests/ )
And look at the audacity of that gentleman Ashley Tellis. He is recommending 40 year old A110 Warthogs to be procured by India as part of modernisation of IAF. Some of our defence experts are quoting him, thankfully not with their own recommendations, but the indications are clear. I am not finding experts from IAF giving comments on this issue
These issues will always be there in every armed forces of the world. We have to remember that USAF has not fought a dog fight after Korean War. Same is not the case with others. Point is, if there is a problem we have to address the issue head on. I am sure when IAF says you pongos don't have to worry, we will look after you, they know their job. At the same time when national strike corps offensive goes the poor Corps Commander will like to get some assurance on number of quantifiable sorties available to him. Independent observers will like to think we have sorted out the type of problem we faced when Army Chief wanted air support in the initial phase of Kargil and the Air Chief refused. Surely IAF will have some valid points to make. But the issue has to be resolved and cannot be left hanging.
Why am I writing all these. Please tell me by appointing a four star General at the helm as Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee will he be able to sort out this sample issue. If yes, by all means go ahead. If NO, then possibly we are not in the right track.
I have the following suggestions for Shri Manohar Parrikar, RM, Govt of India.
- Please see the issue of Joitmanship holistically. The short term measures are no good, do not serve the purpose. A major reorganisation is needed. Please catch the bull by the horn. Remember the Armed Forces have to be under political control and NOT bureaucratic control. Please don't go by all the recommendations of service chiefs with the prism of Defence Secretary. Experienced as they are in bureaucratic shenanigans, how is it that services never think they are part of them. This is not a sign of a good organisation. Civil Military Relations is at his nadir. Both the services and bureaucracy need to be pulled up. This can only be done by a firm political leadership.
· Please take out Committee of Defence Expenditure Report popularly known as Arun Singh Committee Report, dust it off and read. MoD in a written reply to a RTI application has said that the Report is missing from MoD. I am sure if the RM wields the stick, somebody will use the magic wand to get the report. If need be, RM may like to meet the recluse Arun Singh. There are not many knowledgeable people like him in India. Make use of his wisdom. There was only another person I know of : Shri Jaswant Singh.
· Order IDSA to carry out some sort of study as is being done by CSIS. I am aware of the Task Force IDSA has formed. This may become an academic exercise. It has to be made implementable action points. If the feathers are ruffled, let it be. If mistakes are made, they can be course corrected later. But something must be done. And done now.
RM does not have much time. Two years have passed, last year not much major is expected to be done. That makes only availability of two years for the RM to make a major change. Make no mistake, this is a major change, somebody has to do it. Present RM has the great opportunity to make this most wanted reform happen.
It is his call. He has to decide whether he will go down the path of St Anthony and many of his predecessors or carve out a separate path. Does he have it in him.
We will wait and see.
-- PKM
PS.
There is one more school of thought. Why I am using US examples. Show me where has US won a war. We are much better off. We will have Indian solution. We have JUGAAD. I say AMEN to that.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Mohan Guruswamy" <mohanguru@gmail.com>
Date: 28 Jul 2016 7:48 p.m.
Subject: Column on military incompetence
To: "Menaka Guruswamy" <menaka@post.harvard.edu>
Cc:
From: "Mohan Guruswamy" <mohanguru@gmail.com>
Date: 28 Jul 2016 7:48 p.m.
Subject: Column on military incompetence
To: "Menaka Guruswamy" <menaka@post.harvard.edu>
Cc:
Military Incompetence. Who will bell the cat?
In his seminal "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" Norman Dixon poses the questions: "How, if they are so lacking in intelligence, do people become senior military commanders? And what is it about military organizations that they should attract, promote and ultimately tolerate those whose performance at the highest levels bring opprobrium upon the organizations they represent?"
Fortunately we have not had a major war in recent times to test the mettle of our commanders. But even in peacetime many have, unfortunately, managed by their acts of omission and commission to bring opprobrium to our military. The upper echelons of India's military are now visibly dense with obviously incompetent and uninspiring leaders, who invariably KAed their way to good ACR's year after year. They then go about expecting the same from their subordinates, and get it in plenty. Outstanding officers with a strong individuality and intellectual curiosity get culled in this way by the stubborn seniority system, adopted from the bureaucracy.
The Indian military, like many others, doesn't appreciate standout talent and personality, and prefers an uniform grayness. The system beats out the commander and dashing leader in an officer long before he becomes a general. We will never study this, as if this opaque system of evaluation is a military secret.
In his seminal "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" Norman Dixon poses the questions: "How, if they are so lacking in intelligence, do people become senior military commanders? And what is it about military organizations that they should attract, promote and ultimately tolerate those whose performance at the highest levels bring opprobrium upon the organizations they represent?"
Fortunately we have not had a major war in recent times to test the mettle of our commanders. But even in peacetime many have, unfortunately, managed by their acts of omission and commission to bring opprobrium to our military. The upper echelons of India's military are now visibly dense with obviously incompetent and uninspiring leaders, who invariably KAed their way to good ACR's year after year. They then go about expecting the same from their subordinates, and get it in plenty. Outstanding officers with a strong individuality and intellectual curiosity get culled in this way by the stubborn seniority system, adopted from the bureaucracy.
The Indian military, like many others, doesn't appreciate standout talent and personality, and prefers an uniform grayness. The system beats out the commander and dashing leader in an officer long before he becomes a general. We will never study this, as if this opaque system of evaluation is a military secret.
Younger officers in western militaries often challenge mediocrity and are willing to run into their swords for this. Have we any serving officer who will write on this? No, I don't think so. Even those who are retired seem to have deep tribal loyalties. Tribal loyalty is very different from institutional loyalty.
"It was not always this way, Thomas Ricks has argued in his book "The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today" that the US military used to expect its generals to fail. In the Second World War, the US Army fired sixteen division commanders and at least five corps commanders. The British Army fired generals Wavell, Auchinleck, Cunningham and Ritchie in North Africa alone. Many were given second chances.
Somewhere along the way this tradition has lost. Ricks writes: "To a shocking degree, the [US] Army's leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a risk-averse middle where they are more likely to find stalemate than victory."
At least the Americans have started the debate. In 2007, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling published an absolutely blistering, full-frontal assault on American generals entitled "A failure in generalship". In it he challenged the US Army for producing generals with insufficient education, language skills, creativity and moral courage. He attacked the general officer promotion system as fundamentally flawed. His core argument was clear: "Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers". Amazingly, the article – by a serving officer – was published in the Armed Forces Journal. Less surprisingly, Yingling is now a high school teacher. Can anyone imagine an India Army officer writing such an article, or the Army War College Journal publishing it?
Thomas Ricks further writes: "We often think of the military with a culture of clear accountability. This is only really true for lower ranks. In contrast, there is absolutely no question that if the British Army were a listed company (heaven forbid), a slew of generals would have been kicked out of theatre early. Boards of directors have very little patience for poor performance, and regularly give CEOs months rather than years to prove themselves. Recent examples include GM (four CEOs in eighteen months) and Hewlett-Packard (five CEOs in six years). In fact as many as a third of CEO departures are due to poor performance."
This begs the question, must all officers be promoted to their levels of incompetence? Once at the Farnborough Air Show, I ran into a serving RAF pilot who looked well into his middle years and was still a Wing Commander. He was flying an aircraft on show. When he saw the surprise writ on my face, he explained that he loved flying and hence to keep doing that he opted out of vying for higher command. His juniors wear stars but he prefers to see the stars from close up. He made his choice but many more get passed over and serve under course mates or juniors. Heavens don't fall when this happens.
Dwight Eisenhower became a brigadier general in September 1941. In December 1943 he was appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In January 1944 he also assumed command of the North Africa Theater and was re-designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) making him overlord of all allied forces in the West. He was also promoted to General of the Army, the US equivalent of Field Marshal. As SHAEF he was the master and commander of famous generals like Bradley, Patton, Montgomery and Alanbrooke.
Their views about Eisenhower were interesting. Montgomery said: "nice chap, no general." Patton wrote: "its too bad Ike had no personal knowledge of war." But Ike organized the greatest amphibious landing in history and oversaw the defeat of Nazi Germany in Africa and Europe. Not even Zhukov or Rokossovsky commanded such huge forces operating simultaneously in many sectors. Eisenhower went on to become POTUS and when laying down office after two terms warned his fellow countrymen against the growing power of the "military industrial complex." Our problem is that the complexity of military organization eludes our leaders and the subject has become another sacred cow, despite there being no military industrial complex worth the name.
Nearer home William Slim was a brigadier doing a staff job in the Indian Army in Basra in 1941. He was fortuitously appointed GOC of the 10th Infantry Division in the middle east and his performance led to him becoming GOC of the 14th Army headquarter in Imphal. Here he led it to what is now arguably the Second Great War's greatest military victory. Interestingly enough he still held the official rank of Colonel with the wartime rank of Major General and temporary rank of Lieutenant General. He later became Field Marshal and Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The only Indian Army officer to become CIGS.
In 1965 an Indian GOC went to war with his briefcase containing papers pertaining to his passing over for promotion. In the face of a Pakistani counter-attack he withdrew in haste from his forward position on the Ichogil canal leaving behind his briefcase. The Pakistani's gleefully read the out the contents of his gripe over being passed over on Radio Pakistan. In 1971 an IAF pilot (later an Air Marshal) landed his Gnat in a Pakistani airfield, but that didn't stall his climb to higher command.
Clearly we need to separate the wheat from the chaff in time before it becomes expensive. As wars become shorter we can ill afford to test our generals in war. We have to do it well ahead and be ready for war. The nation cannot afford the military to be a bureaucracy where even the undeserving rise. The solution to this can come only from within the military. The politician is not interested. The bureaucrats will just bring more of their ideas, which could be fatal. The military must look within it and encourage the looking. But who will bell the cat?
Mohan Guruswamy
Email: mohanguru@gmail.com
July 28, 16
"It was not always this way, Thomas Ricks has argued in his book "The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today" that the US military used to expect its generals to fail. In the Second World War, the US Army fired sixteen division commanders and at least five corps commanders. The British Army fired generals Wavell, Auchinleck, Cunningham and Ritchie in North Africa alone. Many were given second chances.
Somewhere along the way this tradition has lost. Ricks writes: "To a shocking degree, the [US] Army's leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a risk-averse middle where they are more likely to find stalemate than victory."
At least the Americans have started the debate. In 2007, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling published an absolutely blistering, full-frontal assault on American generals entitled "A failure in generalship". In it he challenged the US Army for producing generals with insufficient education, language skills, creativity and moral courage. He attacked the general officer promotion system as fundamentally flawed. His core argument was clear: "Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers". Amazingly, the article – by a serving officer – was published in the Armed Forces Journal. Less surprisingly, Yingling is now a high school teacher. Can anyone imagine an India Army officer writing such an article, or the Army War College Journal publishing it?
Thomas Ricks further writes: "We often think of the military with a culture of clear accountability. This is only really true for lower ranks. In contrast, there is absolutely no question that if the British Army were a listed company (heaven forbid), a slew of generals would have been kicked out of theatre early. Boards of directors have very little patience for poor performance, and regularly give CEOs months rather than years to prove themselves. Recent examples include GM (four CEOs in eighteen months) and Hewlett-Packard (five CEOs in six years). In fact as many as a third of CEO departures are due to poor performance."
This begs the question, must all officers be promoted to their levels of incompetence? Once at the Farnborough Air Show, I ran into a serving RAF pilot who looked well into his middle years and was still a Wing Commander. He was flying an aircraft on show. When he saw the surprise writ on my face, he explained that he loved flying and hence to keep doing that he opted out of vying for higher command. His juniors wear stars but he prefers to see the stars from close up. He made his choice but many more get passed over and serve under course mates or juniors. Heavens don't fall when this happens.
Dwight Eisenhower became a brigadier general in September 1941. In December 1943 he was appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In January 1944 he also assumed command of the North Africa Theater and was re-designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) making him overlord of all allied forces in the West. He was also promoted to General of the Army, the US equivalent of Field Marshal. As SHAEF he was the master and commander of famous generals like Bradley, Patton, Montgomery and Alanbrooke.
Their views about Eisenhower were interesting. Montgomery said: "nice chap, no general." Patton wrote: "its too bad Ike had no personal knowledge of war." But Ike organized the greatest amphibious landing in history and oversaw the defeat of Nazi Germany in Africa and Europe. Not even Zhukov or Rokossovsky commanded such huge forces operating simultaneously in many sectors. Eisenhower went on to become POTUS and when laying down office after two terms warned his fellow countrymen against the growing power of the "military industrial complex." Our problem is that the complexity of military organization eludes our leaders and the subject has become another sacred cow, despite there being no military industrial complex worth the name.
Nearer home William Slim was a brigadier doing a staff job in the Indian Army in Basra in 1941. He was fortuitously appointed GOC of the 10th Infantry Division in the middle east and his performance led to him becoming GOC of the 14th Army headquarter in Imphal. Here he led it to what is now arguably the Second Great War's greatest military victory. Interestingly enough he still held the official rank of Colonel with the wartime rank of Major General and temporary rank of Lieutenant General. He later became Field Marshal and Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The only Indian Army officer to become CIGS.
In 1965 an Indian GOC went to war with his briefcase containing papers pertaining to his passing over for promotion. In the face of a Pakistani counter-attack he withdrew in haste from his forward position on the Ichogil canal leaving behind his briefcase. The Pakistani's gleefully read the out the contents of his gripe over being passed over on Radio Pakistan. In 1971 an IAF pilot (later an Air Marshal) landed his Gnat in a Pakistani airfield, but that didn't stall his climb to higher command.
Clearly we need to separate the wheat from the chaff in time before it becomes expensive. As wars become shorter we can ill afford to test our generals in war. We have to do it well ahead and be ready for war. The nation cannot afford the military to be a bureaucracy where even the undeserving rise. The solution to this can come only from within the military. The politician is not interested. The bureaucrats will just bring more of their ideas, which could be fatal. The military must look within it and encourage the looking. But who will bell the cat?
Mohan Guruswamy
Email: mohanguru@gmail.com
July 28, 16
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "S. Menon" <shivshankar.menon@gmail.com>
Date: 28 Jul 2016 8:14 p.m.
Subject: Re: Column on military incompetence
To: "Mohan Guruswamy" <mohanguru@gmail.com>
Cc:
Dear mohan,
I was so happy to find someone who had read Dixon as carefully as me that i almost forgot how much I agree with what you have written. I have tried for several years to interest successive governments in the idea of a Military Reforms Commission, and of making the selection and promotion process more objective, especially to and above Brigadier, but have had no luck so far. I do hope you get an audience outside the already committed.
All the best,
Shankar
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 9:16 PM, Mohan Guruswamy <mohanguru@gmail.com> wrote:
General, I have received a great many responses from my fauji friends mostly in agreement. Others like SS Menon too have commented (See below). Like I said in the column the impetus for change must come from within the military. The civilian masters don't have the guts or knowledge or vision to contemplate it. Best wishes.
Mohan 6
From: MAJ GEN PRADYOT MALLICK, VSM (VETERAN)1. While I agree with you that ideally the impetus should come from within armed forces, regrettably I don't see it coming.2. Over a period of time mediocrity has been breeding mediocrity. Hard work is no substitute for brilliance. How do we expect the same set of people, risk averse, toe the line, bereft of any intellectual acumen, suddenly lead the change.3. Except possibly of General George Marshall strongly supported by President Roosevelt , all changes had to be put down the throat of armed forces like a bitter pill like The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. USA is now revisiting this act and trying one more reform. See Ash Carter's statement on military reforms.I have extensively written on these in my e mails. Maggie Thatcher also did the same to her armed forces. If you don't agree please quit, simple. Nobody quits. I am afraid this is the only solution.4. Problem is what should be done. This Govt has taken some initiative. Please tell me how come somebody like Lt Gen Shekatkar comes out of nowhere and heads a committee on defence reforms. IDSA is also doing something. These are all piecemeal approaches. Total disconnect between the existing set up of armed forces, their views. It has to be a comprehensive integrated honest approach.5. I have been writing for a long time if the armed forces don't change internally change will be driven by Arnabs, ill informed media and polity with ulterior interest. Last time something was done during Gen Sundarjee's time, started by the hard working Gen KV Krishna Rao. Arun Singh made a thorough analysis and made a report named Committee of Defence Expenditure Report. Answering a RTI Application the MoD shamelessly replies the report is not found! I have recommended Manohar Parrickar to make a trip to the secluded Arun Singh and get some wisdom. I do have a fair idea about the intellectual prowess of the present set up, I am afraid I can't assure of some light at the end of the tunnel, I only see the headlight of an incoming engine. Please tell me how come the present and previous Chiefs and their fiefdom decide there will not be , say no three stars in general cadre from say Artillery. This is the way to run the army. Talent Management in the Army? It is a joke not even worth mentioning.6. On Reorg, Talent Management, Promotion System I have written number of long voluminous emails over the years. I am reproducing only one of them sent in 16 April this year.6. As the Chinese saying goes we are in interesting times. NJOY.
http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in
Whatever happened in the past, it happened for the good; Whatever is happening, is happening for the good; Whatever shall happen in the future, shall happen for the good only. Do not weep for the past, do not worry for the future, concentrate on your present life.
What did you bring at the time of birth, that you have lost? What did you produce, which is destroyed? You didn't bring anything when you were born. Whatever you have, you have received it from the God only while on this earth. Whatever you will give, you will give it to the God. Everyone came in this world empty handed and shall go the same way. Everything belongs to God only.
Whatever belongs to you today, belonged to someone else earlier and shall belong to some one else in future. Change is the law of the universe.
You are an indestructible Soul & not a body. Body is composed of five elements - Earth, Fire, Water, Air and Sky; one day body shall perish in these elements.
Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
Whatever happened in the past, it happened for the good; Whatever is happening, is happening for the good; Whatever shall happen in the future, shall happen for the good only. Do not weep for the past, do not worry for the future, concentrate on your present life.
What did you bring at the time of birth, that you have lost? What did you produce, which is destroyed? You didn't bring anything when you were born. Whatever you have, you have received it from the God only while on this earth. Whatever you will give, you will give it to the God. Everyone came in this world empty handed and shall go the same way. Everything belongs to God only.
Whatever belongs to you today, belonged to someone else earlier and shall belong to some one else in future. Change is the law of the universe.
You are an indestructible Soul & not a body. Body is composed of five elements - Earth, Fire, Water, Air and Sky; one day body shall perish in these elements.
Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
